FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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The Editors.

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FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 19 JULY 1941 No. 4

PACIFISM AND DEMOCRACY

By Julien Benda

IN all countries there are democrats who maintain that a democratic state must, because it is democratic, refuse any kind of war — a war of defense just as much as a war of conquest. Their thesis is that a democracy must abstain from any international action which is liable to cause war. In short, it must be for peace at any price.

Those who take this position do not always say so frankly. They are embarrassed to admit that they refuse even a defensive war. They therefore claim that what is being presented to them as a defensive war is really an offensive war, planned by politicians or industrialists who expect to derive power or profits from having men kill one another. I once asked one of them whether he thought that the Greeks were right to have stood out against Xerxes rather than become his Helots. He did not reply. If he had stuck to his thesis he would have had to answer that they acted wrongly. Not long ago a citizen of a certain great democracy exclaimed: "This policy of our President means that we shall have war, and one out of every four of our sons will be killed." He should have been told that his own policy meant that all four of them risked becoming slaves. Maybe subconsciously he really preferred this prospect; but he probably would not have admitted it, even to himself.

Others are more outspoken. They endorse a slogan which a group of French Socialists adopted a few years ago: "Servitude rather than war!" Or one that we used to hear from certain French intellectuals: "In our eyes *nothing* justifies war." [1] In most cases this position is based simply on a desire to avoid fighting, camouflaged as well as possible under doctrinal reasons.

[1] Manifesto sponsored by Alain and signed by a group of students of the Ecole Normale Supérieure at the time of the Italo-Ethiopian war.

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The desire is normal enough, and especially today when war has become the thing we know it to be and when the whole nation is involved in it. Sometimes, however, the position is based on sincere ideological convictions. Those who adopt it often are veterans of the last war.[2] It is the position of these perfectly sincere people which we shall consider here, particularly the ones who maintain that the theory of peace at any price is an integral part of the definition of democracy.

DEMOCRACY'S "HIGHEST GOOD"

The mistake of thinking that peace at any price has anything to do with democracy comes from a confusion of essential values. It is imagined that democracy's paramount concern is human life, whereas it is human liberty. Human life deprived of liberty is worthless. Therefore the democrat, in order to preserve the advantages of democracy for his children, admits and sanctifies the sacrifice of life.[3] Over and over again in the course of history democracy has proved this to be its supreme law. If our pacifists were consistent, they would have to condemn the French revolutionaries who were willing to shed human blood to win their liberties, and the Americans who preferred war to remaining the servants of George III. As a matter of fact, some of them do. The question is how they can then pretend to be democrats.

They should meditate the words of George Washington, who was not a bad democrat. In his Farewell Address he weighed the advantages, in various circumstances, of neutrality, and did not hesitate to say that "we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel." We shall be told in reply that war has become something very different from what it was in 1796. But the question of principle has not become different.

The mistake also arises from a confusion between the *fact* of war and the *love* of war. Democracy may accept the one and condemn the other. War may be imposed upon men who have no love for it whatsoever.[4] The ideal of democracy is, certainly, to suppress the fact of war. But the effective way to attain this goal

[2] *For example Alain, who was a volunteer in the World War.*

[3] Jean Giono declares distinctly that the supreme value, the only one, is human life. "There is no glory," he says, "in being French. There is only one glory: it is to be alive." ("Jean le Bleu," p. 303.) But Giono makes no pretense of being a democrat.

[4] "What does one condemn in war?" says St. Augustine. "Is it the fact that it kills men who all must some day die? Faint-hearted men may blame war for this, but not religious men. What one condemns in war is the desire to harm, implacable hate, the fury of reprisals, the passion for domination."

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is to hold in check the people who worship war. This entails accepting the fact of war, under the democratic slogan "War on war."

SAVING PEACE AND ESTABLISHING PEACE

There is a distinction, though it is scarcely ever made, between *saving* peace and *establishing* peace. To save peace is to ward off war in some particular moment of great excitement. There is no leading motive, no general idea. To establish peace is to act deliberately to prevent war in accordance with a thought-out plan, in a time when no particular fear of war exists because those who might wish to disturb the peace have been temporarily deprived of the power to do so. At Munich in 1938 the British and French ministers saved peace. We all know that they did not establish it. At Versailles, the victors of 1918 were in a position to establish peace, maybe because four years earlier they had been willing not to save it.

Two profoundly distinct conceptions of peace are here involved. According to one, peace is based on respect for contracts between nations and on sanctions against violators. This is the *legal* conception. The other, the *sentimental* conception, expects love between men to bring about peace, all idea of contracts or sanctions aside. The first conception puts justice before peace, or at least states that it is respect for justice which must bring peace. This is displeasing to the sentimentalists who, naturally, place love above justice. At the time of the Italo-Ethiopian war, the Archbishop of Canterbury startled some persons by declaring that he, a churchman, favored the use of sanctions against the aggressor. When told that sanctions were liable to cause war, he answered: "My ideal is not peace, but justice." He was only repeating the words of his divine Master: "I came not to send peace, but a sword" — *i.e.*, to make war against evil.

A few examples of the purely sentimental conception of peace might help my readers to measure its intellectual worth.

A famous author, I read recently, was visiting in the Engadine. As he stood looking at the landscape he uttered some words which were much admired by the newspaperman who reported them. "Facing so much beauty," he said, "how is it possible not to think that men ought to love and not hate one another!" Laments of this sort seem to me quite childish. Men should be loved when they deserve to be loved, when they show justice

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and loyalty and respect for the rights of others. I am under no compulsion to love them when they violate elementary rules of moral conduct. Instead, I have to protect myself from them — even if, later on, I try to change them. Landscapes have nothing to do with it.

Recalling pleasant memories of his youth, my compatriot Jean Guéhenno writes: "We were twenty years old. It was a serene July and the sun shone over Europe. . . . Our thoughts, like the earth, were ripening. . . . And then, all of a sudden, there was war, because an Austrian Archduke, whose name no one remembers any more, had been killed at Sarajevo." What does all this signify? It may also have been a beautiful morning at Marathon, at Valmy, at Saratoga. Would that have been a reason to give in to Xerxes, to Brunswick, to Burgoyne?

Again, many of my readers probably saw a film depicting the wife of a German peasant who had been killed in the war giving a kind welcome to an escaped French prisoner. She lets him stay in her house several weeks and watches him depart with regret. The film's name, "Grande Illusion," obviously was chosen to show the error of believing that war between nations implies hatred between peoples. But this question is not related to the question whether or not France in 1914 was right to resist the German invasion.

The really significant thing, however, is that many of my readers will be disgusted that, confronted with such touching pictures, I persist in continuing to use my powers of reason.

NOT DEMOCRATS, BUT ANARCHISTS

One of the ways the absolute pacifists have of arguing is to challenge their opponents: "You call yourself a democracy, that is, a government of the people by the people, and yet you send me to war without consulting me, in spite of myself." Thus we find a character in Roger Martin du Gard's book "The Thibaults" declaring that if the French people had been consulted in 1914 eighty percent of them would have rejected war. This statement rests upon the hope — apparently justified, I must admit — that most men, even in most democracies, still have so little political education that, if consulted individually, they will refuse to make the sacrifices necessary for the preservation of the whole. Now it is arguable that no true democracy as yet exists — in the sense of being completely a government of the people

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and by the people. But is not the reason precisely because men find such difficulty in forgetting their individual conveniences in favor of the collective good? If they were consulted separately, how many citizens would offer spontaneously to pay taxes? Yet even "absolute democrats" probably admit that taxes are indispensable for the State.

"Absolute democrats" also contend not only that there should be a referendum on war, but that only those who voted "yes" should then have to go to war. This is a denial of national solidarity. Yet such people certainly accept some of the advantages of national solidarity. If they are civil servants, for example, they want to be paid salaries which some (perhaps many) of their fellow-citizens might, if they were consulted, refuse to grant. If they are interested in art, they might find that many tax-payers, consulted in the same way, would veto appropriations to maintain the museums. The fact is that these intellectuals would be more truthful — or, let us say, more enlightened about their own natures — if instead of pretending to be pure democrats they called themselves pure individualists or pure anarchists.[5]

Another sophistry often is uttered in the name of democracy. It consists in rejecting even a defensive war on the ground that it will require the surrender of full powers to the governing body, and that this surrender will spell "the end of democracy." They forget that among the basic democratic principles it is formally inscribed that in exceptional circumstances a nation may grant full powers to the governing body. During its famous meeting of September 9, 1793, the Convention declared that it accepted the idea of dictatorship for times of crisis. This doctrine meant, of course, that popular control would be suspended only temporarily and that it would be restored as soon as the emergency had passed. "Revolutionary France," says the historian Mathiez, "would never have accepted the dictatorship of the Convention if she had not been convinced that victory was impossible without the suspension of her liberty."

Two occurrences in French history show democracy accepting dictatorial powers because it is necessary, and discarding them as soon as the necessity is past — the rise and fall of Robespierre,

[5] The American States, though always jealous of their autonomy, conferred upon the Federal Government, as early as 1787, the exclusive power to declare war and the right to promulgate the laws necessary for the "common defense."

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and the rise and fall of Clemenceau. The fall of each occurred when victory was at hand and the danger which the dictatorship had been created to repel seemed safely over. I say "seemed" because France was far from being out of danger on November 11, 1918, and it would have been better for the country if the war government had continued for a while longer.

FORCE, BUT FOR JUSTICE

There is still another side to the argument of the "absolute democrats." They say that when democracy resorts to force it denies its essential character and becomes similar to the very systems which it affects to despise. This is a formalist argument. It forgets that one can inquire on whose behalf force is to be used. To use force on behalf of justice is not the same thing as to use it for aggression. This being so, the democratic system which uses force for justice cannot be assimilated to opposite systems which use force for aggression.

There also seems to be a widespread conception that democracy is a sort of celestial body, aloof and, by definition, scornful of mundane necessities of self-defense. This idea, like the total condemnation of force regardless of the purpose for which it is used, plays straight into the hands of those who wish to use force for aggression. It thus becomes itself an agent of immorality.

At the bottom of these erroneous conceptions of democracy we discern what some would call a Christian idea, namely that it is the fit and necessary lot of the righteous to be weak and to suffer. If the righteous ever becomes strong enough to demand justice, apparently he ceases, for this school of thought, to be righteous. If Socrates had resisted his executioners, for example, he would no longer symbolize righteousness. Carry the argument one step further, and it will be the executioners who, having become the victims, incarnate righteousness. This obviously was the sort of feeling which obsessed many persons in 1918, when a violent nation had at last been compelled to cease from violence and listen to reason.

In such matters, democratic doctrine, like the doctrine of one great school of Catholic thought,[6] considers that the righteous are entitled to "the right of the sword" when they use it in a just cause and without regard for personal profit. Democracy

[6] The so-called scholastic doctrine of war, enunciated by Thomas Aquinas. See my "Trahison des Clercs" (edition in English, entitled "The Treason of the Intellectuals," p. 130).

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merely remains true to its dogma when it reminds absolute pacifists that there are angels who go armed; and that because Lohengrin draws his sword and strikes the felon down, he is not thereby any the less Lohengrin and has not become Attila.

Pascal said: "Justice without force is powerless." I should like to add: "It is essential for democracy that justice shall have power so long as there are men determined to ignore it." Contrary to those who pretend that, by very reason of its democratic principle, the democratic State must be deprived of arms, I contend that by very reason of its democratic principle it must be better armed than any other State, in order that it may be respected by States which might otherwise be tempted to ignore justice and strike across its borders.

HOW ABSOLUTE PACIFISM EVADES THE ISSUE

To be consistent, non-resisters must accept the prospect that their country may be annihilated. André Gide wonders: "What would have happened in 1914 if France had offered no resistance to Germany?" Everyone knows what would have happened. When he says that France would have been invincible if she had used only spiritual force against Germany, instead of opposing force to force, he forgets to inform his fellow-citizens that there is nothing incompatible between the "invincibility" which he speaks of and the erasure of their country from the map.[7]

Others go even further and find that non-resistance to evil is a practical doctrine, the only one which will bring peace to the world. Tolstoi in his "Intimate Diary" says that when a wall stands up to blows it causes the aggression to continue, whereas if it gives in it "absorbs the movement" and causes it to stop. By analogy, war would be suppressed if people never resisted any group which was greedy to expand at their expense. Tolstoi omits, however, to tell us that in "absorbing the movement" the wall ceases to exist, that is to say, loses its life, which, oddly enough, it might wish to keep.

NON-INTERVENTION

It is absolutely contrary to the democratic ideal to watch from a distance, without interfering, while a strong nation crushes a

[7] "Journal," p. 1320–1321. The author adds that though Germany "could swallow France, she could not have digested her." There are no grounds for this assertion. Moreover, it is a most cruel experience merely to be swallowed.

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weaker one and deprives it of its liberty. Non-intervention may be forced upon democracies because they happen not to be strong enough to give material help to the nation which is being abused and oppressed. But if they are true to themselves, they must deplore their weakness and inertia. To some extent they must feel disgraced, as a European minister felt disgraced when, in answer to a call for help from a small country whose independence was being threatened, he replied: "*Flere possumus, juvare non.*" To set up non-intervention as a principle, to feel almost proud of it, is to undermine democratic morality. Selfishness may be a necessity. It cannot be a democratic dogma.

A democracy which rejects the idea of intervention usually declares that it has adopted this attitude in order to "save peace." The truth is that its passiveness encourages the aggressor. He not only attacks the state which has appealed in vain for help, but some day he will perpetrate an act which even the laggard democracy cannot condone and which therefore causes war a second time. Thus the war of 1914 was brought on by the inertia of the democratic governments which did not care to interfere with Austria in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1908. A statesman of one of the Central Empires told us in 1920: "It is you who were responsible for the war. You yielded to us for so many years that you led us to think that we could do anything with impunity." It is unnecessary to cite more recent examples.

It is not by accident that those who disturb the peace of the world are almost always the heads of autocratic states. A man who mocks ordinary standards of justice at home sees no reason to act differently abroad. For that reason democracy should be prepared to intervene within a foreign state when its head flagrantly violates the rights of his people. This is what Mr. Herbert Morrison, a member of the British Parliament, meant when he said on November 27, 1939: "We must cling to an ideal of government, whatever its actual form, as something which exists to serve peoples and not to dominate them; and we must remember that this is no mere internal question, since the governments which dominate at home are often the peace-breakers abroad." In the past few years the democracies have usually refrained from this kind of intervention. But their course has not been determined, as some would like to have us believe, out of regard for democratic principle, but simply because democracy has come to worship peace and quiet. So far as I know, there is no

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principle inscribed in its statutes providing for, or excusing, that form of worship.

OF "DEMOCRATIC ANTI-MILITARISM"

Another aspect of the pacifist democracy which we are here discussing is that democrats often display a sort of systematic hostility to their country's military institutions. They haggle over the number of men there ought to be in the army, the number of years they should serve, how much money should be voted to cover their expenses. They claim that this "anti-militaristic" attitude suits the real spirit of democracy.

In a true democracy the military element should be subordinate to the civilian. Once this principle has been established, we need merely see to it that the military machine is powerful enough to perform its tasks and so to enable the democratic State to survive. One looks in vain through the great declarations of democratic principle, in any time or country, for a single text advocating a weak army. There are plenty of statements about the ideal future world in which this kind of institution will no longer be required. But there is no statement that makes weakness a virtue.[8] Once again we find that an idea which never had any connection with democracy has been added to its concept and has falsified it.

We saw in France, a few years ago, what harm the doctrine of peace at any price can do to democracy. Its devotees maintained that the best defense against a neighbor's greed was disarmament. They even went so far as to advocate a general strike in case war came. Recently in several countries the enemies of democracy exploited the doctrine of peace at any price in order to prevent a war which, though necessary for the salvation of the State, menaced the interests of their particular class. In France men of this sort who for years had berated the working class for their pacifism, suddenly found that same pacifism beautiful and called on labor to oppose the war which lay ahead.

Pacifism, in the sense I have described it here, is a parasite on democracy. It has nothing to do with democratic doctrine. Democracy must repudiate it.

[8] In his "Histoire de Belgique" the great historian, Henri Pirenne, shows how systematic anti-militarism made it impossible for Belgium to avoid war in 1914.

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PLANNING FOR VICTORY

By George Fielding Eliot

THE past year has given ample evidence of the grim truth that in the making of total war the totalitarian state enjoys considerable initial advantages over a democratic adversary. These advantages in preparation and initiative have always lain with absolute rulers. The free nation has found compensation in its greater staying power, its ability to retrieve disaster, and its higher morale under defeat. So true has this been, that since the invention of firearms (which made the common foot-soldier superior to the armored knight) there has not been, until last year, any instance of a strong and well-established republic being conquered and enslaved by an absolutist power; while there have been many instances of peoples determined to be free wrenching their freedom by force from tyrants, even well-intrenched ones, or maintaining it against absolutist assault.

Until last year. The date is significant. For just as firearms helped make possible the emancipation of burgher and peasant from feudal slavery, so now it is a question whether the mechanization of warfare — and particularly the development of those weapons of which the internal combustion engine is the heart — has not produced another revolutionary change affecting not only the conduct of war but its political consequences. Has the speed, range and power of the offensive become so great that initial disaster may be made irretrievable? Has the disparity in armament between the victor who has his force intact and the vanquished who has lost his equipment (and may temporarily be deprived of the means of making more) become so great that no amount of higher morale can be relied on gradually to compensate for such disadvantages? It seems quite possible that these things are true. In other words, the tempo of war, like other human activities, may have been so accelerated by the Machine Age as to require a complete recasting of our theories of national defense, of security, of the maintenance of peace and, in general, of the conduct of international relations.

The character of total war carries it outside the purely military field. Totalitarian attack is not only a matter of coördinated assault, at the assailant's selected moment and after full preparation, with forces precisely adapted to the end to be accomplished.

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It is also a matter of political attack from within the ranks of the enemy, of psychological attack on his morale, and of economic attack both from within and without. Indeed, it is by the co-ordination of all these methods, and the coördination, within each category, of every means available without stint and without scruple, that totalitarian war seeks to achieve success.

In principle, there is nothing new in all this. The three great immutable principles of war still stand, indeed are once more proven sound by this seemingly new experience. These principles are: Concentration, Offensive Action, Security. The first demands concentration of power, of means, of effort. The second demands striking at a selected objective with the concentrated force. The third demands that in the meantime no vital interest of the attacker is to be exposed to enemy counter-action. These principles the Germans know, and apply.

They cannot be defeated except by those who in their turn can apply these principles to their own efforts. Simple, static defense is not enough. It serves only to gain time — that is, either to stave off defeat temporarily, or to permit the gathering of force for a counter-offensive. The latter must come, or defeat is certain. If we have not learned that lesson from the centuries of warfare that have gone before, let us at least learn it from the fate of France.

When we seek to apply the above to the conditions immediately facing this nation we must realize that to await the moment selected by the Germans is to court defeat; but we must likewise realize that for us to take the offensive we must prepare offensive means and possess bases from which those means may be employed. This does not necessarily mean a vast A. E. F. for Europe, now or later. The Germans have shown us other ways. It means that we must be prepared to take the offensive not only with armed force, naval and aerial, but in the political, psychological and economic fields. It means that we must seek out the methods of attack suited to our national genius and our available resources. Of these methods, land fighting on a great scale obviously is not at present possible and may never be required. A Germany defeated on all the other fronts — on every one of which we and our associates can establish an unquestionable and decisive superiority — will hardly require to be defeated on land, where her power is greatest now. The foundations of her land power will crumble away; the energies which give her armies life can be

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destroyed at their fountainhead. The Germans have given much thought to military security. They have rightly anticipated that they would not be attacked in other fields (save economically by blockade) very soon. But they are not as secure against these other forms of counter-attack as they may be against a direct invasion of the continent they have enslaved.

II

Above, very briefly set forth, are certain of the ingredients of victory. It is a victory which must be won if freedom is not to perish from the earth. In its winning, America must take the leading part. It is her duty — it is her right. But in order for her to make her full contribution on all the battlefields to which her energies may be called, America is badly in need of leadership, planning and direction. In all these qualities totalitarian Germany has so far been surpassingly efficient. In all of them, then, free men must meet and overmatch her. And they must do it without the sacrifice of the essential freedoms. It can be done.

Yet the record makes clear that no free people will rise to really efficient action unless the danger is overwhelmingly close — when it may be too late — or unless it is roused by a dynamic and realistic leadership. Evidently a free people is not in a position to make full use of its resources, however great, for the coördinated purposes of total war unless there has been careful planning. Evidently a free people cannot conduct total war in all its phases without competent direction, inspired by trustworthy leadership and proceeding according to well-conceived plans. Lacking these, it will be defeated, maybe irretrievably. The task facing the American people is therefore not only to take appropriate action to preserve their way of life, but to create the necessary organs of leadership, planning and direction to make certain that their action is sufficient, timely and in the end victorious.

At present we have no such organs, or possess them only in rudimentary and uncoördinated form. This is not for lack of warning. The subject of planning for defense is not, for example, new to these pages. In this review, and elsewhere, experts like Hanson Baldwin and Lindsay Rogers have again and again pointed out the defects in our peacetime organization and planning machinery.[1]

[1] *Cf.* Lindsay Rogers, "Civilian Control of Military Policy," January 1940, and "National Defense: Plan or Patchwork?" October 1940; and Hanson W. Baldwin, "America Rearms," April 1938, "Our New Long Shadow," April 1939, and "The New American Army," October 1940.

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The present writer has contributed to these warnings from time to time. The discussion may now be narrowed to the immediate requirements of the moment, however, rather than directed to the developement of permanent arrangements.

For the moment, time is the principal factor in all that we do and plan to do. We ought, therefore, to try to create an efficient organization as quickly as possible, and one which can give us the quickest possible results. This suggests that wherever possible we should seek to develop and improve upon the elementary facilities which we already possess rather than to create a whole new fabric from the ground up. Moreover, we are restricted by the absolute necessity of making our war machinery fit within the framework of our existing constitutional structure.

We begin, then, with the broad powers of the President both as chief executive of the Republic and as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. Such additional powers as he may need may be the subject of legislation. Indeed, they have largely been embodied in the draft legislation appended to the Industrial Mobilization Plan and intended to implement it. It is to the President, initially, by virtue of his powers and his responsibilities, that we must look for leadership. But no single man, however wise and gifted, can exercise those powers and discharge those responsibilities without properly organized assistance, advice and information. The same problem on a smaller scale arises in the case of the commander of an army. Where formerly — as in the Civil War — it was considered sufficient to provide such a commander with a few aides (personal staff), plus an administrative staff (adjutant-general, quartermaster-general, and so forth, each member being responsible for a certain phase of administration), the modern requirements and complexities introduced by the increase in the number and type of weapons and the increased speed of movement has necessitated the creation of a general staff, as distinct from the old administrative staff. The function of the general staff is planning, coördination, control — or, more concretely, to provide the commander with the information and estimates necessary to a decision, and then to see to it that the decision is properly executed by all subordinates concerned.

The President now possesses a personal staff (his secretaries and executive assistants) and an administrative staff (his Cabinet). He does not have a general staff, and he needs one badly. But to create one out of whole cloth, composed entirely of people

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who have not previously been dealing with matters of high policy, might be to impose fatal delays while the new men became acquainted with their duties and with all that had been planned, done and proposed before they took over. There is not time for that. Moreover, let us for a moment consider the nature of staffs, or committees (the civilian term for such advisory and executive groups).

It is necessary for members of such bodies, charged with high responsibility, to have relief from the pressure of the infinite details connected with administrative posts. One reason for creating a general staff for the President is to relieve him of such pressure. This will hardly be accomplished by giving him a staff composed of men likewise harried and shackled. The members of such a staff must have time to think, to plan, to foresee and forestall; to examine the record of experience; and, guided by the light of the past, to project their minds into the future. They ought to be as free as possible to devote themselves to broad aspects of policy, leaving detail to competent subordinates under the guidance of general directives laid down by the President. The main task of the staff is to assist him in formulating these directives.

In the last war, no really satisfactory organization for the British cabinet was discovered until Mr. Lloyd George set up his "War Cabinet," in which the Chancellor of the Exchequer alone was the head of an Executive Department, the other four members being "without portfolio."

But there is another side to this conception of a War Cabinet or Presidential General Staff, and that is the very grave dangers which lie in divorcing the planning of policy from responsibility for its execution. In war planning especially, the work of planning must go hand in hand with the actual conduct of operations, for every day unforeseen developments will alter in some degree the plans of yesterday. A staff charged with advising the nation's Commander-in-Chief on plans, on the procurement of resources to meet the needs of those plans, and on the translation of plans into operations, must include some of those responsible for carrying out the plans — just as the board of directors of a corporation customarily includes several of the principal executive officers. In the British War Cabinet, above referred to, the members "without portfolio," though not heads of departments, were each charged with general oversight of, or at least a particular and understood relation to, a definite phase of the activities of the

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British Government — one with military operations, another with supply and procurement, and so on. Moreover, it was the invariable custom to have present at meetings of the War Cabinet the actual heads of departments whose work was under discussion, as well as the chiefs of the fighting services when appropriate.

What is needed, then, is a directing and planning body in the realm of the higher decisions, the members of which will be sufficiently relieved from details to enable them to give most if not all their time to the great tasks of planning and deciding, and at the same time will be sufficiently in touch with what is going on to bring to that work sufficient day-to-day knowledge of the course of events to enable them properly to weigh risks against advantages; moreover, who will have a responsibility, joint and several, for the execution of the decisions reached, sobering in its effect and essential to efficient progress. Probably only a certain amount of experimentation will enable final adjustment between the necessary time to think, on the one hand, and the necessary flow of authority on the other.

Time to think is essential, it cannot be dispensed with. And yet, as Sir Arthur Salter remarks in his "Allied Shipping Control": "Nothing is so ineffective as a committee which consists of persons each of whom has no specialized function and no personal executive authority, and yet tries to direct executive action. But if a number of persons, each of whom has a direct executive authority which he continues to exercise in his own special sphere, meet from time to time in order to dovetail their several measures and adjust them to a common plan, and then return to their departments to put into effect what they have agreed, the committee is an effective instrument of coöperative action." It should, however, be borne in mind that in a War Cabinet or staff such as we are considering, the planning and advisory function is paramount: that is, the joint activity of the whole is of greater importance than the several activities of the members.

In the light of these considerations, let us now see how we may approach the immediate problems at hand, especially how we can adapt to their solution our existing American institutions with as little lost time and waste motion as possible.

III

It is quite plain that the Presidential General Staff — perhaps we had better call it the War Cabinet, and have done — should

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include some members of the existing Cabinet. Those who would almost always have to be present would be the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy and the Treasury. To these four we might add certain new members to be given Cabinet status "without portfolio," but charged each with a special relation to certain essential activities — one for production and procurement, let us say, one for morale, propaganda and civilian defense, and one for economic warfare. This would give a total of seven members, which is about as large a body as can work satisfactorily together. The three members "without portfolio" should of course be citizens of outstanding character, ability and public standing, chosen with a view not only to the efficient discharge of their functions but also with a view to commanding popular confidence. Care should be taken that their supervision of their several specialties should be of a general nature, avoiding the mass of administrative detail which should be the province of the proper executive officers, the heads of the agencies charged with carrying out the policies agreed upon.

As for the four Secretaries, much could be done in the way of reorganizing their departments so that all ordinary routine matters could be handled by the Under-Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries, leaving only the major decisions to be made by the departmental heads. The work of the War Cabinet should be considered the major task of its members, and every endeavor should be made to free them from red tape and detail, while still maintaining the close touch with general departmental activities which is necessary both for effective departmental control and for the essential connection between the executive departments and the War Cabinet.

On the whole, this plan, while admittedly a compromise all round, is at least a promising beginning. Only in actual practice can the many hitches and complications that are certain to develop be eliminated. At least the President would be provided with an advisory and planning staff, directly associated with the execution of policy.

But in order for the War Cabinet to perform its functions its work must be carefully and thoroughly organized. It cannot simply function in the loose fashion of a weekly Cabinet meeting, sometimes held and sometimes not. It should meet daily, at an appointed and regular hour, to consider the vitally important subjects of its agenda. These meetings should normally be under

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the chairmanship of the President; but the President's occasional inability (because of the terrible demands on his time) to meet with the War Cabinet should not prevent any of the daily meetings taking place. The Vice President should be the Vice-Chairman of the War Cabinet, and preside over it in the President's absence. This will also serve the purpose of keeping the Vice President thoroughly in touch with current policies and plans, a matter upon which the safety of the nation might rest in case of the death or disability of the President.

The War Cabinet's meetings ought not, of course, to be confined to its members. No doubt meetings so confined would be necessary; but the ordinary meeting should be attended by others whose work is involved in the particular decisions to be taken. Among those frequently to be present would be the remaining members of the Cabinet, as occasion might render necessary; the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Deputy Chief of Staff (Air), the Chief of Naval Operations; the Director of the Office of Production Management; the Director of Civil Defense; the heads of executive agencies having to do with shipping, economic warfare, morale, propaganda and counter-propaganda, raw materials, and perhaps some others. Care should however be taken to keep attendance to the minimum necessary to the discharge of the day's business, as nothing is more wasteful of time and effort than an excess of numbers participating in discussion.

To see to this, as well as to other problems of routine and work-organization, should be the care of a permanent Secretariat to the War Cabinet. Great care should be taken in the selection of the officer to head this Secretariat, and in its organization. It should be the servant of the War Cabinet and of the President; it should never be permitted to develop into an executive organism itself. Its duties should be to keep up to date, by daily additions, deletions and changes, a Central Estimate of the Situation; to maintain liaison between the War Cabinet, the various sub-committees thereof, the executive departments and agencies, and the Congress; to prepare the agenda of each day's work, under the direction of the War Cabinet; to prepare digested reports and memoranda for use in connection with the work of each day; to prepare and circulate orders and decisions of the President, giving effect to the work of the War Cabinet; and to prepare such reports and memoranda for the use of the President, the War Cabinet, and Congressional organisms as might be required. The Secretariat

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should not of itself have authority to issue directions to executive departments; but it should have direct access to them, and the right to obtain information and assistance from them in the pursuance of its proper duties.

Too much emphasis cannot be laid upon these two matters — the daily meetings, and the permanent Secretariat. They will give the War Cabinet the definite and established character necessary for it to discharge its grave responsibilities successfully.

The War Cabinet in no sense detracts from the President's responsibility or authority. Indeed, it adds to his powers by relieving him of detail, by presenting him with considered and informed advice, and by giving the public the assurance that sound methods are being taken to reach momentous decisions. The guiding principle should be that the War Cabinet advises, the President decides, the executive departments carry out the decisions.

The matter of how the War Cabinet is to secure professional advice in the realm of strategy, as well as in that of production and procurement, and in other fields, demands attention. This was a source of difficulty to the British War Cabinet in the last war. The failure at the Dardanelles, for example, is ascribed in part to the view taken by the professional advisers, naval and military, that once they had expressed their dissent to their civilian superiors and had been overruled, they were bound in loyalty to remain silent when the matter came up for discussion in their presence by the War Cabinet. In the light of this experience, the British principle now lays down that the military advisers of the War Cabinet (or of the Committee of Imperial Defense in time of peace) have the *duty* to make their views known and the *right* to have them recorded. It is hard to see how this principle can be improved upon. The British practice is that the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, the Chief of the Air Staff, and the First Sea Lord (Chief of the Naval Staff) form what is called the Chiefs of Staff Sub-committee of the War Cabinet, and are responsible jointly and severally for giving military advice to the War Cabinet. They are, as one British writer puts it, a sort of "super-chief of staff in commission."

In this country the President has taken a step in the right direction by placing the Joint Board of the Army and Navy under his personal direction. It might be suggested, however, that the Joint Board at present is too large and that it should be reconstituted, to consist only of the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Deputy

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Chief of Staff (Air) and the Chief of Naval Operations. These officers should be invested, while retaining their individual responsibilities, with an additional *joint* responsibility for the giving of military advice to the President and the War Cabinet. It should be a matter of course for them to attend all meetings of the War Cabinet at which military decisions are to be taken. To assist them in carrying out their joint responsibility, and especially for the purpose of producing, under the direction of the Joint Board, coördinated memoranda and reports, there should be a small group of specially selected officers of both services.

This special staff should be quite distinct from the Joint Planning Committee, which should serve directly under the Joint Board and should consist of the Chiefs of the War Plans Divisions of the two services, with such assistants as might be necessary, and probably including a representative of the agency concerned with economic warfare and one of the Office of Production Management. To furnish the information required by the Joint Planning Committee, there should be a Joint Intelligence Committee, consisting of the Intelligence Chiefs of the two services, plus representatives from the State and Justice Departments and the economic warfare agency, also with the necessary assistants. In the matter of procurement and production, the relationship of the Director of the Office of Production Management to the War Cabinet should be much the same as that of the Chiefs of the fighting services.

It seems likely that experience will show the advisability of having much of the "spade work" of the War Cabinet done by sub-committees of one sort and another — groups working together (according to the principle laid down by Sir Arthur Salter, quoted above), composed of people actually dealing with, or having special knowledge of, the particular subjects involved. Whether, as the British found advisable in some cases, members of the War Cabinet should sit as Chairmen of some of the more important of these sub-committees, is a matter for experience to determine. The members of the War Cabinet ought to be protected as far as possible from demands on their time which do not help them directly to carry out their fundamental duties.

The basic advantage of a War Cabinet so constituted is that it would afford the means of coördinating the work of the various executive departments and agencies and of the various joint committees which now seek to effect some degree of coördination. It

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provides for a flow of information upward, and of decision and authority downward. It assures the continuity and consistency of policy. It avoids waste motion and makes real team-work possible. It gives point and direction to the efforts of the Government in such manner that the resulting "indoctrination" is felt by all concerned. This translates itself into public confidence in the efficiency of the Government and its agencies. It prevents conditions such as described recently to this writer by a high official, who said: "There is no national policy. There are departmental policies, conceived within each executive department according to its lights. The trouble is, they are all different."

IV

In the field of leadership, the War Cabinet system provides the President with information and advice, relieves him of detail, and keeps before him a running estimate of the situation, military, economic, political and psychological. He has more time to think, to consider the broad general lines of policy. He has more information on which to base sound decisions. The quality of his leadership cannot fail to be enhanced.

In the field of planning, the War Cabinet system provides machinery for coördinated planning. It brings together the labors of the executive departments and the many sub-committees studying special subjects, introducing into its discussions the clear expositions and analyses from which simple and direct plans can be prepared. It reduces to a minimum the useless dispersion of effort. It avoids waste of the nation's resources in unproductive labors where they are most ruinous, at the top. It insures that first things shall come first.

In the field of direction, the War Cabinet system provides means by which the plans agreed upon, and which have received the approval of the President, may be carried into execution under the supervision of those who have had a share in their making. In this connection, a suggestion made by Lieutenant Colonel Garsia in his admirable book, "A Key to Victory," seems worth-while — that under the War Cabinet there should be a sub-committee for each theater of operations, or each special enterprise. This sub-committee should include a representative of the officer in command, or the person charged with carrying on the enterprise. This sub-committee would have the task of keeping up a daily study of what is being accomplished in its particu-

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lar sphere of attention; of what resources are needed, and will be needed later, for further accomplishment; and to act in some part as an advocate of its campaign or task before the President and War Cabinet, who must weigh these needs and apportion the available resources according to the requirements of the moment. When there are conflicting claims to be settled, *ex parte* decisions ought not to be taken, but the claims of those whose requirements are in conflict should be heard by the President and the War Cabinet, each in the presence of the others.

Such a system of planning and direction involves the "grading" of the various subsidiary plans that will be brought forward; the selection of those plans and methods which seem best suited to accomplishment of the chosen objectives; and the daily prosecution of the war or the accomplishment of the national ends with resources best adapted to the purpose. It serves also to keep the objectives themselves, and the methods chosen to attain them, within the limits imposed by the available means. It puts new ideas to the test of careful and impartial scrutiny, while tending to guard against the rejection of ideas for no other fault than novelty. It tends to eliminate, within the limits of human foresight, the waste and danger that attend hasty changes of plan and improvisations in the face of surprise moves by the enemy.

Two other points with which this article cannot deal directly should be given attention. One is the relation between the executive and the legislative branches of the Government in the conduct of war. At present no less than eight Congressional committees and sub-committees are concerned with national defense: the Military and Naval Affairs Committees of each House, and the subcommittees on Military and Naval Affairs, respectively, of the Appropriations Committees of each House. In addition, the Foreign Relations Committees and probably the Commerce Committees of each House are closely involved in discussions of war policies. There is obvious need for a single Committee of each House on National Defense, to consider not details, but matters affecting the national defense as a whole. It should not take the place of the existing committees, but there should be an arrangement for interlocking memberships in order to save time and eliminate duplication of effort. Finally, there should be set up a system of liaison officers, through whom the War Cabinet and the Executive Departments would maintain close touch with the Congressional Committees.

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The other point requiring consideration is the matter of how best to coöperate with Britain, the British Dominions, the Latin American Republics and other possible allies or associates — the Netherlands and China, for example. The conduct of war by a coalition is a subject which has received little attention and study. Yet in these days, when time is of such vital importance and when the enemy is in a position to take single-handed decisions, a means clearly must be found of offsetting this advantage by equally efficient methods. The War Cabinet plan offers possibilities for arranging a close collaboration with our associates which would be difficult if not impossible to achieve under our present loosely articulated system. This is not the place to go into a detailed discussion of this subject, but its importance can hardly be overemphasized.

Fortunately, certain steps have already been taken in the direction of establishing more efficient machinery for our leadership, planning and direction in war. The President has taken the most important of these steps in setting up the authority for executing the provisions of the Lease-Lend Bill. This authority consists of the Secretaries of State, War, the Navy and the Treasury, and Mr. Harry L. Hopkins. Mr. Hopkins thus represents the Cabinet members "without portfolio" suggested above. He has begun to assemble a group of advisers and liaison officers which could easily become the nucleus of a suitable Secretariat, just as the Lease-Lend Authority itself could easily pass from its present character into that of a true War Cabinet. The ground-work, at least, has been laid.

It is not beyond the genius of the American people to create instruments of government and command which are capable of dealing with anything that totalitarian efficiency can produce. Today the vital need is that all concerned — which means every citizen — should realize the imperative necessity of wasting no time. If we are to defend our way of life we must have not only weapons, but the right weapons; we must have not only armed forces, but armed forces of the size and character the situation demands; we must not only act, but our actions must be timely and effective. We must, in short, provide not only the material ingredients of victory, but the leadership, planning and direction without which victory cannot be achieved. We can do this if we will. There is still time. But the sands are running out.

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LEGISLATURE AND EXECUTIVE IN WARTIME

By Lindsay Rogers

THE more popular a government the greater the disadvantages it faces in preparing for and waging war. Government action must wait on the development of a substantial measure of supporting consent. And the support must come not only from public opinion but from the legislative representatives of that opinion. Effective preparations are hampered and military effort is checked if, instead of joining forces in the face of a common enemy, the executive and the legislature waste their strength in jurisdictional quarrels. An emergency, however, is no time to dispense with or even unduly to subordinate a legislature. It may have to change its activities, but it can play a high, albeit a different, rôle in making a militant representative government more vigorous and effective.

Representative governments have now well-nigh vanished from the continent of Europe. Herr Hitler's Gauleiters have taken their places. Only in Great Britain and the British Dominions, in the United States and in the continent to the south of us, are there governments which are still representative. Only these states, therefore, face problems which involve the relationship of executive and legislature, whether in peace or in war. When, in wartime, these problems are solved, representative governments which at the start have faced disadvantages of disunion and delay develop a resiliency and superiority of spirit which can carry them to victory. That was abundantly demonstrated from 1914 to 1918. And since September 1939 all observers of the House of Commons agree that it has played a not inconsiderable rôle in making Britain's effort as effective and as magnificent as it has become. On the other hand, the failure of the French executive and parliament to subordinate personal and factional quarrels and to give to the country the vigorous leadership it needed was one of the reasons for the French collapse.

In the United States, as I write, relations between the President and Congress are unsatisfactory but they are not yet ominous. So long as the war is a white war — that is, one of threats and propaganda, of economic reprisals and sabotage — the emergency does not seem pressing enough to make a chief executive display

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his best qualities of leadership, to impose on the legislature adequate feelings of responsibility, and, the coördinate branches of the government having reached virtual agreement on essentials, to unify public opinion and energize administrative action.

In ordinary times, when "normalcy" reigns and government can approach — but not very near to — the simple thing that President Harding declared it to be, relations between the executive and the legislature almost always give rise to complaint. If a president tries to lead, he is charged with seeking to be a dictator and with expecting Congress to be a rubber stamp. If he does not wish to do much and Congress flounders, then we complain of the legislative inefficiency which derives from executive inaction. In England and France there have been comparable complaints. During the twenty years between two world wars, the balance in Great Britain (save when two minority labor governments were in office) was decidedly in favor of the cabinet, which in effect legislated subject to the consent of the House of Commons. On the other hand, the normal working of the French parliamentary system was such as to justify the statement that during the eight months of the year when they were in session the chambers administered as well as legislated. The critical publicist will have thought the balance out of line in each country.

But when crisis comes, when action must be speedy and drastic, when a wrong decision may be better than no decision at all, the scales always oscillate violently in the direction of the executive. When fear stalks abroad, as it did in the United States in 1933, Congress is willing, even eager, temporarily to abdicate. That spring Congress passed bills before its members had read them. Just a year ago, after the fall of France, when the President presented a huge defense program, Congress approved the largest appropriations in history without serious question — indeed, without careful scrutiny. When a legislature realizes the necessity of spending huge sums of money rather quickly — on something like defense or relief — it ceases to be a checking body and must let go of the purse-strings. On the other hand, when, as in the case of the Lease-Lend Bill, the decision is on policy and time does not seem to be of the absolute essence, Congress (and rightly so) seeks to be a good deal more than just a rubber stamp.

For the waging of war — even for war preparations — the legislature must grant enormous powers to the executive. Then it becomes the task of the elected representatives of the people to

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watch the possessors of the power and to encourage or tame them. An unsympathetic executive can make this difficult. A legislature is always unhappy in wartime, no matter how much confidence it may have in the executive. For it wants to know more about what is going on than the executive is willing to disclose. It feels that it has experience and ability that are not being used. Only an unbroken succession of victories can prevent or remove fears which may, sooner or later, drive it to critical speech or interfering action which may weaken the national effort.

"I hold it to be our bounden duty, impressed upon us by our position here, to keep an anxious, watchful eye over all the executive agents who are carrying on the war at the direction of the people, whom we represent and whom we are bound to protect in relation to this matter." Thus argued William P. Fessenden in a speech in the Senate on December 9, 1861. Eighty years later, Congress considers itself to have the same "bounden duty." But how can the duty be performed without hampering the executive in his task of direction? How far, indeed, is it proper that the "anxious, watchful eye" of Congress be permitted to scrutinize the President in his use of powers which he possesses apart from statute, under the Constitution which makes him Commander-in-Chief of the Army and the Navy?

No one can make a blueprint for executive-legislative relationships. "The men of Massachusetts," Walter Bagehot declared, "could have worked *any* constitution." Much will always depend on the characters and abilities of the individuals who may be in key places in the two branches of the government. But from the past we can draw suggestions which are pertinent to our present situation. Those drawn from the experience of France and Great Britain do not lose value because there is a difference between parliamentary and presidential government.

II

So long as military matters were the preserve of monarchs and a popularly elected assembly had not gathered power to itself, the problem of legislature and executive in wartime could not arise. Curiously, the first legislative interference with the conduct of military operations was probably the most extreme of all. In August 1793, the French turned to the *levée en masse*. Since France's "mass armies and their warfare were at first in the service of the new bourgeois state, the 'lawful' representatives

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of that state — whether the Legislative Assembly, the Convention or the Directory — sought to maintain civilian control over the Leviathan that they had called into being." Hence Lazare Carnot, as head of the Committee of Public Safety, sent to the front so-called "deputies on mission." As Dr. Alfred Vagts has explained in his "History of Militarism," these deputies controlled the armies "by the summary promotion and demotion of officers and the execution of generals who failed to achieve victory."

That experiment France did not repeat, although in 1915 and 1916 there was greater parliamentary interference with the military authorities than was the case in any of the other states then at war. There were parliamentary delegations to the armies; Deputies and Senators presumed to question and chide commanders and, on their return to Paris, seek for dismissals. Such parliamentary activity was probably annoying rather than harmful. Sometimes the parliamentary interference had beneficial consequences, especially in the case of inquiries which certain commissions made into the adequacy of hospital facilities and the provision of heavy artillery and munitions supplies. Some of the members of these commissions were on terms of intimacy with the President of the Republic, Raymond Poincaré. Successive Cabinets endeavored to keep him in ignorance, and he had grave doubts as to the adequacy of the French industrial effort. To the pages of his well-nigh interminable diary he confided his fears and chronicled the encouragement that he gave to Deputies and Senators in their efforts to speed things up and to bring the Ministry of War to a realization of the seriousness of the situation. Such a combination of pressure by the President of the Republic and parliamentarians in his confidence was on the whole more beneficial than harmful. Half a dozen changes of ministry before Clemenceau began to earn the title "Père de la victoire" showed that Parliament had not abdicated. It was still exerting control, albeit selectively and spasmodically. The fact that the Deputies were in session, debating and prodding, had a good effect on public opinion.

While France was engaged in the present war, however, from September 1939 onwards, the French Parliament did nothing in particular and that not very well. The negligible character of its rôle was the result of a number of different factors. Not the least important was that it had, over the years, permitted itself to be-

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come more and more anaemic in comparison to the executive. The complexity and severity of financial and economic crises had compelled the French Parliament to grant *pleins pouvoirs* to successive Cabinets. It was necessary that the Ministers do much of the legislating; but Parliament should at least have concerned itself with the results. The decrees had to be submitted to the Chambers. Only rarely, however, did objections force withdrawal or modification. This abdication of Parliament as an organ of review and control, and as a critic of the executive, was fatal.

When the war came Parliament could not reassert itself. From September 3 until November 30, 1939, it did not meet. On the latter date it extended M. Daladier's decree powers and provided (in the usual form) that each decree must be submitted within one month for the approval of Parliament if it was in session. At meetings in December the Parliament considered budget matters. Throughout the winter there were no important debates. Unlike the House of Commons, the Chamber of Deputies contained only a few members who could catch the ear of the country by criticisms of the government. These seem not to have felt it a duty to criticize, and if they had the censorship to which Parliament consented would have kept their voices from being heard.[1] A number of parliamentary commissions pretended to be active. They met rather frequently and listened to perfunctory statements from Ministers. But the commissions were futile because they emanated from a Chamber in which the country had little confidence. This time, moreover, there was not in the Elysée a President who, like Poincaré, wanted to be something more than a machine to parade or sign. The Parliament and the commissions had a few secret sessions — an expedient which, as the English have learned, is never reassuring to a nation. The Chamber did drive out Daladier and install Reynaud as Prime Minister. But this was brought about as much through party and personal intrigues as from a parliamentary demand for more effective leadership. It is not strange, therefore, that in the tragic days that marked the end of the Third Republic the Ministers and a few powerful personages who were not Ministers were permitted, or forced, to make the crucial decisions without any Parliament which they could consult. Decisions participated in and approved by Parliament might not have been any better. They could hardly have been worse.

[1] Parliament made no serious effort to force the modification of any of the censorship regulations.

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III

In Great Britain, from 1914 to 1918, Parliament was less effective than its counterpart across the Channel. When the present war began it was incomparably more effective. When in 1915 the munitions shortage became so great as to be a scandal and a serious threat to the British armies in France, exposure took place in the newspapers and not on the floor of the House. In December 1916, when the House turned from Mr. Asquith to Mr. Lloyd George, the parliamentary opposition became even more negligible. Save in a few cases when Mr. Lloyd George clashed with generals who had their friends in the House of Commons, the real criticism of his administration came only from the press. Parliament, through select committees, investigated a few matters, but by and large the Fourth Estate took the place of the elected representatives of the people as the forum where grievances were voiced and where the executive would hear criticism of its acts. Indeed, the Prime Minister was infrequently in the House. He entrusted its leadership to Mr. Bonar Law, the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Mr. Lloyd George attended only when he had some pronouncement to make. His parliamentary utterances became more like Presidential Messages than participations in disputes on policy. He was frank in recognizing this shift of influence to the press; and not unconnected with the recognition was the large number of press lords whom he translated into real Lords with seats in the upper chamber.

In this war the House of Commons has not had to yield to the press as critic of the executive. It has influenced policy; it has forced the correction of abuses; it has spurred executive action; and it has not felt that it was deprived of the knowledge which is essential if action is to be intelligent. British critics are sorry that the House has not been able to do more, but even the most severe of them agree that the House has done much. The daily questioning of ministers has been important. Even Mr. Chamberlain recognized its utility and endeavored to give members greater opportunities. On the whole there has been expert steering between the Scylla of triviality and the Charybdis of demanding information that would be of use to the enemy.

The House forced Mr. Chamberlain's resignation and in effect made Mr. Churchill Prime Minister. It has driven some individual incompetents out of the government and has brought

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about a number of shifts of square pegs to what it was hoped might be square holes. Full powers of legislation have been transferred to the Cabinet, but debates on some of the emergency defense regulations have caused their withdrawal and revision. Policy — strategic, financial, economic, industrial — has been discussed in the open, mostly on the motions for adjournment which permit full debate without requiring the debaters to take sides in a vote.

At secret sessions war ministers have been able to talk more frankly than in public session. But the whole principle underlying a virile legislature is frustrated if it does not meet in public. It must be a sounding board for the wishes and fears of constituents, and the sounds are ineffective if they reach the ears of ministers only in private. The nation is prevented, moreover, from knowing whether ministers have satisfactory explanations for what have seemed to be mistakes, and whether, in criticizing and questioning, the House of Commons is really representing it. But, as Mr. Churchill has said, "There is no reason why we should keep the enemy informed of the details of our arrangements." And he added grimly: "We do not receive similar information from him about his way of life, although, I am sure, our military staffs would be much convenienced thereby."

Under these circumstances, the Select Committee on National Expenditure has done highly important work. Set up in December 1939 "to examine the current expenditure defrayed out of moneys provided by Parliament for the Defence Services, for Civil Defence, and for other services directly connected with the war," the Committee is instructed "to report what, if any, economies consistent with the execution of the policy decided by the Government may be effected therein." The limitation "directly connected with the war" has not prevented the Committee from ranging over nearly the whole field of British administration. At once the Committee determined that they conceived it "to be more their duty to prevent or check waste before it occurs than to conduct inquiries into past events." They would be able to discharge this task better "by discussion and exchange of ideas with the spending departments undertaken concurrently" with the examination of representatives of the departments and scrutiny of their plans, rather "than by recommendations and criticisms in a formal report." Thus the Committee, which consisted of twenty-eight members (later increased), divided into six

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sub-committees among which were allocated all phases of the war effort.

This was a wise decision. Five persons meeting privately with a Minister or Under Secretary are not an inquisitorial body. In April 1940 the Committee reported to the House that "in this field" — that is, "in discussion and exchange of ideas" — their efforts had "already met with definite success." It would be tedious to enumerate all of the matters that the Committee and its sub-committees have inquired into. Each sub-committee has held dozens of sessions and heard scores of witnesses. A coördinating committee composed of the chairmen of the sub-committees seeks to secure an over-all view. Normally a Select Committee of the House of Commons can speak only to the House, but this Select Committee received special permission to address memoranda directly to the Prime Minister. In these it makes suggestions on matters unsuited for public comment.

Nearly a score of reports have been published. The Eleventh Report, filed in August 1940, was comprehensive and enumerated some of the matters in respect of which the Committee had thought that changes of policy or reorganization of administration were essential, and checked them with the actions, if any, that the government had taken. Nearly one hundred Committee proposals were listed, some of them minor but many on matters of great importance. The Departments reported what they had done: "accepted"; "partly accepted"; "under constant study"; "not accepted, but coördinating committee set up"; "implemented with certain exceptions"; "substantially implemented"; "action under consideration by Treasury". The subjects ranged from the purchase of land and the selection of airdrome sites to priorities for sub-manufacturers of machine guns and the best utilization of the available supplies of sugar.

If members of the American Congress read the reports of the Select Committee, they will feel that, in comparison with members of the House of Commons, they are uninformed and uninfluential in respect of the progress of our defense preparations.

IV

Members of our Civil War Congresses, however, were neither uninformed nor uninfluential. In December 1861, Lincoln's radical opponents got Congress to set up a Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War which at times seemed not unmindful of the

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precedent of Carnot's deputies on mission to the armies. Originally proposed to inquire into why battles had been lost, it obtained broader terms of reference. As Senator William P. Fessenden declared, Congress is "not under command of the military of this country. They are under ours as a Congress." The Committee summoned commanders and their subordinates before it and inquired into the political opinions of the generals. Sub-committees visited the battle-fronts. Sessions were in secret, so a witness did not know what had been testified to about him before his appearance. Senators used the testimony in their speeches or gave out driblets to the newspapers.

In 1917 when the Senate sought to amend the Food Control Act to set up a Joint Committee on Expenditures in the Conduct of the War, President Wilson declared that, if accepted, it would "render my task of conducting the war practically impossible." He thought that "the constant supervision of executive action which it contemplates would amount to nothing less than an assumption on the part of the legislative body of the executive work of the administration." And he added that there was "a very ominous precedent in our history which shows how such a supervision would operate." He referred, of course, to the Civil War Committee which, in his view, "was the cause of constant and distressing harassment and rendered Mr. Lincoln's task all but impossible." He went on to say that he was not questioning what might be the motives or the purposes of the members of such a committee. Even if they wished to coöperate in the most patriotic spirit, such coöperation would not be "practicable in the circumstances. The responsibility rests upon the administration. There are abundant existing means of investigation and of the effective enforcement of that responsibility." Mr. Wilson's judgment of the Civil War Committee was probably too severe. His estimate of the "abundant" means that Congress had of holding the executive responsible was certainly optimistic.

For, given the uneasiness in Congress and the unrest among the public, the Civil War Committee was probably inevitable. There is little evidence that President Lincoln was hostile to its creation or, within limits, to its activities. Indeed, Nicolay and Hay spoke of the Committee as "earnest, patriotic and honest." The Committee reported to Congress that "for a long time they were in constant communication with the President and his Cabinet and neglected no opportunity of at once laying before them

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the information acquired by them in the course of their investigations." But after two years relations with the President became acrimonious. Members of the Committee used their positions to seek advantages for their military friends. The commanders regarded the Committee as a Court of Star Chamber or a species of Aulic Council.

On balance, did the Civil War Committee do more harm than good? It is interesting to note that two scholars who have devoted particular attention to the workings of the Committee do not view its efforts or even its excesses so harshly as President Wilson did. Writing shortly after the controversy in 1917, Professor W. W. Pierson thought that the Committee had "brought speed and energy into the conduct of the war; that they ferreted out abuses and put their fingers down heavily upon governmental inefficiency; and that they labored, for a time at least, to preserve a balance and effect a coöperation between the legislative and executive departments." Three years ago, Professor T. Harry Williams, reëxamining the evidence, concluded that if the Committee had been divorced from its unfortunate political bias it "might have performed a very real service. No other body in the country had its unique opportunity to gather information from all fields of the war." In short, the most valid objections to the Committee were to its members and to their behavior, rather than to the device as such.

During the World War, President Wilson's opposition to any Congressional committee was effective. There were one or two special inquiries. The House of Representatives agreed speedily and almost unanimously to the appointment of a special committee to investigate the shipment of defective ammunition. Under Senator Chamberlain, the Senate Military Affairs Committee held a series of hearings and probably did some good, although all too patent were the desires of certain Senators to embarrass the administration rather than to ferret out mistakes and to seek their correction. Again, in May 1918, Wilson successfully opposed a Senate Resolution which would have made the Military Affairs Committee in effect a committee on the conduct of the war. He asked that every supporter of the administration vote against the resolution and added (to the regret of some): "These are serious times and it is absolutely necessary that the lines should be clearly drawn between friends and opponents." He did yield to the general demand for an inquiry into

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aircraft production and appointed a Board under the chairmanship of Charles Evans Hughes, who two years before had been the Republican candidate for the Presidency. With no fanfare of trumpets, that Board went about its task expeditiously, and a reorganization of the aircraft procurement speedily followed.

By and large, however, Congressional scrutiny of the conduct of the war — of what was being done with the billions that were being expended — waited until after the Armistice. Then the Republican House of Representatives elected in November 1918 appointed an investigating committee known as the Graham Committee. It spent half a million dollars in conducting wholesale inquisitions into past demeanors. Such *ex post facto* investigations must stress malfeasance, not nonfeasance and misfeasance. They cannot accept the principle of Fouché: "It was worse than a crime; it was a blunder." The Committee turned up a very small amount of corruption. It did uncover imbecilities that had cost the country millions. But who then cared? The war had been won. Who, now, indeed, recalls what the mistakes were? Legislative control, to be effective, must be concurrent.

V

Unhappily, however, the Congressional system is not well geared for concurrent scrutiny and criticism of executive action. Constitutional arrangements separating legislature and executive give Washington a political climate that is inhospitable to harmonious relationships. When at the outset of his first administration he revived the custom of delivering Presidential Messages in person, Woodrow Wilson told the Congress that he thought it desirable to demonstrate that the President was a person and "not a mere department of the Government hailing Congress from some isolated island of jealous power" — that he was "a human being trying to coöperate with other human beings in a common service." During his first administration President Wilson had a high measure of success in achieving such coöperation. There was never any doubt as to what he desired in the way of legislation, but he worked with, instead of attempting to dictate to, Congressional leaders.

It is only by Presidential frankness with Congressional leaders and by the appearance of Cabinet members or other officials before Congressional Committees that Congress can get the information which the whole House of Commons receives from the

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Prime Minister and his colleagues. Congress does not often debate large policy and the way it is being implemented. Senators and Representatives are hard-working men, but most of their energies are devoted to committee service and within the committees the matters under discussion frequently boil down to technicalities. The machinery of defense preparations is so ramified and uncoordinated that Congress cannot be sure of who does what. On occasion President Roosevelt is unwilling to give a clear lead on important matters — the conscription bill of last summer, for one example, and the pending tax measure for another. Anyone who set out to rewrite Émile Faguet's book, "L'Horreur des Responsabilités," would find pertinent materials in Washington today.

Even though the American executive and legislature are separated, even though the former occupies a special status under the Constitution as Commander-in-Chief, and even though the latter has difficulty in securing an over-all view, the two can and should seek to work harmoniously in a time of crisis. The President could allay a good deal of legislative uneasiness if he conferred on a group of Congressional leaders the rights which Walter Bagehot once declared were the only rights the British Crown possessed: the right to be consulted, the right to encourage and the right to warn. Bagehot added that "a King of great sense and sagacity would want no others; he would find that his having no others would enable him to use these with singular effect." Those are in essence the rights that Mr. Churchill encourages the House of Commons to exercise. He could ignore Parliament. Instead he cultivates it.

Much in the way of collaboration and understanding can be achieved through committees of inquiry. If Senators and Representatives undertook (like members of the Select Committee on National Expenditure in Great Britain) to spend dreary hours quietly examining representatives of the services and other spending officers — who at the outset, at least, might be hostile and uncommunicative — and if they made it clear that the Congressional intention was only to aid and coöperate and not to pillory or to gain personal publicity, they might discover that they were aiding Congress to perform "its bounden duty" more effectively. An executive weakens himself if he neglects "the care and feeding" of his legislature. And a legislature must make its wants known.

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THE ATLANTIC AREA

By Francis Pickens Miller

FOR three centuries Americans have been accustomed to think of their world in continental terms. The land mass of the Western Hemisphere was the New World. Expansion meant moving west and settling land. Political and military control, in so far as it played a rôle in shaping national policy, was limited mainly to land control. The Monroe Doctrine was concerned with continents, not oceans. We wanted European nations to leave us alone, and to leave other parts of the Western Hemisphere alone. We favored freedom of the seas, but we were not interested in ruling the waves; and we did not often stop to notice how much we relied on the naval power of the country which did "rule" the waves to keep them open to our commerce.

This three-hundred-year period in American life has come to an end. It has been terminated by the juxtaposition of several historic events. The land has for the most part been settled. Communications by air and by sea have been revolutionized. And at the very moment when the economic, political and strategic consequences of these developments were becoming apparent, a militaristic Power, through its conquest of the entire European Continent, moved into position to put the Western World into a strait jacket, unless opposed by the full resources of the United States. The combination of these circumstances radically alters the position of the United States and requires a fundamental reëxamination of its world outlook and policy.

The purpose of the adjoining map is to indicate some of the factors to be taken into account when we plan our national policy, under these new circumstances, now and in the years ahead. The focus is no longer on land masses but on air and sea communications. The ocean has ceased to be a barrier and has become a highway for enemy attack. Our coastline is no longer the line of American defense. To paraphrase Nelson, our sea and air frontiers have become the shore-lines and air-lines of our enemies. Our freedom as a nation will depend, in the future, less upon our ability to execute land operations than upon our control of the sea and air approaches across the oceans.

This means that as long as Europe continues to be a source of actual or potential aggression against us, the air and water of the North Atlantic must be controlled by us or by our friends. A glance at the map will show the location of control points in this area. If control over the entire area is to be effective, the controlling forces must be in possession of Greenland, Iceland, the British Isles, Gibraltar, the Azores, Cape Verde Islands, and either Dakar or some nearby point on the West Coast of Africa. From the standpoint of the defense of the United States, these strong-points are our advance bases. Most important of them all, of course, are the British Isles.

The exercise of effective control over this area depends upon joint action by American-British sea and air power, since the armed forces of the United States are not at present strong enough to assume single-handed the responsibility which the British Navy assumed in the past. Joint action presupposes a powerful British Navy and Air Force in being and free to operate from their own

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bases. This obviously would not be the case if England, Scotland and Ireland were occupied by a continental enemy. Hence it is a paramount national interest of the United States to insure the continued and successful defense of the British Isles.

Another glance at the map will indicate what would happen if American-British forces were not able to control the air and water spaces in the eastern half of the North Atlantic. Suppose, for example, that the Germans were to establish themselves in force at Dakar, as they will do eventually — perhaps this summer — if not prevented. Obviously if the United States thereupon attempted to defend the Monroe Doctrine, it would be outflanked before its armed forces could go into action. Squadrons of German bombers could fly overnight from Dakar to Natal. Once established on the South American mainland, the Germans could shortly thereafter make an air attack upon the Panama Canal, with fair chances of hitting their target, assuming of course that they had made the same kind of thorough advance preparation in the countries supplying intermediate bases that they have always made in comparable European circumstances. If the Canal were blocked temporarily as a result of such an attack, the Germans would have a breathing spell within which to organize a series of other operations. That is all they would require in order to be able to move on South America below the bulge.

American-British control of the North Atlantic is essential for strategic reasons. It is equally imperative on other grounds. The North Atlantic area is the cradle of our civilization, and the survival of the American way of life depends upon the survival of this civilization. For more than a thousand years our fathers have been building a common society around the shores of the North Atlantic. They built it by labor, by faith, and, when necessary, by arms. It is a civilization based upon a belief in the essential dignity of man, as expressed through representative government, limited by a Bill of Rights. The Atlantic Ocean has become the ocean of freedom.

As long as control of the North Atlantic remains in our hands, and in the hands of those who share our material and spiritual interests, freedom, both political and economic, will have a chance to reassert itself in the world. If that control is lost we shall lose our freedom. That is the reason why we are beginning to assert control.

Editor's Note: The accompanying insert map of the Atlantic area, prepared for FOREIGN AFFAIRS by William Briesemeister of the American Geographical Society, differs in several respects from more familiar maps on such projections as the Mercator. The projection on which this map is drawn is "oblique," "zenithal" and "equal-area." In the present case, the center of the projection is at latitude 20 degrees N., longitude 30 degrees W. By using this center the cartographer has been able to show the entire north polar area with comparatively little distortion, which would not have been the case if he had used the more usual position directly over the Equator. Because the map is equal-area, linear distances cannot be scaled from it with accuracy. The figures in red refer to distances in statute miles.

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WARFARE IN THE ATLANTIC

By Admiral William V. Pratt

THE sea term blockade can claim as its progenitor an older military term, the word siege. Siege itself is a form of warfare limited both in conception and application. A general campaign which is being conducted along a broad front often passes beyond some strong and obstinately held position or place. An encircling force is left behind to capture the position in question, either by direct assault or, more probably, by preventing all succor in the shape of weapons or supplies from reaching the beleaguered occupants. Hence, unless the place has been evacuated of its civil population, the hardships of siege fall alike upon them and the fighting forces. Previous to the appearance of the concept of total war, the civil population were usually classed as non-combatants. However, siege was not considered an inhumane practice, even though it entailed general starvation. The besieged always had the choice whether to hold out or surrender.

In its first concept blockade was, like siege, a limited form of warfare. Only those ports were considered blockaded which had to seaward of them a sufficient naval force to prevent safe ingress and egress. A ship attempting to run the blockade was a legal capture irrespective of the character of the cargo carried. But even such a ship was not destroyed unless she first refused to stop. Beyond the limits of the immediate blockaded zone, international law prescribed certain definite rules of procedure covering search on the high seas, to determine the character of the cargo carried, its ultimate destination, and whether it consisted in whole or in part of contraband. The ship was never endangered and the lives of those on board were not jeopardized unless she resisted the legal right of search. A ship was not permitted to be destroyed on the high seas unless it was impossible to bring her into port for legal adjudication. In all cases where a ship was destroyed, every provision had to be taken to assure the safety of the personnel. Thus it can be seen that under the guidance of international law the practice of sea war was as humane in its attitude toward persons not actually engaged in combat as any form of war can be.

The first use of the system of total blockade did not originate with sea-minded Britain, nor was World War Number One the first time it was tried. After overrunning the Continent of Europe,

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and finding the invasion of Britain impossible, Napoleon declared the Continental blockade of the British Isles. This meant that no nations under his military influence could trade with England. He hoped thus to bring England to terms, reduce her influence on the Continent, and lessen the sea and financial power which had made her a great thorn in his side ever since the beginning of his career of expansion. Not being able to meet Britain on the seas, Napoleon had to exert military pressure on her as best he could. How like his action then is Hitler's pressure on Britain today! But because Tsar Alexander, who had at first concurred in Napoleon's plan, finally broke away, Napoleon turned on Russia. War with that country resulted in the débâcle before Moscow, which, with the campaign in Spain, was the beginning of the end.

During the last war Britain further extended the principle and practice of blockade, which, as already indicated, was originally designed to prevent contraband, *i.e.* supplies of military value, from reaching the enemy. The "Kirkwall practice," which required neutral ships to put into certain ports for examination, clearance or detention, represented an evolution in this practice. "Visit and search" became different from what it had previously been, and contraband as such ceased to exist. The net result was that blockade, previously intended to hamper the military life of an enemy nation, rapidly developed into an instrument for stopping the arteries of its economic life. In effect, the practice of siege was extended to entire nations, involving combatants and non-combatants alike. While this was going on, the United States remained neutral. By arming its ships it succeeded in evading the old right of visit and search on the high seas. For since the submarine is vulnerable to a single shot in its hull it could not carry on the customary procedure without risk of being sunk.

These practices by the Allies and by the United States led the Germans to establish their own counter-blockade methods — unrestricted submarine warfare. The great distinction which has been drawn between the practices of the Allied and the Central Powers lay here. One gave the choice between life and death; the other did not. This is not the place to discuss the merits or demerits of this phase of the last war. The writer's only purpose is to show that one departure from established law leads to another.

In the last war submarines operated independently, and all were of the seagoing type. The small submarines of the present day were then unknown. The method of attack at first was to

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come to the surface, fire a gun, board the ship, put its crew in boats, place bombs in the hull, and in that way sink it. The advantage of sinking a ship by gunfire and bombs was that this did not waste a torpedo. Later on when all ships were armed the procedure became impossible, and then sinkings were effected by mines and torpedoes.

Convoys were not used until the spring of 1917. Ships continued sailing from various ports all over the world directly to the British Isles and to the Mediterranean. Even when submarine sinkings reached their height, in the spring of 1917, Admiral Jellicoe, First Sea Lord of the Admiralty, was loath to resort to the slow method of convoy, and finally yielded only after much persuasion from Admiral Sims. Before the introduction of convoys the chief protection given shipping was by the patrol system. Coming from ports all over the world, the ships bound for England entered what might be called a funnel-mouth on their way to London and Liverpool. The German submarines naturally operated around this congested spot. The British marked off the danger area into smaller areas, and a light craft, a destroyer if possible, was assigned to patrol each such area. Needless to say, this method of hunting submarines was not effective. The sinkings went on apace, until cut down by the shift to convoys. In distant seas, meanwhile, raiders took their toll of shipping also. But raiding never has been the menace to shipping that submarine warfare is, and never can be.

We adopted the convoy system as soon as we entered the war, though we never did arrive at the point where we could afford to give as efficient protection to cargoes as to troopships. However, our aid eased the strain and greatly helped the Allies protect cargo ships bound for their own ports. We did not try to convoy all our ships. Those capable of making 19 knots or more sailed alone. The convoys were never so large as they are in this war. One of thirty ships was considered very large. Our practice on this side of the ocean was to give Admiral Sims notice of the time and latitude when the convoy would pass longitude 30 degrees W. Command during the passage was vested in a commissioned officer, on board of an auxiliary cruiser or some naval craft. He led the way, gave all the orders, set its courses, and directed when and how the zigzag (the simultaneous change of course of ships in column) should be carried out. As ports on the Irish Coast as well as the French Channel ports were then open to the use of the

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Allies, the problem of protecting ships at sea was infinitely easier than it is today, especially since air attack must now be guarded against in addition to the danger from submarines.

II

Immediately upon the start of the present war the British readopted the convoy system. But the neutrality of the United States left Halifax, Nova Scotia, as practically the only large port on this side of the Atlantic from which Allied convoys could sail. As our aid in the way of supplies increased, a congestion of shipping in Halifax naturally resulted, and this meant that individual convoys became larger than they should be for efficient handling. The British also were forced to include in these big convoys vessels of low speed, which naturally handicapped the faster vessels.

The patrol system was still followed on distant seas, however, as a measure of protection against raiders. But up to the time the *Graf Spee* became active (she was eventually destroyed in the engagement off Montevideo) the raider problem presented no serious difficulties to Britain, at any rate none at all comparable to those in the last war. The British did not have the numbers of small naval craft available for escort duty that they had in the last war. Nevertheless until France fell they could count on the assistance of such French naval craft as were not engaged in convoy work in the Mediterranean. Again, the British Grand Fleet in this war did not have to stand watch and guard over a formidable German High Seas Fleet lurking in the Baltic, and this released many destroyers for escort duty.

The present war of the seas should be divided into two phases — before the fall of France, and after. In the first phase, the Germans had to send their seacraft out from the Baltic or from North Sea ports. In fact, both the British and the Germans started the first phase of the sea war exactly where World War Number One left off. The Germans operated in the North Sea and close around the British Isles, using the individual submarine as the instrument of attack. Improvements had been made in the torpedo in the period between the two wars, but these were mostly in the direction of speed and accuracy of fire. No great change had been made in the weight of charge carried. Nor was this necessary, as it had been proved in the last war that one torpedo was usually enough to sink the ordinary cargo carrier. Both opponents had improved their listening devices, and in their newer and heavier

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naval craft the British had improved their underwater protection.

In the last war the Germans started their submarine offensive against naval vessels. But this time they at once made the merchant ship their main objective. Though they had a great air armada available, they looked on it more as a military than a naval asset. In fact, until they acquired the French bases its naval rôle was only as an adjunct to the submarine.[1] In this first phase of the sea warfare the Germans obtained the use of Norwegian bases, but their submarine campaign was not materially aided thereby. Their air power was still located too far away for it to be able to act efficiently in conjunction with the submarine.

The British reply to the Germans in this phase of the sea warfare was to block off the Straits of Dover, just as they had done in the last war. They also laid a mine field along the entire east coast of Scotland and England, with entrances and exits for Allied merchant shipping passing around Scotland or through the English Channel. As an additional precaution, they erected a balloon barrage to catch night flyers laying magnetic mines in the free seaway along the eastern coast. The west coast ports of Scotland and England remained fairly free for the use of shipping, since the main German submarine concentration was still in the North Sea. The close-in defense instituted by the British, conducted by their own air forces, by small craft such as trawlers and patrol boats, and by such destroyers as could be spared from escort duties, took so high a toll of submarines that the first phase of the sea war went decidedly against the Germans. The British were satisfied that they had the submarine fairly well under control.

III

But the second phase of the sea campaign has caused the British much greater concern. They have had to do without the naval assistance of France, while the Germans have gained that of Italy. Still more serious, control of French bases has enabled the Germans to conduct their submarine campaign from the Atlantic coast instead of the North Sea. Worse still, the Nazi air arm can now coöperate efficiently with the submarine. This is particularly important because the Nazis some time ago put the construction

[1] In conjunction with the submarine campaign, the Germans sprang a surprise with the magnetic mine. A counter for it was soon found, though actual contact with any form of mine always remained a danger.

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of small submarines on a mass basis, with an estimated production rate of around 25 a month. This figure may lead to miscalculations as to the number of submarines actually available. World War estimates of the actual number of submarines in operation proved later to have been too high. And in this war intensive RAF bombing of construction, repair and operating bases undoubtedly reduces the total of submarines which can be used efficiently. In general, only about one-third of the total number of submarines available can be at sea at one time. Crews are under a great strain and craft must be overhauled after any great length of time at sea. Nevertheless, it is a safe assumption that many more German submarines are at large in this war than in the last.

Furthermore, the plan of campaign has been changed. Instead of operating individually, the small submarines now work in groups, probably under the leadership of a larger submarine which is able to maintain radio contact with long-range scouting planes. This arrangement enables the submarines to spot each convoy and plan their attack with great accuracy. In fact, they no longer have to use their own periscopes to detect shipping, but can remain submerged until the time for attack arrives. No system of patrol can cope with submarine attack under such circumstances. The only answer is to increase the number of warships used on convoy duty.

Today the area of most intense danger for British shipping extends from 300 to 700 miles west of Ireland and from Iceland to the English Channel. When the convoys from America enter this zone they are subject to air bombing, which increases in intensity as they approach the British coasts. Possession of French Atlantic bases also enables Nazi submarines and air forces to prey efficiently upon convoys bound from Cape Town and the Mediterranean. In addition, long-range submarines operate well out in the Atlantic, as they did in the last war, to destroy such shipping as they may come upon there. The Nazis also decided, in this second phase of sea war, that the best use they could make of their heavier naval ships was to send them out as commerce raiders. The *Hipper*, *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* have operated in the Atlantic, while other raiders, principally converted merchant ships, have worked in the Indian and Pacific Oceans.

The British have been hampered in dealing with these various onslaughts by the fact that they are constantly threatened with

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invasion, which has made it impossible for them to spare the small craft necessary to perform escort duty at sea properly. The number of such small craft on hand was inadequate in any case. Of these, a large proportion must be kept near home to prevent Nazi troops from crossing the Channel or coming in from Norway. The shortage of small ships used for convoy duty has enabled the German submarines to make attacks by night as well as by day. Indeed, some of the most successful German attacks have been made at night, by submarines operating on the surface.

The British have been further handicapped in convoy operations in the Atlantic by their campaign in the Mediterranean. Troop convoys must always be more heavily escorted than cargo ships, and there have been many troop movements in the Mediterranean, besides movements of supply ships. At all times, too, the main fleet must have its quota of destroyers, cruisers and aircraft. This still further diminishes the number of smaller naval ships available for escort duty. In consequence, a great burden has fallen on the smaller fishing boats and trawlers around the British Isles. They have performed their work nobly. But still the British have found no effective answer to the question of how to provide a greater measure of defense for their Atlantic shipping.

The fact is that what is required is teamwork between air and sea forces, and an increased number of each. The British have been handicapped by not being allowed the use of Irish bases. But even if they were, this would not compensate wholly for the insufficiency of their forces. Only America can supply what is needed now.

IV

The first attitude of the United States towards the war was that we were neutral, but neutral in a limited sense. Thus we gave up freedom of the seas in favor of the cash-and-carry plan. We also joined the other American Republics in establishing a so-called neutrality zone, something hitherto entirely unknown in international law. This zone covered the waters about the coasts of the signatory American states, up to roughly a thousand miles, and included the whole Caribbean. A naval patrol was set up in this zone with the ostensible purpose of preventing any hostilities from taking place within it. The proclamation of the neutrality zone did not succeed in stopping hostilities, and its main purpose turned out to be to secure and make public information about any

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belligerent craft found operating there. This information was probably of more use to the British than to the Nazis. Since the British control the seas, they could use the information to direct the movements of their shipping and to pursue Nazi craft, whereas the only advantage to the Nazis was that the information might help them escape from danger. Our patrols were not empowered either in law or by executive order to drive enemy warcraft out of the neutrality zone.

Let us get some definitions straight. The term convoy is applied to a group of ships unable to defend themselves against attack and therefore in need of a protecting escort. The escort is responsible for its charge, the convoy, and must do its utmost to defend it. Hence the provision of an escort, though not an act of war, is an indication that the escorting ships intend to defend their charges even if this leads to fighting. But the escorting ships never fire the first shot unless they belong to a belligerent nation or are clearly within their rights in defending their own property within a sea area which their nation can claim as its own — nominally, under the old rule of international law, the three-mile zone. The duties of patrols are various, depending on the instructions received. Their duties may merge into those of an escort; or they may lead them to range very widely over the seas. Patrols may be either non-belligerent or belligerent. When used by a non-belligerent the supposition is that they will not undertake any belligerent act. When used by a belligerent, however, it naturally is supposed that they will fight whenever they encounter an enemy.

Though the present total war has smashed many old precedents and rules it may have the effect of bringing new ones into force. The Americas took a first step in the declaration of a neutrality zone at sea. Our recent extension of the area under patrol to a thousand or more miles from our shores is a second step. Patrol within such a far-flung area can never have the same decisive results as escort. Yet it does have the effect of broadening the area in which the ships and planes of a non-belligerent, in the present case the United States, can receive and impart information of military importance. Even though such devices may not in the end prove to have affected decisively the course of the present war, they are interesting harbingers of a new order of international law more competent than the old to cope with the problems raised by modern total war.

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NARKOMINDEL AND COMINTERN

Instruments of World Revolution

By Bruce C. Hopper

THE goal of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is a World Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics, to be established through the strategy and tactics of world revolution. Historically, the strategy has been divided into three phases, depending on current and immediate objectives. From 1903 to the March revolution in 1917, the immediate objective was the overthrow of Tsarism. In the second phase, from March to November 1917, it was the overthrow of imperialism in Russia and withdrawal from the "imperialist" war. In the third phase, after the November revolution, it was to consolidate the dictatorship in one country, where it could be used as a fulcrum to overthrow imperialism in all countries and open the epoch of world revolution. In this strategy the chief reserves of the revolutionary army are considered to be the masses in highly industrialized countries and the native populations in colonial and dependent lands. Throughout any one phase the strategy remains fairly constant in its principles; it changes only as the revolution moves from one phase to the next. Tactics, on the other hand, change repeatedly within any given phase, according to whether the revolutionary tide is ebbing or flowing, advancing or receding.

The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. is dominated by considerations of practical politics. It knows how to change its tactics of world revolution both to fit the internal problems of Russia as well as to meet the changing pressures exerted first from one side, then from another, in the shifting constellation of world Powers. Its instruments in conducting its external relations are two — the Narkomindel (Foreign Office), used to maintain formal relations with other states and to promote peace during the period of building Socialism in Russia; and the Comintern (Communist International), used to promote class war everywhere outside Russia, to convert imperialist war into civil war, and to further the cause of world revolution.

The conflicts of policy between the Narkomindel and the Comintern at any given moment can be explained by shifts in the incidence of their use in the general scheme of strategy and tactics.

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The goal, however, remains unaltered. By using the Narkomindel to placate other governments, and the Comintern to promote the overthrow of the same governments, the Bolsheviks were able over the years to create for themselves a position of special privilege in world politics, in which the right hand could deny responsibility for the left. They captured the interest and support not only of the instinctive revolutionaries around the world, but of a great number of idealistic liberals who observed the actions of the Narkomindel but ignored those of the Comintern. Herein lies the prevailing confusion regarding Soviet foreign policies.

The zigzag course of Bolshevik strategy and tactics is illustrated in the four major reorientations which the Soviet Government has executed in its relations with other states.

THE TACTIC OF WORLD REVOLUTION, 1917–1921

When the Bolsheviks proclaimed their peace decree on November 8, 1917 — no annexations, no indemnities, and self-determination — they fully expected the "imperialist" war to be converted into a series of civil wars which would be the prelude to world revolution. Thus in defending his decision to accept the Brest-Litovsk peace with Germany on March 3, 1918, Lenin wrote: "By concluding a separate peace, we free ourselves as far as is possible at the present moment from both the contending imperialist groups, turning their mutual hostilities to our own account, taking advantage of the state of warfare between them which prevents their joining forces against us, thus freeing ourselves for a time so we can further and consolidate the Socialist revolution."

What was not expected was that the attempts of the Allies to reëstablish the eastern front, and to prevent German exploitation of Russian resources, would develop into military intervention against the Bolsheviks, civil war, and the *cordon sanitaire*. Instead of being allowed to lead a world revolution, the Bolsheviks were barred from the Paris Peace Conference. Nevertheless, they claim the credit for inciting the revolution which accompanied Germany's military collapse in the West. The revolution hung fire in Central Europe for two years. Bela Kun's Soviet Republic in Hungary was smashed by White reaction. The revolutionary tide reached its climax with the defeat of the Red Army at the gates of Warsaw in 1920. Projects for revolution in Turkey, Persia and elsewhere in the East, which had been launched at the Baku

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Congress of the Peoples of the East in 1920, were destined to be held in abeyance by a shift in tactics.

The first instrument for world revolution was the Bureau of International Revolutionary Propaganda, which was set up in Moscow under three Americans, Boris Reinstein, Albert Rhys Williams and John Reed. After the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, the Narkomindel became for a time the chief disseminator of propaganda, and Chicherin, as Commissar for Foreign Relations, asserted in July 1918 that assistance to outside proletarian movements was a recognized function of revolutionary diplomacy. Accordingly, tons of revolutionary literature were distributed, especially among the million German soldiers occupying the Ukraine.

However, these activities were eventually taken over from the Narkomindel by the Comintern, created by Lenin in March 1919 to build a backfire against the interventionist states and to wean the masses of the world away from their support of the Second (Socialist) International. The Comintern consists of professional revolutionists organized into national sections, and is controlled by an Executive Committee which dictates the resolutions and theses of each Comintern Congress. It is in turn controlled by the Communist Party of Russia. The directives for action originate in the Russian section, and are forwarded by the Executive Committee of the Comintern to the national sections, or local Communist parties, in all countries. Internationalization of the revolution was to be achieved by a combination of two elements: the militant violence of professional revolutionaries and the doctrinaire aspirations of the Socialists. Part of the program, therefore, was to capture leadership of the entire Socialist world. Hence the subsequent alternations in policy between efforts toward a United Front with the Second International, and equally strenuous periods of active hostility inspired by hatred of that organization.

Between 1917 and 1921, to use Stalin's words, the revolutionary tide was flowing. As the Bolsheviks were in quarantine behind the *cordon sanitaire* there was no pronounced conflict between the Narkomindel and the Comintern. The Narkomindel negotiated peace with the Baltic limitrophe states and Poland in 1920, but refused to recognize Rumania's acquisition of Bessarabia. A dummy, the Far Eastern Republic, with its capital at Chita, was set up to serve as a buffer against Japan. But toward the end of the period the tide of revolution began to recede. Foreign intervention in Russia was ended, but Russia proper was

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devastated by civil war and weakened by famine and epidemics. Wartime Communism had brought the economic life of the country almost to a standstill. A change of policy was in order.

FIRST MAJOR SHIFT: THE TACTIC OF TRUCE WITH CAPITALISM, 1921–1927

Lenin launched the New Economic Policy of 1921 in order to restore economic life through private enterprise, and to invite foreign investments in the form of concessions. Money was restored, industry was decentralized, and labor was granted freedom of contract. The Narkomindel was instructed to work out a *modus vivendi* with capitalist states and to subscribe in part to the accepted rules of international law. In 1923 the Soviet Union was formed. Property rights in concessions having been assured, the major Powers — with the notable exception of the United States — recognized it the following year.

Of special importance were Soviet relations with Weimar Germany. The rapprochement of the two nations, both outcasts from the family of nations, was cemented by the Treaty of Rapallo in 1922. This was the start of close economic and military collaboration. Their Treaty of Commerce, signed in 1925, was presumed to serve as a working model for subsequent arrangements between the capitalist and Socialist camps. By signing the Locarno treaty in 1925, and negotiating for entry into the League in 1926, Germany seemed to reorient her policy in favor of the Western Powers. But she immediately propitiated the Bolsheviks with the 1926 Treaty of Amity, by which Russia was assured that German soil would not serve for passage of a League army in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant. Meanwhile, the Russians had supported Turkey in replacing the Treaty of Sèvres by the Treaty of Lausanne, in 1923. The murder of the chief delegate to that conference, by a White Russian, caused the Bolsheviks to refuse all subsequent invitations to Switzerland until the Swiss had made reparations. Adjustment of the dispute was made by the Germans, and Litvinov officially appeared at Geneva for the first time in 1927 as a delegate to the Preparatory Disarmament Commission. Russia likewise made a series of non-aggression treaties with her immediate neighbors. Germany aided Russia to emerge from the quarantine, and at the same time used her as a club to shake in the direction of Britain and France.

While the rôle of Narkomindel thus changed radically in this

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period, that of the Comintern continued as before. Until Lenin's serious illness in 1922 he continued to serve as coördinator between the two. The Comintern policy was presumed to be promotion of the United Front with the Social Democrats. And yet Stalin, in his first declaration on international affairs (Imprecorr, October 9, 1924), said: "The workers are moving to revolution. Pacifists and democrats alike deceive the masses. Social democracy is the moderate wing of Fascism." And again: "The Fascists are certainly not sleeping, but it is to our advantage for them to attack first; that will attract the whole working class to the Communists. Moreover, all our information indicates that Fascism is weak in Germany. In my opinion we should restrain and not incite the Germans."

The contradiction between a United Front with the Social Democrats and opposition to them as the "moderate wing of Fascism" may account for the fact that the Comintern first ordered a revolution in Germany in 1923 and then abandoned it. Certainly Stalin's assumption that Fascism was weak in Germany had much to do with the subsequent Comintern policy to destroy social democracy there and allow the Nazis to seize power, in the belief that the Communists would succeed them in a brief time. The chief enemy of the period was considered to be Great Britain. There was the incident of the Zinoviev letter, the continuous Curzon-Bolshevik quarrel over conflicting interests in the Middle East, and finally the British general strike in 1926 which the Communists tried to capture for their own ends.

In 1925 Stalin conceded that capitalism had entered a period of temporary stabilization, and that the revolutionary tide again was ebbing. It was then that the Comintern became active in China. The Canton-Moscow Entente (1924–27) ushered in the expedition north, and ended in the expulsion of the Bolshevik advisers and the mass execution of Chinese Communists. In this period Comintern interference with the Narkomindel resulted in the breaking off, in 1927, of diplomatic relations between Russia and Britain and between Russia and China.

Within the Party the feud between Stalin and Trotsky for control of the direction of the revolution reached a climax in November 1927. Trotsky was expelled. Besides conceding that capitalism had been stabilized, and that the revolutionary tide had receded, the Bolshevik leaders realized that economic life had been restored in Russia largely through private enterprise, and that

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major efforts would be needed to divert the Soviet system back to the Socialist rails. Plans for a gigantic and rapid industrialization of the country had been maturing for some years. To make them effective required another major change in policy. It was undertaken in 1928.

SECOND MAJOR SHIFT: "PEACEFUL COËXISTENCE WITH CAPITALIST STATES," 1928–1934

The new internal policy was called Socialist Offensive on All Fronts. Stalin's victory over Trotsky, the victory of "Socialism in one country alone" over "permanent revolution," was equivalent to the temporary renunciation of world revolution. To industrialize a huge country so backward in technique, and at the same time to force through the measures necessary for socialization, required above all a policy of peace. The Narkomindel was instructed to work out "peaceful coëxistence and friendly collaboration with capitalist countries." The avowed purpose was to obtain credits abroad and foreign technicians to aid in the socialist reconstruction of Russia by means of a series of Five Year Plans. Under the momentum of the Socialist offensive, the Soviet system weathered the economic depression beginning in 1929 better than most capitalist states. As one writer phrases it, "The Bolsheviks stole three years from history." At the end of the first Five Year Plan Socialism was pronounced "victorious." Russia was said to have built up the industrial bases of military defense and to have become independent in matters of foreign trade.

As Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Litvinov negotiated another series of non-aggression pacts, and demanded total disarmament at Geneva. At the London Economic Conference in 1933 he seemed to be the one constructive statesman present. Recognition of the Soviet Union by the United States followed. Bolshevism seemed to have become respectable.

The Comintern, in this period, was relatively quiet. The fear of capitalist intervention and encirclement nevertheless evoked a call to workers everywhere to "defend the Socialist fatherland." And in Germany the Comintern worked on lines parallel to those followed by the Nazis, thus hastening the arrival of the Nazis in power. To this extent it was in direct conflict with the Narkomindel policy of close economic relations with the social democracy of Germany.

The Bolsheviks did not have any illusions regarding the war

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purposes of the Nazis. At the 17th Party Congress, in January 1934, Stalin said that, "War will certainly unleash revolution, and will challenge the very existence of capitalism in a number of states." In the confused tactics that followed, Stalin's special concern was to see that the expected conflict between the Nazis and the Western Powers would not be converted into a general crusade against Soviet Russia. Hitler's rise to power, his persecution of Communists as well as Jews, and the reiterated Nazi intention of marching one day to the Ukraine and the Urals, necessitated another change in Bolshevik policy. Having built an industrial base for military defense, the Bolsheviks, for the first time, felt strong enough to participate in the balance of power politics of Western Europe.

THIRD MAJOR SHIFT: THE TACTIC OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY AGAINST FASCISM, 1934–1939

As the first gambit in the new tactic the Narkomindel was instructed to negotiate Russia's entry into the League of Nations. The treaties of mutual assistance with France and Czechoslovakia were made the year following, 1935. These were part of Barthou's scheme for an Eastern Locarno. It was Germany and Poland that held back. Russia had in effect shifted from the revisionist to the *status quo* group of Powers, and had become a stalwart pillar of collective security. Litvinov was an ardent supporter of the sanctions against Italy, and he also championed Turkey in legalizing remilitarization of the Straits at the Montreux Convention in 1936. His speeches at Geneva were perhaps the most eloquent and convincing of any ever delivered in the cause of collective security. The failure of his policies, however, became apparent at the time of Munich. The Russians were excluded from the negotiations and from the conference.

The Comintern swung into action on the new tactic at its 7th Congress, held in 1935. On that occasion it passed a resolution ordering national sections everywhere to coöperate with all groups opposed to Fascism and war. This resolution was the basis for the *Front Populaire*, which brought the Blum Government to power in France and proved to be the spark for the civil war in Spain. In France the conflicts between capital and labor led ultimately to the ruin and downfall of the French Republic. Everywhere Communist parties were instructed to campaign for support for the "Socialist fatherland," using the thesis of the so-

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called Peoples' Anti-Fascist Front. In speaking to the 18th Party Congress, in March 1939, Manuilsky, a member of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, reported that membership in Communist parties in capitalist countries had increased in the previous five years from 860,000 to 1,200,000 (the figure in the United States grew from 20,000 to 90,000), and in the Young Communist International and affiliates from 110,000 to 746,000. This made a revolutionary army abroad of nearly two millions.

Mystery still surrounds the duel between Hitler and Stalin in this period. Whatever the validity of the treason charges against older Bolsheviks like Bukharin and Rykov and against Marshal Tukhachevsky, and whatever the factor of Stalin's thrust for personal power, the immediate result was that the Old Bolsheviks were destroyed, the Red Army was decapitated, and a ruthless purge spread out through the Soviet rank and file in what seemed to be a colossal process of self-devourment. At the end Stalin became supreme dictator. But Russia, equipped with a new constitution called economic democracy, was for the time being incapacitated for war. This weakened condition at the moment of the final failure of collective security, combined with the encirclement of Soviet Russia by openly hostile Germany and Japan, made a new tactic inevitable.

FOURTH MAJOR SHIFT: THE TACTIC OF NEUTRALITY TO BREAK ENCIRCLEMENT, 1939–1941

Moscow was ominously silent during and after Munich. It is not yet known definitely whether the Bolsheviks would have joined in aid to Czechoslovakia in fulfillment of the 1935 pledge to follow the lead of France. But of this much students of Soviet foreign policy were sure — that the Bolsheviks were likely to take Homeric retaliation for their exclusion from the Munich negotiations. And not merely did the British and French abandon collective security themselves; their spokesmen did not deny the general expectation that as a result of the Munich Agreement the Nazis would be diverted eastward into Russia. At this moment the Bolsheviks were confronted on one side with the threat of a German *Drang nach Osten* and on the other with the threat of a Japanese invasion.[1]

Stalin's first public utterance after Munich, in January 1939,

[1] The Anti-Comintern Pact had been signed by Germany and Japan in November 1936, and joined by Italy a year later.

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showed by its acceptance of the Nazi seizure of the Sudetenland how the wind was blowing. Then came the seizure of Prague on March 15, 1939, which transferred equipment for forty divisions to the German side, a net gain for the Germans equivalent to eighty divisions. This changed the whole military balance of Europe. Stalin now spoke again, and even more leniently of the Nazis. Despite these warnings the Allied Governments in April gave guarantees to Poland and Rumania without consulting Moscow. Litvinov's resignation in early May should have given conclusive warning of a pending change in Soviet policy. Nevertheless, the Allies sent diplomatic and military missions to Moscow to enlist Bolshevik support. These missions utterly failed because they had no blue chips. Poland refused to entertain the idea of allowing the Red Army to cross Polish soil for the purpose of defending Poland against Germany. And the Allies refused to sanction a Russian guarantee of the Baltic states against the will of those states.

It was then that Stalin cast the die. In plans that had been maturing for months, he accepted the Nazi offer to share in the spoils in return for remaining neutral during the invasion of Poland. The pact was signed August 23, 1939. Molotov, who had succeeded Litvinov as Commissar for Foreign Affairs, was likewise a member of the Politbureau of the party. The policy of the Narkomindel and the Comintern had again become coördinated.

This action, which shifted Russia from the *status quo* camp back to the revisionist camp and ushered in the Second World War, had been heralded in the discussions of the Comintern. Manuilsky, in the speech quoted above, declared that Britain was the real enemy of the revolution. He said that she intended to sacrifice the small states, divert the Nazi push southeastward to Russia, partition China, and make a Munich peace in the Far East. The action likewise put the Soviet system back on the track to world revolution. The Comintern changed tactics in accordance with the new policy — expansion for defense of the "Socialist fatherland" through coöperation with the various national sections of the Comintern. Eastern Poland was occupied by the Red Army, under the partition agreement with the Nazis. The process failed in Finland because the Finnish army prevented contact with the local Communists. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania the process worked smoothly, beginning with treaties of mutual assistance and the acquisition of rights to naval and air bases in September

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and October 1939, and ending with annexation in June 1940, after the fall of France. Bessarabia and North Bukovina were acquired in July 1940 through old-fashioned power politics. Thus as a result of the Bolshevik-Nazi deal, the Comintern became an instrument for territorial expansion of the "Socialist fatherland."

Meanwhile the fellow travellers abroad, whose ideals had been outraged, began to drop off the revolutionary train. But not the professional revolutionists who compose the vast majority of the national sections of the Comintern. Their difficulty was simply to keep abreast of the "party line." In Britain, the Communist Party continued a pro-war policy until after the conquest of Poland. Then it turned defeatist, with a policy emulating that of Lenin in 1914: "Let the people of each country concentrate their attack on 'their own' government. The result will be, not the victory of one side or the other, but general international revolution and a Socialist peace." In New York, the *Daily Worker* continued its anti-Nazi attacks until the Red Army invaded Poland. Then it shifted to neutrality. After the partition accord it brought out a front page editorial entitled "Stop This Imperialist War!" Since that time no forthright anti-Fascist articles have appeared in any of the Communist papers abroad. And just as the German Communist Party worked in conjunction with the Nazis to bring about the downfall of the Weimar Republic, so the French Communist Party in 1939–1940 undermined the Daladier and Reynaud Governments in the hour of France's greatest peril, helping pave the way for the Nazi destruction of the French Republic itself. Just before May Day this year, to cap the climax, the Comintern issued from Moscow an appeal to "workers and people of capitalist countries to unite their efforts for a struggle against capitalism-breeding wars."

This revolutionary defeatism would seem to deny any assumption that the Bolsheviks would like to see the war continue to the point of exhaustion of both sides. But for the purpose of uniting workers of the world on behalf of a "Socialist peace" it is the same tactic employed by Lenin during the World War — the tactic of world revolution.

Having temporarily broken the threat of encirclement in the West, and having redivided Eastern Europe with the Nazis, Stalin next sought to accomplish a similar result in the Far East. For two decades Russia and Japan have been moving towards a collision in Asia. From the moment of Japan's conquest of Man-

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churia in 1931, until the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936, Russia consistently sought a non-aggression pact. But the Bolshevik price had gone up. Finally the Soviet-Japanese Treaty of Neutrality, signed April 13, 1941, indicated that both parties agreed on the need to come to an arrangement. Whether or not the Nazis exerted pressure on both sides to make the agreement, it obviously was to their advantage that Japan should be free to engage the attention of the United States in the Western Pacific and thus divert American attention from the job of aiding Britain.

Under the strain of war in China, Japan had taken a definite plunge toward totalitarianism by dissolving political parties and trade unions in the summer of 1940. The Bolsheviks, thus encircled not by capitalism but by totalitarianism, have ample reason to fear that in a long war of attrition the Nazis will be compelled to seek oil and fats in Russia. They see that the real objective of the Nazi Balkan campaign might be the Ukraine, in order to gain control of the lower Volga, capture the oil wells of Baku and Grozny, and exploit the Ukrainian share of the Soviet Union's 30 million pigs. The longer the war lasts the greater the certainty that all the belligerents will be exhausted, thus insuring the progress of world revolution. But the likelihood also increases that the Nazis will demand the right to exploit Russian oil and fats, with or without Bolshevik consent. In these circumstances the decision of the Bolsheviks to abandon the risk of collision with Japan is as understandable as is Japan's decision to eliminate the risk of war with Russia in view of America's increasing preparations for war.

The Bolshevik gains from the pact with Japan are, on paper: neutralization of Japan in the event of a Nazi invasion of the Ukraine; recognition of Soviet control over Outer Mongolia; and freedom to move part of the Far Eastern military establishment back to the Western frontier. The latter might also imply freedom to take over Northern Iran, and otherwise to protect Soviet interests in the Middle East should the field of major hostilities extend to that area via Turkey or Syria.

The Japanese gains, on paper, are: escape from the obligation, implied in the alliance with Axis, to attack Russia in the event of a Nazi invasion of the Ukraine; neutralization of Russia if Japan engages in hostilities with Britain and the United States; recognition of Manchukuo; and freedom to move troops from the Russian frontier to Indo-China or other points south.

If there are secret clauses in the treaty we may presume that

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they take care of Russia's need for effective use of the former Chinese Eastern Railway as the short-cut to Vladivostok, and include an arrangement regarding Northern Manchuria, Southern Sakhalin, and even the Kurile Islands. It likewise may be presumed that Japan demanded that Russia cease giving supplies to Free China; but Moscow has denied making any such concession.

While as many ways can be found to interpret this treaty as being as much against the Axis as in favor of the Axis, it marks a new Bolshevik reorientation which contains certain long-range possibilities definitely unfavorable to Britain and the United States. Japan, Italy, Germany and Russia have joined in breaking down the international order, and have shared in the division of the spoils. While offering different versions of a "New Order," they have made common cause against the remaining democracies. They want to keep their spoils. They do not intend to disgorge them at some peace conference called by victorious democracies. If, rather than go to war, the Bolsheviks consent to let Nazi Germany exploit their oil and fats, then there might emerge the equivalent of a Eurasian bloc running from the North Sea to the Pacific, and down the Pacific coast to Saïgon, for the purpose of smashing the British Empire. Such a Eurasian bloc could probably withstand attrition from without for an indefinite period. The situation is further complicated by the revival of the split between the Kuomintang and the Communists in China. Should that chasm widen, not only would the united front of Chinese resistance to Japan be broken, but there might develop a Chinese tendency to break into three parts: (1) North China to south of the Yangtze, including the seaports, under the domination of Japan; (2) Northwest China, under the domination of Soviet Russia; (3) West and Southwest China, under the Kuomintang, and supported by Britain and America. Such a partitionment of China would be a prelude to civil war and social revolution.

As the war crisis deepens, social revolution becomes an increasing threat in Japan also. Her position today is not unlike that of Tsarist Russia in 1916, with war expenditures overtaxing the capacities of the treasury and social forces boiling up from below. Temporary relief from a desperate situation might be found in the full exploitation of Indo-China and of the oil and mineral resources of Southeast Asia. The ultimate victor in a long war of attrition might then well prove to be the Comintern. This is a vital point. Though revolution holds the field today both in Con-

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tinental Europe and Asia, it as yet is only a *cauchemar* in a world sense. But the specter can be dispelled only by British victory or by a breakdown of the Bolshevik as well as the Nazi régime.

DEDUCTIONS

Let us try to make a few deductions. The Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. has never abandoned, and is not likely to abandon, its goal of world revolution and a World Federation of Soviet Socialist Republics. The various reversals in direction of Soviet foreign policy are merely moves in the basic strategy to that end. The shifts are determined by the internal problems of Russia (industrialization, socialization, periodic purges, etc.); by shifting values and pressures in the constellation of Powers; and by the flow and ebb of the revolutionary tide throughout the world. On occasions the Bolsheviks have been unable to distinguish a flow from an ebb (*e.g.*, in Germany in 1923). At other times they have allowed their two instruments for the conduct of external relations to work at cross purposes.

Before 1921 the Narkomindel and the Comintern were coördinated in the tactic of world revolution to defeat the Allied intervention and to break the *cordon sanitaire*. Between 1921 and 1939 they were often in conflict. The Narkomindel promoted the official peace policies of truce with capitalism, peaceful coexistence with capitalist states, and collective security against Fascism. The Comintern meanwhile played a secondary rôle, although it was active at times in the internal politics of Great Britain, China, Germany, Spain and France. Since 1939 the Narkomindel and the Comintern have again been coördinated in pursuing the tactic of neutrality, the while Fascism carries out its world-wide assault on democracy.

Faced with such a record we recoil from any attempt to predict exactly what the next Bolshevik tactic will be. But we may note that the world revolutionary tide has been flowing again for ten years, and that it can hardly be expected to reach flood peak until the end of the present war. The general policy of the Bolsheviks is to gain time, and to rely on the revolutionary defeatism being busily propagated by the Comintern's two million members and affiliates abroad under cover of the alleged desire to bring about a "Socialist peace." The success of this policy is predicated on Russia's ability to keep out of the war. She faces the danger that in a long war of attrition the Nazis, pressed on by desperate need,

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will put up to Moscow the alternative of waging war or permitting the exploitation of Russian oil and fats. In that event the Nazis may again give Russia compensation, and we may see the process of redividing Eastern Europe extended to the Middle East, with the Red Army occupying Iran in a race toward India. Or, if forced to a final decision whether to fight the Nazis or coöperate with them fully, the Bolsheviks, putting all their faith in the inevitability of world revolution, may simply retire beyond the Urals and wait for the Germans to smother themselves in the Ukraine as they did in 1918. No one knows but Stalin, and Stalin does not cross bridges too soon.

On May 6, 1941, Stalin assumed the functions of Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. It is the post from which Lenin directed Soviet affairs during what is called the Homeric period of the revolution, when the Narkomindel and the Comintern were coördinated and the revolutionary tide was flowing. Today the Narkomindel and the Comintern again are coördinated; the revolutionary tide again flowing; and Soviet foreign policy and Communist world revolution again are one pattern.

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THE WARTIME USE OF SHIPPING

By William Diebold, Jr.

THE shipping problem is not just another name for the Battle of the Atlantic. Overloaded warehouses in Batavia and political crisis in Rio may result from torpedoings in the Atlantic; but the solution of the problems they create cannot wait on the defeat of the submarine. World shipping problems must be met within their own terms of reference and solved by the means at hand. British control of the Atlantic and a successful defense of the British Isles may depend on there being enough ships in the Pacific, Caribbean and Indian Oceans. The shipping problem is not one, it is many; it concerns not only embattled Britain and her American armor-bearer, but all countries that live by the purchase or sale of goods beyond the seas.

"It must be remembered," says Sir Arthur Salter, "that sea transport is almost as transferable as money itself."[1] From this premise it is clear that the British problem, and the problem of American aid to Britain, must be seen as a part of the world shipping situation. Every ship afloat and beyond Axis control is, in a sense, available for solving every wartime shipping problem, and almost every shipping problem is related to the British war effort. To secure war supplies from the United States, Britain must have transatlantic shipping; to guarantee the manufacture of those supplies in this country, there must be transpacific shipping. The war contribution of the Empire is communicated through ships. Ship transport for supplies may decide the attitude of borderline countries toward the war. The demands on world shipping as a whole and British and American shipping in particular arise from all of these needs.

No neat statistical etching of the British or world shipping position is possible. Some of the data are uncertain and behind the times; some are lacking. Yet a rough draft, showing at least the problem's dimensions, must be prepared as a preliminary to framing a solution.

The Germans claim to have sunk 11 million tons of British, Allied and neutral shipping from the outbreak of the war through April 1941; the British put the figure at 6.1 million tons.[2] It is

[1] "Allied Shipping Control," p. 31.

[2] Unless otherwise noted, figures in this article refer to gross tons, a measure of capacity in which a ton is taken as equal to 100 cubic feet. The gross tonnage of a ship is the capacity of the space

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generally taken for granted that the German total is exaggerated, as, quite apart from propaganda motives, the Germans are in no position to determine sinkings accurately. The British might be expected to minimize their losses for the sake of morale. Admiral Sims wrote that at their first interview, on the entry of the United States into the World War, "Admiral Jellicoe took a paper out of his drawer and handed it to me. It was a record of tonnage losses for the last few months. . . . These figures indicated that the losses were three and four times as large as those which were then being published in the Press." [3] On the other hand, a desire to speed American aid, particularly in the matter of convoys, might prompt the British to write their losses large, especially of ships carrying American supplies.[4] Perhaps these motives result in something like a balance. In any case, neutral observers are inclined to believe that the British figures are fairly accurate. With these caveats, and in lieu of alternative data, British figures will be used to discuss sinkings. They are subject to revision by the Admiralty for several months after they have been issued; and they do not include merchant ships lost on naval duty.

The monthly pattern of sinkings is significant. For the first half year of the war, sinkings averaged about 190,000 tons per month. The figure fell during the Scandinavian campaign, rose sharply in May, and spurted to over half a million tons in June, the month of Dunkerque. From July through the end of 1940, German submarines, operating now from bases along the whole western coast of Europe, raised their monthly average to 390,000 tons. A drop during the winter weather was followed by sinkings of 489,000 tons in March and 488,000 in April (including the Balkan campaign), bringing the total for the first third of 1941 to 1.6 million tons. It seems likely that sinkings for 1941 will total some 5 million tons. An intensive German effort might well raise the total above this mark; better protection for British convoys, whether through American help or not, might keep it lower. The rate of loss sets the pace for the shipping problem.

between the sides and ceiling of the hull plus the storage or living space above decks, with deductions for water tanks, wheelhouse and certain other installations.

[3] Quoted in "War Memoirs" of David Lloyd George (London, 1938), vol. I, 689–90.

[4] In a letter to Senator Vandenberg, Admiral Land gave world sinkings for the first four months of 1941 as 781,914 gross tons, less than half the British Admiralty's total (*New York Times*, May 8, 1941). It has been suggested that Admiral Land's figure was based on newspaper reports only. The Maritime Commission's Division of Economics and Statistics declines to explain the discrepancy, on the ground that it publishes no information regarding merchant shipping losses.

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In the summer of 1939 the world's merchant marine (all ships of 100 gross tons or over, excluding Great Lakes shipping) totalled 66.5 million tons, somewhat more than was required to carry world trade at that time. After twenty months of war, the supply of merchant vessels available to countries not under German or Italian control had apparently fallen to between 52 and 54 million tons, a drop of some 20 percent.[5] At the same time, the demand for shipping rose. Though import restrictions and the blockade have curtailed or eliminated many kinds of trade, their effect seems to have been more than offset by the British war effort, increased production in the United States, longer trade routes, congested ports, slow convoys, and the use of merchant shipping by armies and navies.

Merchant tonnage directly under British control has increased since the war began. In June 1939 some 20.6 million tons of shipping were registered in the British Empire, 87 percent of it in the United Kingdom. The British have captured at least 400,000 tons of Italian and German ships. From the merchant marines of the occupied countries (including France) they acquired about 7 million tons. Some of these ships are operated by the governments in exile along lines approved by the British. Ships totalling more than 800,000 tons were bought from the United States. New building in the British Empire during the first twenty months of the war was probably between 1.4 and 1.7 million tons. To all this should be added whatever neutral shipping the British may have on time charter above what they had in the prewar period, as well as those parts of the Greek and Jugoslav merchant marines coming to Britain. The subtraction of 6.1 million tons sunk leaves Britain, at the end of April, in direct control of 24–26 million tons

[5] Total sinkings, including Axis ships, probably equalled 7.5 million tons. New building outside the Axis area, but including Japan, probably did not reach 3 million tons. Of the 6.5 million tons of unsunk German and Italian ships, the British captured at least 400,000, leaving the rest in Europe or laid-up in foreign harbors. A number of those used in the Mediterranean or in European coastwise trade have probably also been sunk by the British. The merchant marine of the occupied countries, including France, exceeded 12 million tons in 1939. Perhaps 1.3 or 1.5 million tons were sunk, and the British secured about 7 million. The remaining 3.5 or more million tons were under Axis control or in foreign harbors, save for parts of the French fleet still operating, claimed by Vichy to exceed 1.5 million tons. In all, something over a million tons of Axis and occupied country shipping is in foreign harbors, including that seized by the United States and Latin American countries. There are 600,000 tons of Axis shipping in Latin America, 150,000 in the United States, almost 300,000 tons of French, Danish and other laid-up ships in the United States and an undetermined amount in Latin America. Further deductions should be made for the Greek and Jugoslav ships which fell into Axis hands. Those sunk before the end of April are included in the 7.5 million above. It must be emphasized that the wartime figures are all estimates, but they have been compiled and checked by the best sources available.

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of shipping, considerably more than before the war.[6] It would be fallacious to regard this as a net gain of 30 percent in ships available to the British, as much of their commerce has always been carried in foreign bottoms. Foreign flagships carried 46 percent (by net tonnage) of United Kingdom imports during 1938. Nevertheless, it is an advantage to the British to have this larger number of ships directly subject to their wartime controls, and not to have to compete for them in a world market.

Not all the ships are effective merchant tonnage, however. The figures include many ships too small for overseas trade, and also passenger ships. Damages as well as sinkings reduce the supply. No official figures are available as to the number of British merchantmen laid up for repairs at any one time, but they are probably about 1.5 million tons, perhaps more. The Royal Navy has taken over numerous merchant ships to serve as auxiliary cruisers and patrol boats; the Army has taken transports and supply ships. By the autumn of 1940, the services were believed to have taken about 4.5 million tons of merchant shipping. With the development of the war in Africa and the Near East this figure rose, probably to 7 million.

Perhaps 16 to 18 million tons of shipping are available to the British for merchant traffic at any one time. Ordinarily Empire routes far removed from the United Kingdom absorb some 2 million tons. Recent reports suggest that less than a million tons are now so engaged; but there may be difficulty in keeping the total as low as this for a long period of time. Most British ships have been withdrawn from world trade routes outside the war zone, and the remainder are being taken out. British ships — many of them coastwise vessels — entering and clearing Chinese ports fell from 8.3 million tons in 1939 to 4.4 million in 1940. However, there are still Norwegian freighters in the Latin American trade, and Norwegian and Dutch ships, largely tankers, in the Far East. This has usually been taken to mean that Britain's position is not absolutely desperate. The ships are kept there, it is believed, as part of a compromise with the owners and in hopes of holding open trade routes for British shipping in the postwar period. Negotiations for the replacement of these ships by American vessels have probably been going on. Without such replacement their withdrawal would create serious difficulties. They

[6] It is not quite accurate to subtract the whole 6.1 million from the British total as it includes neutral tonnage not under British charter but, presumably, sailing to the British Isles.

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comprise, for example, about one-fifth of all the ships plying between Latin America and the United States.

Probably about 15 million tons of shipping are used to supply the United Kingdom. The task is much greater than in peacetime. It is no longer possible to obtain 32 percent of the United Kingdom's imports from nearby Europe, as in 1938, and ships from the Far East must sail around Africa. As is well known, the convoy system reduces the carrying power of the merchant marine. The collection of convoys causes delay; their speed is that of the slowest ship; some of them being reported to go as slowly as six knots an hour. At least 25 percent reduction in carrying power for ships in the war zone is usually attributed to the use of convoys, though this may be somewhat mitigated by allowing fast ships to travel alone. There is congestion at the English ports, arising from the arrival of large convoys, bombings, and the difficulties of unloading at night in the blackout. Over-all figures conceal the strain on British shipping resulting from heavy losses in specialized carriers such as tankers and refrigerated ships. While figures are not available, it is generally understood that a higher percentage of these ships has been lost than of ordinary cargo vessels.

Reduced capacity and efficiency make annual losses of 5 million tons very grave. The British are traditionally a nation of shipbuilders, but there is little prospect that their prowess in this field will be adequate to meet present needs. In his address of May 27, President Roosevelt said that "the present rate of Nazi sinkings of merchant ships is more than three times as high as the capacity of British shipyards to replace them: it is more than twice the combined British and American output of merchant ships today." Even this statement may be too optimistic. In 1938 over a million tons of merchant shipping were launched in the United Kingdom. Accurate figures are not available for 1939 and 1940, but most estimates put each year's launchings at about a million tons. However, a Department of Commerce estimate placing British shipbuilding in the first nine months of 1940 at 400,000 tons suggests that the output for that year might have been considerably lower. Naval construction and the repair of damaged ships occupy many of Britain's yards and much of her labor. The shipbuilding rationalization scheme closed and razed numerous yards in the years before the war; in 1938 Britain had 40 percent less shipbuilding capacity than in 1918. Bombings and

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the blackout hinder the building of new yards and the full utilization of existing capacity. Estimates putting British launchings this year at 1.5 million tons are probably over-optimistic; two-thirds of that figure is more likely. The rest of the Empire's shipbuilding capacity is small; launchings in 1938 equalled 28,000 tons. Orders for ships have been placed in Canada, Hong Kong and elsewhere, and new shipyards are being built in Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Much of the Dominions' effort, however, is going into the construction of corvettes and other small naval craft. Certainly they will make no significant addition to the merchant tonnage supply until 1942. It is doubtful if their output for this year will exceed 100,000 tons.

New British building may replace as little as one-quarter of this year's sinkings. A small amount of slack might be taken up in the use of the merchant marine — some further tonnage might be withdrawn from foreign routes, convoys might be more efficiently handled, commodities might be purchased from Canada and the United States rather than from Australia, Argentina and New Zealand. A total collapse of the Near Eastern front, whatever its strategical effects, might free some merchant shipping and additional naval vessels for convoy; but it might also bring new problems of protecting ships off Africa and in the Indian Ocean. Britain alone cannot supply the new tonnage needed to maintain her present rate of imports. She must have ships from abroad. The possible sources are few. Use of all the ships of Axis and occupied countries now laid-up in ports in the Western Hemisphere would yield over a million tons, a very considerable help. It is doubtful if much tonnage can be chartered or bought from the remaining neutral countries of Europe and Latin America. Seventy-five percent of Japan's fleet, once a great earner of foreign exchange, is now engaged in Asiatic waters, and the rest carries little but Japanese imports. Withdrawal of Dutch and Norwegian tonnage from the Japan trade would intensify Japan's problems, raising political issues the British and American Governments apparently wish to avoid. It is to the United States that Britain must turn for large-scale shipping aid.

The first measure of American wartime merchant marine policy — in the Neutrality Act of 1939 — curtailed the tonnage potentially available to Britain. Though of minor importance to the British in the past, the 500,000 tons of American shipping laid-up under the Act and now employed on other routes, would

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have been precious in wartime and, in the absence of the law, would have been augmented by other American ships drawn into the Atlantic by higher freight rates. At the same time, the Maritime Commission gave permission for sales of about 800,000 tons of ships, many of them over-age, to British and Canadian purchasers. Britain also secured more or less direct benefits from the 450,000 tons of United States shipping, largely tankers, transferred to Latin American or European registry during the first year and one half of war. Late in February 1941, Maritime Commission officials were reported as saying that American needs made it impossible to transfer or sell any more ships abroad.[7] Since the Commission's laid-up fleet of 700,000 tons has been depleted, further transfers would be at the expense of the active merchant marine, except to the extent that they were replaced by new building.

Since 1936 the Maritime Commission has had a merchant shipbuilding program designed to replace the high percentage of over-age tonnage in our fleet, much of which dates from the World War. The program was speeded up after war broke out and was supplemented by an emergency program calling for the construction in 1941 and 1942 of 200 "ugly ducklings," partially pre-fabricated ships of a standard design, inferior in excellence to the Maritime Commission's ships, but quicker to build. A British order for 60 cargo ships of about 10,000 tons each was also placed here. The production schedules on this program call for the launching of slightly over a million tons of new shipping in 1941 and about 2.3 million in 1942.

Whether the schedule can be speeded up, or whether it is itself optimistic, remains a matter of dispute among the experts. Early in April the President announced that he would use $500 million of the lease-lend appropriation to build 56 new ways and 212 ships for Britain. The tonnage of these ships has not been announced, nor has the date when they should be completed. It seems unlikely that any will be launched before 1942, and the majority of them will probably not appear until late that year or in 1943. A figure of 5 million tons is sometimes mentioned as our output of ships in the latter year. To reach this figure it will be necessary to push the shipbuilding effort much harder than is

[7] As a matter of fact, some sales and transfers have taken place, though at a much slower rate than in 1940. Outstanding among these was the transfer in April to Britain under the Lease-Lend Act of four large speedy cargo carriers of the newest design.

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now being done and to begin work now on new ways and yards. More general use of pre-fabrication and possibly resort to wooden ships would also hasten construction. On present schedules, the combined rate of British and American shipbuilding will not equal half the rate of loss from sinking until sometime in 1942. This may be bettered by increasing the shipbuilding program or reducing the sinkings. The nub of the building problem is the relatively long lapse of time from the building of ways to the launching of ships.

The building of ships is the only fundamental way out of a world shortage. But the new supplies of tonnage to be expected this year are inadequate to the need, and little can be done to increase them. The problem is immediate; things will get worse, not better. To cope with this crisis, American policy must concentrate on making the best possible use of available tonnage in whatever routes it is sailing. The need for ships is not limited to the North Atlantic. The general shipping shortage has made it difficult to secure space for United States imports of jute, hides, vegetable oils, and other raw materials from Latin America and Asia. The accumulation of stockpiles of strategic materials has been hampered. The spectre of future shortages begins to be seen, though still not so clearly as it should. The rise in freight rates, though somewhat restrained by government pressure and British controls, is an element in increasing domestic costs which lies outside the scope of present price controls, and threatens the financial structure of the defense economy.

Cognizant of this situation, the President on February 10, 1941, addressed a letter to Admiral Land, Chairman of the Maritime Commission, stressing the importance of shipping to the defense effort and asking his advice and assistance regarding the "maximum utilization" of the merchant marine. The Maritime Commission then set up a Division of Emergency Shipping which sought to smooth out difficulties by conferring with shippers. Coördination in the use of shipping space and informal priorities for strategic materials were instituted. Some of the difficulties arose from the acquisition of merchant shipping by the Army and Navy. A partial solution was reached by arranging that some of the supplies for West Indian bases should be carried by southbound freighters in the Latin American trade, instead of by special ships which would then return empty to the United States. Army ships returning from the Philippines were also used to carry

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strategic materials. By the end of May the services had taken over 400,000 tons of passenger shipping and an undisclosed number of cargo vessels, particularly fast ships of the latest types, originally designed as potential naval auxiliaries. The increased rate at which merchant ships are being acquired by the Army and Navy threatens to become a serious factor in limiting the tonnage available for other uses.

On April 30, President Roosevelt asked the Maritime Commission "to secure the service of at least 2,000,000 tons of merchant shipping which now exists and plan the operation thereof in such a manner as will make their cargo space immediately effective in accomplishing our objective of all out aid to the democracies." This was the first action approaching a mobilization of American shipping resources to meet the emergency. Arrangements were made almost immediately for 25 tankers to be used to carry oil from Latin America to east coast ports in the United States, where it would be transferred to British ships for the run to the United Kingdom. Later 25 more tankers were supplied. On June 4 the Commission ordered Gulf and Atlantic coastwise shippers to divert half their ships to the pool. By making use of all the laid-up shipping of Axis, French and occupied country registry in United States ports, about one-quarter of the 2 million ton pool would be supplied. However, the damaged German and Italian ships will not be ready for use for some time. It may be possible to purchase some of the laid-up ships in Latin American harbors, but at least a million tons and probably more will have to come from the active United States merchant marine.

At the end of December 1940, some 4 million tons of our shipping plied in coastwise or intercoastal routes — nearly 60 percent of our whole merchant marine of 7.2 million tons.[8] In the period from October 30, 1939, to the end of 1940, some 400,000 tons were withdrawn from the coastwise trade for sale to Britain or to take advantage of the higher freight rates on deep-water routes. The fifty tankers taken for the pool in May came largely from this source, leading to predictions that the consumption of petroleum products in the eastern United States would have to be sharply curtailed in the coming year. In urging Congress to pass a bill providing for condemnation of rights of way for a pipeline from Texas oilfields to Middle Atlantic refineries, the President

[8] Figures for the United States merchant marine refer to ships of 1,000 gross tons and over.

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stressed the need for additional transportation facilities to offset the reduced tanker supply. The withdrawal of numerous ships from the coastwise trade which has begun will require some adjustments in our economy. Reduction in water transport would increase the burden of American road and rail carriers. This pressure, coupled with the rise in industrial production, will probably necessitate an expansion of railroad facilities, including an enlarged production of rolling stock and other equipment. This in turn will intensify the strain on steel production. The higher freight charges for overland transportation will also tend to increase production costs of many items. Drawing on Great Lakes shipping would have similar effects. Some of the 2.6 million tons of shipping on the Lakes could be brought out through the canals to the open sea, but the need of bottoms on the Lakes is so great that a new law has been enacted allowing Canadian ships to carry iron ore between American Lake ports to relieve the burden on our own vessels.

There are no other domestic reservoirs of shipping. Any additional ships must be withdrawn from overseas routes, thereby aggravating one problem to ease another. The choice as to the relative importance of different uses, cargoes and routes can be made wisely only in terms of our defense economy as a whole. Some form of priorities for raw materials imports, drastically applied, would lay the foundation for a more efficient use of shipping. Shorter hauls, made possible by shifting purchases to nearer sources, would also save tonnage. Philippine sugar is already virtually barred from this country by high freight rates and the lack of ships. It has been suggested that Asiatic raw materials might all be delivered at west coast ports and carried the rest of the way by railroads and trucks. The purchase of increased quantities of semi-finished goods instead of the bulkier raw materials may be possible in a few cases.

Once priorities have been established, and imports regulated, so that it is known to what extent the rubber, jute and manganese are to share space with bananas, coffee and spices, it will be possible to calculate more exactly how much shipping can be spared, and from what routes. It will be necessary, of course, to control the ships themselves in order to be able to move them where they are most needed. If Britain needs ships in the North Atlantic, and if the United States remains on a short-of-war basis and retains the Neutrality Act, they can be transferred to British

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or other registry. If they are to be used outside the war zone, they can remain under United States control. Or some compromise plan can be worked out, such as chartering the ships to the British for use outside the war zone, as was done in the case of the first 25 tankers collected in May. The aims of American shipping policy would not be dictated by defense needs alone, though these would be the weightiest factors, but also by political motives — the Good Neighbor policy, aid to China, the strategy of food — and by the usefulness of shipping control as an instrument of economic warfare. To the extent that the merchant marine was more efficient under a unified policy, larger amounts of consumption goods might be imported than would otherwise be possible.

Sir Arthur Salter has said: "I am confident that there is presently available in America enough merchant tonnage to form the so-called bridge of ships, until such time as the combined ship construction efforts of the United States and Great Britain begin sending new vessels off the ways."[9] There is every reason to believe that this is true, provided the United States makes the most efficient use of its merchant marine. Perhaps this can be done by the present program based on the coöperation of the owners and operators. It is doubtful. Coöperation is secured for specific problems involving a clear and immediate need, but a shipping policy articulated to our defense economy as a whole must be conceived in larger terms and be planned in relation to future needs in a situation which will deteriorate so long as sinkings exceed launchings. Coöperation is likely to be a cumbersome, halting process. As shippers are called on to make greater sacrifices — in terms of what they might get in a free market — coöperation will be harder to secure. Compromise is basic to coöperation, for the shippers' needs as well as the government's must be considered. It is not conducive to immediate and drastic action.

The *requisitioning* of our entire merchant marine is the prerequisite to using it at its maximum. Section 902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936 empowers the Maritime Commission to requisition ships in a national emergency or "whenever the President shall proclaim that the security of the national defense makes it advisable. . . ." Once requisitioned, the routes, sailings and cargoes of all ships could be determined by government order, though the actual operation of the vessels might be left in the hands of their managers, as is now done in England. Owners

[9] *Journal of Commerce*, May 8, 1941.

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would receive compensation for their ships on agreed terms and freight rates could be fixed at whatever level the Government chose. For many years we have subsidized the operators of deep-sea ships in one form or another, and protected coastwise ships from foreign competition. This policy was justified by the claim that it is in the national interest to maintain a merchant marine. Now it is in the national interest to use it.

Requisitioning raises many problems. At what rate shall the owners be paid? How shall the demands of different government agencies be coördinated? What weight shall diplomatic policy have in comparison with defense needs? Shall shipowners, who retain an interest in the ships they expect to have returned after the war, be employed by the Government to help operate the control? What representation shall be given to maritime labor? The problems are difficult, as would be those of any kind of control or of no control at all. Of the many possible types of government regulation of shipping, requisitioning is the best because it makes possible a unified control of the entire merchant marine in terms of the whole pattern of national needs. As Sir Arthur Salter explained it to the British Parliament: "Under requisitioning you can, as you cannot under a licensing system, plan ahead, take a look at your whole programme of imports, look at the whole of the ships operating. You can make a plan of the whole and no one who has not access to the whole of the facts can do that."[10]

Requisitioning will not take care of one important matter: the foreign ships carrying our goods. Only about 30 percent of our prewar imports (on the basis of cargo tonnage) arrived in American ships. Undoubtedly this share has risen since the war began. But of the 119 ships in the Latin American trade in March 1941, only 54 were of United States registry. Clearly some means must be found to bring foreign ships within range of an American ship control. Many such ships are in fact American-owned, though of foreign registry, and may be subject to requisitioning. Bunker control proved a useful instrument for bringing neutral ships into British service in the World War. Under this plan ships may fuel only if they are on voyages approved by the shipping authorities. Harbor regulations or the issuance of warrants may be similarly used. Some owners might prefer not to touch at American ports rather than meet these terms. But if our program were geared to that of the British, the field left for such ships

[10] Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, March 18, 1940, col. 1769.

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would be small; Japan would be the biggest customer. Should the situation become serious through the defection of too many ships, we might have to choose between offering inducements to enter our trade, in the form of very high rates, or of applying economic and political pressure on the individuals or countries involved.

The relationship between the American and British merchant marines is of the greatest importance. Under present conditions, the United States seeks to free ships from its services, and freed ships are then turned over, in one way or another, to the British. This procedure is unsatisfactory in that it contributes nothing towards the solution of our own problems. If our merchant fleet were requisitioned, a more coherent program could be worked out. Unless there is coördination there will be friction and working at cross purposes, with a consequent loss of efficiency. Even operating in close harmony there would be conflicts of interest and differences of opinion as to the best way to achieve agreed ends. The organization of such coöperation is beyond the scope of this article. Two chief instrumentalities suggest themselves: a specialized advisory body, modelled on the Allied Maritime Transport Council of World War days; or a joint board with virtually complete power over the two merchant marines. Whatever the form, the need for the articulation of the two programs is patent. Shipping is the crucial central link between the two war economies as well as between each economy and the areas of the world on which it depends for sustenance. Conceivably, Anglo-American coöperation in this sphere might strike roots and become the nucleus for a wider international organization, or at any rate for closer coöperation between the two countries in other spheres. In the postwar period, no less than in wartime, there will be problems to solve. Though the outside pressure will be absent, the merit of joint solutions will remain.

Whatever may come of this, and whether Britain wins or loses, the immediate wartime needs of the United States in the field of shipping are dual: increased shipbuilding, and maximum utilization of the ships available. These will not come about of themselves, but must be brought about by planned policy and strong action.

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HISPANIOLA

By John Gunther

ON his first voyage to the American Indies, shimmering on the western horizon, Christopher Columbus discovered a Caribbean island which he called Hispaniola, meaning "Little Spain." He set foot on what is now Haiti on December 6, 1492, shortly after his first landfall at Watling Island in the Bahamas. Hispaniola was — and is — an exceptionally curious place, and it has had as curious a history as any area in the Western Hemisphere. Today it is divided into two independent states strikingly different from each other, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. Haiti occupies the western third, and the Dominican Republic (often called Santo Domingo) the rest.

On the poinsettia-fringed shores of Hispaniola, Columbus — the most imaginative, the vainest, the luckiest, and the most persistent sailor the world has ever known — pitched his first camp and built his first fortress, La Navidad. It was in Hispaniola that he lost his caravel, the *Santa Maria;* here that he picked up his first naked Indians and screaming parrots for delivery to Seville; here that his men grumbled and almost mutinied as he lay sick for five months. In Hispaniola Spain created its first colony in the new world — which Columbus still thought to be the kingdom of Cathay — founded its first university, and erected its first cathedral, which still stands. In this cathedral Columbus still lies buried, after exhumation from his first burial in Spain. Columbus crossed the Atlantic after, as well as before, his death.

When Columbus first arrived in Hispaniola it was inhabited by mild-mannered, friendly Indians whom his men promptly butchered. Hardly an Indian survived fifty years after his coming. As early as 1506 sugar cane was introduced, and by 1512 the Spaniards were bringing in Negro slaves to work the new plantations. These slaves proliferated as did the crops they grew — spices, indigo, tobacco, as well as sugar. The island became rich, and the slaves survived the violently hard labor to which they were subjected. As a result Haiti today is 90 percent pure Negro and 10 percent mulatto (there are no whites except foreigners). It is the only Negro republic in the world, Liberia excepted. The Dominican Republic next door has, in contrast, a considerable

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white population — perhaps 20 percent. The rest is mulatto, with some Indian admixture. Haiti speaks French and a bastard patois called Creole. Santo Domingo is Spanish-speaking.

The history of Hispaniola until modern times is a complex record of murder, romantic madness, nationalism, greed, ignorance, foreign intervention and black magic. The basic trend is perhaps rivalry between French-speaking Haiti and Spanish-speaking Santo Domingo. At first the Spaniards concentrated on Santo Domingo because it had some gold, though not much. Meantime French and British buccaneers and traders got into Haiti and found a better bargain. It turned out to be the richest colony in the new world, and they began to loot it. The French grip on the island grew, and presently Spain was forced to give up the Dominican end. All of Hispaniola — then called Saint Domingue — formally became French in 1795.

Observe the date. The distant winds of the great French Revolution began to reach Haiti. Fanning the dark fires already smouldering there they soon produced one of the most exceptional events in history, the revolt of the Haitian negroes against their French masters. A black chieftain whose name is legend, Toussaint L'Ouverture, beat the French and established a free republic in 1801. Napoleon sent troops under his brother-in-law, General Leclerc, to conquer Toussaint and his fighting blacks. It was the only instance of attempted Napoleonic penetration of the Western Hemisphere. Toussaint was captured. But the revolt went on, blindly, blackly, savagely. Two formidable Negro chieftains, Dessalines (who had all the whites on the island exterminated) and Christophe (who built the citadel near Cap Haitien which stuns tourists to this day), continued the struggle until independence was confirmed. Dessalines was "Emperor" from 1804 to 1806, and Christophe became "King," as Henri I, in 1811. But Christophe, a man of fantastic quality, killed himself in 1820. Haiti has been a republic ever since.

The affairs of Santo Domingo next door were inextricably entangled with this bloody record. Part of the time it was united to Haiti, despite the difference in language; part of the time it reverted to Spain or had a semi-independence of its own. The Spanish upper classes furiously resented subjection by Negro kings, and they joined the French to fight Toussaint and Dessalines. Then the Spanish revolted against the French, and Santo Domingo went back to Spain in 1809. Later, two more remarkable

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mulatto adventurers — Pétion and Boyer — entered the scene. The Haitians reconquered the Dominican regions and reunited the island under Haitian rule till 1844. After a revolution, Santo Domingo reannexed itself to Spain in 1861, the only country in Latin America that has ever done so. It is curious that the United States did not invoke the Monroe Doctrine. In 1865 the Dominicans pulled loose from Spain again, and in 1869 the forlorn little country asked to be incorporated into the United States. A treaty annexing it was negotiated and drawn up; it failed ratification in the United States Senate by one vote. Had this vote gone otherwise, the Dominican Republic might be part of the United States today.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries both Haiti and the Dominican Republic, now independent states, were tormented by the most vicious kind of civil disorder and revolution. By 1915 Haiti in particular had succumbed to complete political chaos. There had been six presidents in four years, and three of them were murdered. One president, named Guillaume Sam, was torn to pieces by a mob that dragged him from the French Legation after he had slaughtered a batch of political opponents. The United States intervened, and our marines took over protection of public order. We had been contemplating intervention for a considerable time.

This was one of the earliest and is probably the most celebrated case of what came to be known later as "Yankee Imperialism." Beyond doubt Americans entered Haiti for mixed motives, some of them dubious. We wanted to save lives and protect foreign property. But also we wanted to protect private American investors who had an important stake in the country — and what counted more — important friends in Washington. Bloodshed in Haiti was to some extent a pretext for intervention, not the real reason. American interests were largely concentrated in the National Bank of Haiti and a railroad concession controlled by the National City Bank of New York. The whole is an unsavory story. The best summary is that of Ernest Gruening in FOREIGN AFFAIRS for January 1933. Once established in Haiti the American Administration took control of the government, wrote a new constitution,[1] ruled through puppet politi-

[1] President Franklin D. Roosevelt has been quoted in the *New York Times* (August 19, 1920) as saying, "The facts are that I wrote Haiti's constitution myself, and if I do say it, I think it is a pretty good constitution." See Gruening, cited above. Roosevelt was Assistant Secretary of the Navy at the time.

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cians, and forced the country to float a large loan on exorbitant terms.

But (it is important to state) the American occupation was probably a very good thing for Haiti on the whole. We never intended permanent settlement or conquest; we had no idea of making Haiti a colony in the orthodox imperial way. The American occupation lasted for 19 years — until 1934 when the Good Neighbor policy was getting fairly under way — and it ended a year ahead of schedule. Too long, certainly. But American guidance and control grew wiser and more lenient as the years went by. We ended a period of appalling violence and we restored political stability and public order. We contributed to education and public works. The cost to Haitian civil liberties was negligible. After all, there had been no "civil liberties" there before!

American intervention also took place in the Dominican Republic. Our marines went there in 1916, a year after our entrance into Haiti, but they stayed only until 1924. Intervention in the Dominican Republic never aroused as bitter resentment, either locally or among liberals in the United States, as did our prolonged Haitian adventure. Anyway the chapter is closed, or closing. No armed forces are maintained in either country by the United States today. Nor do we maintain any direct political control. In the Dominican Republic we have gradually unloosed financial strings, though we maintain a lien on Dominican revenues until the debt is liquidated. In Haiti we still maintain a Fiscal Representative who superintends local finance and controls the customs in collaboration with Haitian authorities.

II

We now turn to contemporary personal and political issues in the Dominican Republic. It has an area less than that of West Virginia and a population less than that of Los Angeles. In many ways it strikingly resembles Guatemala, although there are few Indians. A ruthless and highly efficient dictator, Generalissimo Trujillo, rules it with a steam roller, as General Ubico rules Guatemala. He exploits it, too.

Like Guatemala, the Dominican Republic pays somewhat appealing attention to the surface amenities. No beggars are allowed; it is forbidden to walk barefoot; children are permitted in the public parks only if they are decently dressed. The Dominican Republic carefully asks if you are a journalist before giving

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you a visa (again like Guatemala), and pays close attention to any visitors. And Dominicans are formidably sensitive.

The Dominican Republic is run, bossed, awed, bullied, frightened, stimulated, made to work, and in general dominated by one of the toughest men in Latin America, General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo Molina. I did not meet General Trujillo. He was in New York when I visited his country. I regret this very much. He is the archetype of old-fashioned Latin American despot — though he has some modern ideas — and I wanted to see and study his face. General Trujillo, who was born in 1891, calls himself Generalissimo of the Armed Forces, Founder and Supreme Chief of the Partido Dominicana, Benefactor of the Fatherland, Restorer of Financial Independence, and First Journalist of the Republic. (This last because he owns the newspaper *La Nacion*.) Some of these titles were given him by the Dominican Congress, unanimously. Foreigners refer to him (when he is not present) as "Mr. Jones" or "Mr. Jackson."

This puissant general, who is of mixed racial ancestry, came of humble stock, like his friend Batista in Cuba. He started life as an errand boy and cattle hand, and then entered the Guardia Nacional, after graduating from the National Military School. After eight years of service he rose to Colonel. This was in the period of American occupation. The United States marines liked Trujillo, who was a doughty officer, and he built his career largely on their favor. They said, "He thinks just like a marine!" One American officer, a Major Watson, gave him his first chance. Watson "created" Trujillo much as the British General Ironside "created" the present Shah of Persia.

Trujillo rose rapidly and in 1930 performed the *coup d'état* that gave him power. The marines were gone, though the United States continued to control local finance and customs. The President in 1930 was Horacio Vasquez; Trujillo was chief of staff of the army. He made his "revolution" by telling Vasquez that army "reservists" were marching on the capital. The frightened Vasquez promptly resigned, though actually the Trujillo troops were still far away. But Trujillo did not at once make himself president. He appointed someone else to the job (a man who is now in jail), and then, a stickler for proper form, superintended "elections" whereby he became "legal" president. He remained president till 1938, serving two terms; then he decided to resign and rule from behind the scenes. In 1939 he visited Europe briefly

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and saw the United States (for the first time) en route. He went to the United States again in 1940.

General Trujillo's domination of the Dominican Republic is complete and rigorous, but occasionally he must take drastic steps to retain his comprehensive position. Early in 1940 a group of dissident army officers disappeared; one is said to have been poisoned while in jail, the others shot. Later in the same year, when reports were current that Trujillo was ill, a group of former comrades determined to seize control in the event of his death. One of these was General José Estrella, formerly Trujillo's closest friend. The center of the plot was the Santiago region. But an officer in the capital betrayed the conspirators, and Estrella and the others were arrested. Estrella was sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment for complicity in a murder case ten years old. Estrella admitted the murder, but said he performed it on Trujillo's orders.

Late in 1940 the Partido Dominicana, the only political organization in the country, was purged and a new group — inside the Partido Dominicana — was formed called the Partido Trujillista, composed exclusively of intimate adherents of the dictator. Its leader is Dr. José Enrique Aybar, a professor of medicine, one of Trujillo's best friends and his private dentist.

The worst blot on the Trujillo record is the massacre of Haitians in the autumn of 1937. By the most conservative estimate, at least 7,000 Haitians were slaughtered in cold blood, cut to pieces by machetes, and left out in the fields to rot. These Haitians were absolutely innocent of any political ideas. They were itinerant farmers and laborers who drifted into Dominican territory each year to get work cutting sugar cane. What apparently happened was that Trujillo, with ambitions to control the whole island if not the whole Caribbean area, had sent agents to Haiti to foment revolution there. These were caught by the Haitian authorities and shot. Trujillo ordered reprisals. Then Dominican troops got out of hand and went berserk at the opportunity for wholesale slaughter.

This affair made the Generalissimo extremely unpopular in Washington; it was, indeed, one of the most unpleasant episodes in many years of Latin American history. Trujillo, alarmed, has behaved well ever since. He needs American good will, and he has enough political sense to know how important the United States is in Caribbean affairs. Besides he is very pro-American. This is

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partly because of his training with the marines, partly because of natural instinct. Trujillo would be delighted if we actually established bases in the Dominican Republic. He is one of the rare Latin American leaders who take this point of view. He knows, of course, that United States army and navy garrisons and aircraft on his territory would serve to stabilize his régime.

The basic fact about the Dominican Republic may be expressed in one sentence: Trujillo in effect owns and runs it, except for the American sugar properties, virtually as his private estate. He controls the salt and shipping monopolies; he dominates the match monopoly; his dummies have their hands on practically all business enterprises. Trujillo manages this "estate" with considerable efficiency. The budget is balanced, and administration is well handled. But he makes vast sums out of it, while the peasants come near to starving. They do forced labor on the roads; they are lucky if they earn 20 cents a day.

About 60 percent of Dominican economy depends on sugar. Trujillo, with an eye to approval in the United States, leaves sugar severely alone. Even during the Haitian massacre, the miserable fleeing Haitians who took refuge on American-owned sugar estates were not molested. Trujillo, it seems, is content to let Americans control 60 percent of the country's business, provided he is free to do what he likes with the remainder.

But hard times are coming to Santo Domingo now. About 60 percent of the sugar crop was customarily exported to Great Britain and Canada. In 1940 British purchases sank to zero. The British simply stopped buying because of wartime exigencies, and this threatened to bring complete economic collapse. The United States has stepped into the breach in several ways. First, the Export-Import Bank lent the Dominican Republic $3,000,000 late in 1940. In theory this was to build a hotel in the capital city (which, uniquely among world capitals, does not possess one) and for road development. Second, American experts are working on a scheme whereby Dominican sugar is transformed into "invert molasses," which in turn becomes alcohol. By importing this molasses the United States hopes to take about 12 percent of the Dominican sugar crop.

Meantime, as a natural development of the Good Neighbor policy, the United States early in 1941 gave up its control of the Dominican customs which had been American-run since 1905. This agreement followed years of complex negotiations. Our cus-

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toms control was originally established to provide security for Dominican bonds sold in the United States. Private American bondholders protested against the 1941 agreement, which was effected without consultation with them, but met with no success. The State Department took the view that the United States no longer collects debts by such mechanisms as direct control of customs. On the other hand, American rights continue to be safeguarded. For instance, we retain a lien on all Dominican revenues, not just customs, for gradual debt repayment, ending in 1969. But no one knows what is going to be happening in 1969.

At the age of 50 Generalissimo Trujillo is a perfect picture of the successful Latin American dictator. He has millions in the bank; all the gaudy comforts of life; complete political authority; an army to back him up; a peasantry to exploit. He has cleaned up Santo Domingo physically; he has established political stability and ensured friendly relations with the United States; all his opponents are under the sod, in prison, or in exile.

A word about Trujillo personally. Like politicians in other lands he likes comfort and display. He maintains five houses, one of them converted out of a nightclub called the San Souci. He is ambitious, cool and forceful. An excellent horseman, he likes to ride. He likes to eat, to drink (especially a kind of brandy called Carlos Primera), to smoke, to dance. His yacht, the *Ranfis*, purchased from the Fleischmann family (it was formerly known as the *Camargo*) is the most splendid in the Caribbean; it has an American skipper, an American engineer, an American chief steward. One of Trujillo's characteristics is a fondness for clothes. He keeps absolutely complete wardrobes, even a full set of uniforms, in all of his five houses. The present Madame Trujillo, whose name was Doña Maria de los Angeles Martínez Alba, is of pure Spanish descent. He has several children. His family sense is very strong; like so many public men in Latin America, he clings close to his own kind. He has four sisters and a number of brothers, and all of them play a rôle. One brother, Hector, is chief of staff. One, Virgilio, is minister to Belgium and Switzerland. One of his sons, aged ten, has recently been promoted to brigadier general in the national army. At five he had become a colonel.

The other Dominican political personalities are, to put it mildly, somewhat overshadowed by the Generalissimo. The President of the Republic, however, is a personage of considerable

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dignity and charm. He is Dr. Manuel Troncoso de la Concha, aged about 60, a lawyer by profession, a scholar of distinction, and a former rector of the university.[2] The foreign minister, Dr. Arturo Despradel, is a fluent professional diplomat who knows procedure well. An attractive character is Vaino Pichardo, the head of the Partido Dominicana, who is very close to the Generalissimo.

As to matters of defense in the Dominican Republic, there is virtually no Fifth Column problem, because no local Fascist party could exist and Germans are almost unknown. American military and naval planes use Dominican airfields practically at will. We could probably make formal arrangements for bases any time we wanted them, but at the moment they are unnecessary. The minuscule country is, from a military point of view, dependent on the United States.

I have mentioned points in General Trujillo's career that may pain the tender-minded. But one accomplishment to his credit should recommend him to their thanks — the colony for European refugees at Sosua, in the northern part of the island, near Puerto Plata.

Here is a tract of some 50,000 acres, the personal property of the Generalissimo, which he recently donated to the Dominican Republic Settlement Association. Originally, becoming interested in the refugee problem, Trujillo contributed a 26,000-acre estate worth $100,000 which had formerly belonged to the United Fruit Company. Later he donated additional lands, including a mountain area.

The Sosua colony derives originally from the conference to deal with the plight of Jewish refugees called by President Roosevelt at Evian, Switzerland, in 1938. The conference talked piously and accomplished little. But out of it did come a permanent Intergovernmental Committee to deal with refugee problems. Since 1938 this committee has had an actual offer of land from only one nation — and of all nations in the world it happened to be the Dominican Republic. General Trujillo said that he would be glad to donate 25,000 acres, and that his country would give haven to 100,000 refugees.

Trujillo's motive was, one can imagine, double. First, he was

[2] A unique cabinet post exists in the Dominican Republic, that of Secretary of State for the Presidency. Presumably this is to give Trujillo direct access to the head of state if he needs it. The post is held by one of Trujillo's uncles.

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eager to get favorable mention in the United States — particularly after the Haitian massacre mentioned above. Second, he had the long-range idea of improving the quality of Dominican stock by a deliberate importation of healthy white blood. Third, he wanted to stimulate and diversify the local economy.

A group of American philanthropists led by James N. Rosenberg of New York followed Trujillo's lead by creating the Dominican Republic Settlement Association. This, working in close conjunction with the American Department of State and the Dominican Republic, organizes the emigration of refugees from Europe and their settlement on Dominican soil. The Administration is financed largely by private contributions. Officially the movement is nonsectarian. Most of the refugees who have arrived are Jewish. The work has been in progress only a year, and only about 300 refugees are so far at work on the 750 acres that have been brought under cultivation. One thousand more settlers are expected during 1941. Buildings are going up; activity is lively; Mr. Rosenberg and his associates are highly confident. Various agencies in the United States, including the Brookings Foundation, are sending experts in such fields as rural electrification, tropical forestry, and sanitation, to lend technical assistance.

The Sosua experiment may give answers to several questions of great potential interest. First, can white Europeans settle satisfactorily in a tropical Latin American republic? Second, can they grow crops to provide more than mere subsistence? A third point will be the future social and political relations between the refugees and the Dominican natives. Something at least remotely akin to the Zionist experiment has moved into the Western Hemisphere. Luckily Dominicans are not Arabs — at least not yet.

III

Turn now to Haiti. Here the picturesque almost obliterates the practical. This is the country of *papalois* and *mamanlois* (witches), of muffled drum beats from hillside thickets, and of *zombis*, whom the superstitious natives believe to be folk who have been drugged, raised from the "dead," and made to work as slaves.

Voodoo — about which much nonsense is customarily talked — is a kind of animistic cult based on secret ritual and magic. As one friend in Port-au-Prince said to me, it is a religion of propitiation, fear and hate. The voodoo worshipper seeks to

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exorcise the forces of nature — mountain torrents, snakes, the parching sun, hurricanes, poisonous weeds in the jungle — so that they may not destroy him. Similarly he seeks protection from his enemies. The technique is aggressive. You put a curse on your enemy before he can put a curse on you. The witch-doctor or priest prescribes the particular charm that will do the job, and makes a certain profit thereon. The prospective victim then buys off trouble by procuring a counter-charm. So at least the procedure was described to me by Haitians. Anyone, not merely the voodoo priest, may utilize *wangas* or charms. Anyone can "put the eye," as I heard it colloquially expressed, on anybody else. The priests sometimes are very powerful. If they say to their followers that a certain person is to be removed, that person will have an uncomfortable time. He may not be murdered, but he will be shunned by other Haitians, thoroughly terrorized, and probably forced to leave the community.

Voodoo is thus of considerable political importance. No Haitian government would dare to stamp it out, though one recent president, Louis Borno, a devout Roman Catholic, attempted to discourage it. His successor, Sténio Vincent, gained great popularity and thus helped to entrench himself in power, by leaning the other way. Legally, voodoo has approximately the status that alcohol had during prohibition in the United States. It is imbibed, so to speak, behind closed doors, and the police often slip in to take a drink.

Haitians are much milder folk than the Dominicans next door. Gentle, rather timid, 90 percent illiterate, ruminative, with small national sense despite their heroic past, speaking their strange mixture of French and Creole, they are an attractive and picturesque community. There are about 3,000,000 Haitians, living on 10,204 square miles, the area of Maryland. They occupy only one-third of the island, but their population is about that of the Dominican Republic. Most of them are peasants, and most are very poor. The annual budget is only about $5,000,000. The amount of currency in circulation is about 50 cents per head.

Haitian economy depends largely on coffee, and the fall of coffee prices has impoverished the country. The average coffee crop — say 27,000,000 kilograms — was worth around $16,000,000 in 1929; today the same amount brings perhaps $6,000,000. The United States took 56 percent of Haiti's coffee crop in 1939–40; Haiti was the first country in 1941 to sell its cof-

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fee quota. This shows remarkable foresight among the Haitians and their advisers, like the American fiscal representative, Sidney de la Rue. Until 1934 the United States bought no Haitian coffee at all. But obviously the American market would be of tremendous importance if Europe should be lost. So the Haitians adjusted their coffee blends to American standards of quality and taste. Similarly there has been great development in the sale of bananas to the United States. In the early 30's Haiti had no banana industry. But by 1940 it was producing 3,000,000 stems, all raised by small peasant landowners, and marketed by the Standard Fruit Company, an American concern.

The chief political issue in Haiti since the restoration of political order and the evacuation of the United States marines has been the struggle for power between the mulattoes, who comprise about 10 percent of the population, and the pure blacks. Though greatly outnumbered, the educated mulattoes hold practically all political power. The blacks resent this, and dislike the mulattoes much more than they dislike whites. But there is very little they can do about it. The situation derives from a law passed early in the nineteenth century which established that pure Negroes must go into farming and trade, while mulattoes were permitted to enter the professions. Thus the mulatto class — doctors, lawyers, engineers — became intellectually and socially dominant, and economic and political dominance naturally followed.

The grand old man of Haiti is Sténio Joseph Vincent, who became president of the republic in 1930, and who served as such until 1941. Robust, vigorous, jovial, he does not look or act his 67 years. He was a poor boy, but he managed to scrape his way through school; a brilliant and ambitious student, he got his degree in law at 18. Vincent is a man of deep culture, an intellectual. He is the author of numerous books; he can converse with vivid clarity on almost any subject; his indispensable hobby is reading; he talks French with the purity and grace of a member of the French Academy.

I saw him in his modest private villa in the oddly named village of Kenscoff, 4,500 feet above Port-au-Prince, the harbor capital. Walking along the roads were marvelous straight-limbed, firm-breasted peasant women, with trays and bowls balanced on their heads; they march gracefully mile after hilly mile, with their hands swinging, never touching the burdens their heads carry.

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The road is winding, jagged and lined with jungle; the valleys dip steeply to the sea, flowering with blazing red poinsettia, bougainvillaea and wild nasturtium.

Dr. Vincent has spent his whole life in political service. While he was still a law student he worked as a school inspector. Then he went abroad, to both Paris and Berlin, as a diplomatic attaché. Returning to Haiti he became in turn a government commissioner, a judge, a senator, and eventually president of the Senate. He spent ten years, 1920–30, in the poverty-stricken political wilderness. In 1930, though he started as a bad third, he managed to win the presidential election by some very complex political strategy. Early in his career — when the marines were in Haiti — he was hotly anti-American; he was Haiti's severest critic of United States intervention. Later he came to acknowledge Haiti's absolute dependence on the United States politically, economically and geographically, and he changed his mood and policy. As things stand today he is one of the staunchest pro-Americans in the hemisphere.

There are no political parties in Haiti, and Vincent ruled for ten years by keeping close control of the armed forces (the first duty of every Latin American statesman), and by astute political chess play. A lone wolf himself, he balanced various groups against one another. His passion and joy was, and is, political manœuvre. He sought to build schools, and to organize relief work for the poor. His idea was to make use of individual largess if necessary, and out of his healthy salary of $25,000 a year he maintained a semi-private charity called the Caisse l'Assistance. He likes to go out into the country and distribute coins himself. He is a bachelor, and his sister is his all-watching hostess. He likes to sip Haitian rum in which peaches have been soaked, and a very delicious drink it is. He is a chain smoker of Philip Morris cigarettes. His English — as he put it to me — is good enough so that he can read the *Times*, but not the magazine *Time*. He doesn't like to be called a dictator, and he is very proud that in Haiti — in considerable contrast to the Dominican Republic hard-by — there has been no political execution in 17 years.

Early in 1941, his friends said, Vincent was flirting with the idea of following Roosevelt and getting himself elected for a third term. Unfortunately, it had already been necessary in 1935 to amend the constitution in order to let him run a second time, and a third term was forbidden unless approved by special plebiscite.

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Vincent could have "arranged" to win this plebiscite, no doubt. For a long interval he refused to disclose his ultimate intentions. On March 10 the Chamber of Deputies went on record voting to extend his term. Then Vincent suddenly changed his mind, or was prevailed upon to change it. On April 4 he announced that he would not run again, and on April 15 the Haitian Minister to Washington, Dr. Elie Lescot, was chosen President as his successor.

Lescot, born in 1883, is a lawyer, administrator and diplomat of much experience. For some years he was a judge, like Vincent, and he served in various cabinets as Minister of Agriculture, Education, Justice and Interior. It was Lescot, astute and dignified, who arranged the settlement with the Dominican Republic after the 1937 massacres. Many Haitians thought he behaved too softly on this occasion. But he had little choice. School children in Haiti have sung for years a ditty called *Merci Papa Vincent.* The song became a kind of national anthem in diminutive. Now, perhaps, it will be *Merci Papa Lescot.*

As regards Fifth Columnism and national defense, the position of Haiti is much like that of the Dominican Republic. German commercial influence is stronger in Haiti, but political expression is mute. Like its neighbor, Haiti will almost certainly give the United States any facilities we wish. But since our acquisition of British bases neither Haiti nor the Dominican Republic is so important as she used to be as a site for full-fledged bases. Haitian landing fields may be useful, however, as fueling stops for fast fighter planes whose range is too short for direct flights from regular base to base.

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CANADA IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

By P. E. Corbett

A MINISTER from Brazil has just reached Canada. Opening the new legation, he will also formally open a new chapter in the Dominion's short diplomatic history. In the fourteen years since Mr. Vincent Massey went as first Canadian Minister to Washington, the Dominion has exchanged representatives with France, Japan, Belgium and the Netherlands. But in the Latin American field it has done nothing more than maintain a few scattered trade commissioners. Until late in 1940, the Government was politely but firmly negative to representations from inside and from outside the country suggesting closer ties with the Latin nations of the hemisphere. Then, suddenly, things began to happen. The Prime Minister announced that invitations to establish legations in Brazil and Argentina had been accepted. Almost immediately those two countries appointed their ministers to Canada; and similar overtures were received from Peru, Chile and Mexico.

These developments have been hastened, if not caused, by the war. Normally the actual or potential volume of trade with a country has been a major consideration in determining the establishment of a legation, and this factor has played some part in the present instance. For though there still is relatively little trade to lead Canadian diplomacy southward beyond Washington, war conditions have cut off or restricted overseas sources of supply and overseas markets both for Canada and for Latin America; and the hope of increased exchanges within the hemisphere is at least a gleam of light in a fairly grim prospect. It was to follow this gleam that a mission set out from Ottawa in November 1940, under the Minister of Trade and Commerce. The intention was a grand tour of the Americas; but unhappily the Minister fell ill at Cristobal and the whole expedition returned to its base, leaving only the correspondent of a financial journal to blaze the new commercial trail. At a favorable moment, we are told, the exploration is to be resumed. Meanwhile the Government has been exhorting exporters to apply to the Department of Commerce for information regarding possible markets in the Latin countries.

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Yet the briefest glance at statistics will convince us that something more than the prospect of trade must lie beneath this budding of diplomatic relations with South America. In 1939 it required only $4,407,000 of imports to make Brazil the largest Latin American customer of Canada. Argentina was next, with $4,117,000. In 1940 Argentina took first place, with purchases in the amount of $6,107,000 (almost the whole of the forty percent increase being in newsprint). Brazil also bought more in 1940; but the total still was only $5,063,000. As for imports into Canada from Brazil and Argentina, these amounted in 1939 to $1,111,000 and $4,406,000; in 1940 to $6,243,000 and $6,542,000 respectively. Evidently a year of war did more than fifteen years of industrious trade commissioners. But the result is still far from impressive.

The figures showing the percentage held by various countries in the total trade of Canada are not yet available for 1940. In 1939, however, exports to South America were only 1.8 percent of Canada's total exports, while imports from South America were 2.8 percent of total imports. To the whole of North America, other than the United States, exports amounted to 2.9 of total Canadian exports; and imports from the same area were 2.3 percent of total imports. These figures state what is perhaps the chief reason why these countries have not bulked large in Canadian thought.

Nor is it by any means clear how a great and lasting expansion in this trade can take place. Canada will probably buy increasing quantities of cotton, coffee, linseed, fruits, hides and even wool; she may sell more lumber, more newsprint, a little wheat to Peru, more fish, conceivably some machinery and some textiles. But the fact remains that, as a manufacturing country, she can hardly compete in unprotected markets with the larger centers of mass production; while in respect of food and raw materials, her economy is largely competitive with, rather than complementary to, the principal countries of the hemisphere. In the matter of tropical products, a large part of her supply comes, under mutually preferential agreements, from the British West Indies and British Guiana. Such special privileges may give way after the war to a general lowering of trade barriers, but even so these established channels of exchange are not likely to be abandoned.

True, any potential new market is worth cultivation by a country that depends on exports, as Canada does, for thirty percent of its income. True also, the future may hold a rich devel-

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opment in the Caribbean and in South America. New capital and new initiative are flowing into these channels from the United States. The accompanying rise in general standards of living, with the obviously needed improvements in nutrition, may in the long term completely change market potentialities throughout that part of the world. But in Canada, at any rate, there is little tendency, either among economists or in government circles, to bank on optimistic predictions of hemispheric self-sufficiency.

The timing and direction of Canada's latest diplomatic expansion are not so much, then, a move in economic strategy as one manifestation of a new sense of general solidarity with the other nations of the West. As a sign of a continuing adaptation to environment the development is even more significant than the joint defense agreement with the United States.

In the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940 the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Canada set up a Permanent Board for the joint study of defense problems affecting the whole continent. This was a larger recognition of North American community and responsibility than Canada had ever previously made. But collaboration with the United States in fisheries, transportation, aviation, radio and other matters of common concern has been a familiar feature of our good neighborhood, and the Ogdensburg excursion into the vital field of defense was a natural enough response to common peril. Moreover, it has always been connected in the public mind with the destroyer-naval-base deal, and it was justified to Canadians of the imperial school as merely one side of a triangular British-American-Canadian arrangement for carrying on the war. To these people it looked as if the United States had said to Great Britain and Canada together: "Give us naval bases in the western Atlantic and coördinate your defense in this continent with ours, so that if the war does come this way we shall be strong to meet it. In return, we'll give you the things to fight with." Few thought of the fifty destroyers as more than a forerunner of much to come. Thus the defense agreement, interpreted as part of the price for desperately needed continuing help, was acclaimed even by those who in normal times would most stubbornly resist any Canadian move towards the American orbit.

The exchange of diplomats with Brazil and Argentina, on the other hand, is a *volte-face*. Hitherto Canada has held systematically aloof from all the broader aspects of inter-American activity.

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Officially she has scarcely acknowledged the existence of a world south of the Rio Grande. It was a vast unknown, worth scouting for trade, perhaps, and offering scope for some of the bolder power and traction enterprises. At Geneva delegates from Ottawa rubbed shoulders with polished diplomats who brought from both east and west of the Andes names that were often strangely Scottish or English. But as for direct association with these peoples, that was not really considered. Certainly it cannot be said that the "myth of the continents," so effectively demolished by Eugene Staley in the last issue of FOREIGN AFFAIRS, has ever figured prominently among Canadian illusions.

Opinion in the country corresponded, in the main, to the official attitude. A few Canadians spent winters in the West Indies or went on Caribbean cruises, but almost none extended these travels to South America. Three Canadian banks had numerous branches in these countries and maintained a certain exchange of personnel. One of them even published every two months a review of business conditions in the Latin American states and the British West Indies. Mining, power and traction enterprises financed by Canadian capital in Mexico, Brazil, Peru and Colombia distributed annual reports and quarterly dividends to shareholders in Montreal and Toronto. Some of the most biting criticism of Latin Americans and their ways came from men who operated or derived profit from these companies. Amid general ignorance, their supposedly experienced judgment had great weight. The impression spread that the peoples south of the Rio Grande were of such a different sort that the less we had to do with them the better.

These reasons for resisting Pan-American associations were reinforced by another objection. A hypersensitive loyalty to Great Britain and the Commonwealth made some Canadians shun a connection that might wean them away from the motherland and the other members of the family. They feared, too, that if they weakened the connection with England they would weaken their claim to England's protection and so be thrown into dependence upon the United States. If they had to depend on someone outside themselves, they preferred the old subordination.

All of these obstacles have shrunk in the last three years. Even before the war, the drying up of European markets owing to tariffs, quotas and exchange controls had worked curious changes in attitude. Several of the most British of the Canadian news-

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papers began urging the Government to take a hand in the Pan-American conferences and share in any compensatory trade arrangements that might be devised there. When France fell, some Canadians became suddenly much more aware than before of the advantages of the Dominion's autonomy and hastened to assure American friends and clients that the country would not become a German colony even if resistance broke down in the British Isles. Other adjustments to a swiftly changing world followed. There are few echoes in Canada now of the complacent superiority expressed about Latin Americans in the thirties.

We must not leap to conclusions. The fact that Canada is opening up diplomatic relations with Latin American states does not mean that she is joining the Pan-American Union. But the age of aloofness certainly is over. Through its representatives in Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires (others are to go later to Santiago, Lima and Mexico City), the Government at Ottawa will inevitably feel an increasing pressure for collaboration. Washington, too, will join in the persuasion, particularly if its present policy of strengthening the spirit and organization of Western Hemisphere solidarity is maintained.

How far the Dominion will respond to these urgings must depend to a considerable extent on how the war ends and what kind of world organization, if any, is set up afterwards. Hitler can consolidate his rule over Europe only by defeating Great Britain or forcing her to terms. If he can make her accept terms, Canadians might have two conflicting reactions. There would be a desire to make terms along with Great Britain; and there would be a determination to work in the closest collaboration with the United States in order to keep North America, at least, free. The latter desire would be supported by pressure from Washington, pressure amounting almost to insistence. Whether by her own desire, or as a result of such persuasion, Canada then would join in a program, defined for the most part by the United States, aimed at creating the strongest possible economic and political community on this side of the Atlantic.

We are even more concerned here, however, with Canada's voluntary adaption to the changing forces of her world, such as would follow the defeat of the Axis. Given the survival of Britain, the extent of Canada's collaboration with the Americas will depend in part upon the decision of the United States in the whole matter of world organization. If the United States again

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retires into isolationism, Canada will continue to maintain her familiar ambiguous position with one foot in Europe and one in North America. She might even throw a little more weight on the American foot, participating gradually in any inter-American activities which did not seem likely to imperil her special political or economic relations with the other British nations.

This time, however, the United States may decide that she must, in her own interest, participate in whatever plans are worked out to prevent the recurrence of war. She then will have to remain associated with the British countries for an indefinite period after the end of hostilities, so as to maintain order and set the stage for general organization. Will she favor a single society, in which all peoples will join? Or will she favor a number of groupings, determined by geographical or other ties, perhaps under some looser universal association? Recent developments seem to point towards the latter choice. If the United States Government goes on strengthening the inter-American system, in the effort to check Axis influence, it will probably want to preserve whatever solidarity it has achieved there as an element in the new world order. Nor, if present indications are any guide, will Washington any more than Ottawa be content to regard their coöperative defense of the continent as a mere emergency measure to be dropped as soon as peace is declared. The word "Permanent" stands out in the title of the Joint Defense Board. A prolonged war will add to the partnership of defense an economic and financial partnership which peace will not totally dissolve. Is it not likely, then, that the United States, binding to herself the Latin Americas on the one side and Canada on the other, will try to knit these elements together in one regional community? The final result must be full Canadian participation in the inter-American system.

In the past, one argument heard in Canada against membership in the Pan-American Union has been the alleged danger of troubling the infinitely more important direct relations with the United States. Ottawa might find itself opposed to Washington in some Pan-American matter, and that opposition would sour a vital coöperation. The objection was always rather childish. But in the circumstances now developing, the very opposite reasoning would appear valid. Canada's absence from the wider association would be apt to hamper relations with the United States, not so much because there might be resentment in Washington

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over the Dominion's aloofness, but for the simple reason that, as the community becomes more closely knit, an unintegrated unit that refuses to use the general machinery of coöperation will find itself in a position of increasing disadvantage.

It might have been expected that French Canada would take a well-defined stand either for or against a more intimate association with the other Latin peoples of the West. In fact it has not done so. For some years one important French newspaper of Montreal has advocated Canadian representation at Pan-American meetings, but the response has been indifferent. There is, however, an effective appeal which can be used at the proper moment. That is the invocation of the common religion and of the common Latin heritage of law and culture. Already there are signs that this avenue to the French-Canadian heart will not be ignored. An article by Professor Anatole Vanier, of the Université de Montréal, refers to recent discussions of the matter in which Latin Americans and French Canadians have joined, and shows that at least in university circles the opening up of diplomatic relations has aroused some enthusiasm. Professor Vanier lists the reasons for French-Canadian support of this development as follows: the common Greco-Latin culture; the widespread knowledge of French in Latin America; the historic position of New France as sharing with New Spain and New Portugal the glory of bringing the civilization of Europe to this hemisphere; and, finally, the advantage of increased economic interchange at a time when war has broken up the traditional channels of trade. It is characteristic of French-Canadian thought that the material profit should have been mentioned last.

Let us now attempt to strike a balance of the pros and cons. Chief among the factors working against Canada's participation in the inter-American system we must put down a reluctance on the part of those Canadians who have the strongest emotional attachments to the British Isles as their mother-country, or who believe in the permanent benefits of a closed British system of preferential tariffs. Add to this an unfavorable opinion, backed by the most inadequate knowledge, of the political and social qualities of Latin American peoples; an estimate that only insignificant economic profits would be gained; and a lingering fear that quarrels over Pan-American interests might in some way damage Canadian relations with the United States. On the positive side is the increasing recognition of Canada's identity

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of interest with the United States; a growing confidence in the good sense and good faith of that country in its Pan-American policy; and a fuller realization of Canada's responsibility to help make this hemisphere into the strongest possible base of resistance against the spread of totalitarianism. Few economists or businessmen see any hope that Latin America can provide an adequate substitute for European markets; but there is almost unanimous support for plans to increase the volume of hemisphere trade and reduce our economic dependence on continental Europe. The obstacles to collaboration seem, on the whole, to lack actuality. The living forces of the present seem to be moving towards the full integration of Canada in the hemisphere community.

What will be the effect of this new orientation on Canada's membership in the British Commonwealth? To answer this question, we must first inquire what that membership means. For most of its members, it means one reigning sovereign; a common nationality (in addition, usually, to a Dominion nationality); a strong tendency to rally around Great Britain in time of war; and, economically, preferential treatment in British markets. Yet to show how these connections may be attenuated we have only to mention the case of Eire. Without ceasing to be a member of the British Commonwealth, Eire is resolutely neutral in this war; holds that its citizens have only one nationality, namely its own; uses the mechanism of monarchy not for internal government, but only in external relations; and has conducted a bitter trade feud with Great Britain.

There seems no reason why a regional association should exclude cultural, economic or even certain political bonds with other groups. This is particularly true when the other bonds are as elastic as those of the British Commonwealth. Yet it may be not merely interesting, but practically important, to know which of several associations a state would put first if in critical circumstances a choice had to be made. Concretely, that question asks whether Great Britain and the Commonwealth would continue to play the chief rôle in Canada's external policy or would be ousted by the inter-American system.

We may hope that Anglo-American coöperation will continue to be so close that Canada will never be placed in the position of having to choose between joining Great Britain immediately, on the outbreak of a war involving that country, or waiting to

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take counsel with the United States and possibly other American nations. But if such a choice has to be made, the decision of Canada will depend, among other things, on the substantial value of the inter-American association and the extent to which its efforts and achievements have won the loyalty of the Canadian people. So far there is little ground upon which to base anything but an emotional prediction.

The monarchical government of Canada is sometimes mentioned as an obstacle to her membership in the Pan-American Union. Formally this is of no consequence. The documents of the Pan-American conferences use the terms "republics" and "states" interchangeably. In any event, the constitution of the Union is such that a mere resolution could remove any superficial difficulty of this nature. But the use of the English royal house as part of the Canadian system of government does have a bearing on the choice between an American as opposed to a British foreign policy. Even if constitutional lawyers end their debate by agreeing that identity of sovereigns does not involve identity of the British nations in war and peace, many Canadians will go on regarding themselves as belligerent when the King of England declares war. So long as the King of England is also King of Canada, this very natural confusion, though scarcely a determining factor, will have to be reckoned with in the ultimate issues of foreign policy.

We have probably heard the last of another confusion of thought which until recently made a good many Canadians tend to think of any closer association in a general American community as presaging absorption by the United States. The word that comes from south of the border these days is not one of manifest destiny stretching out towards the North Pole. Instead there comes an unmistakable hint that certain powerful interests, notably the wheat-growers of the Middle West, would strenuously oppose adding a parcel of Canadian states to the Union. The wholesome impression is growing that, far from having to fear absorption, Canada would experience some difficulty in persuading her neighbor to take her in. The bogey of annexation that stalked so fiercely thirty years ago is dead. Its burial has enabled Canadians to approach more dispassionately the problems of practical adjustment to their American environment.

When Colonel Lindbergh questioned the right of Canada to go to war without reference to the United States, the indignation

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which he aroused in his own country was hardly less than in the Dominion. In the American strictures on his speech, Canadians saw evidence of respect not only for their national independence, but of recognition that their part in the British Commonwealth was not without its advantages to the United States. As Americans realize more and more that British security is a prime factor in their own security they give increased approbation to Canada's contribution toward that end. There no longer seems any danger of the United States exerting pressure to separate Canada from the Commonwealth.

It has indeed been suggested in some American quarters that Canada might assume a more active and responsible rôle in Commonwealth affairs. Certain Americans seem to find Great Britain's ownership and administration of colonies in the Caribbean an irritating next-door exercise of imperialism, and Britain's lease of naval bases there has not put a stop to proposals that she hand over the colonies in payment of existing or future debts. A counter-proposal is that Canada should assume the part hitherto played by Great Britain in this area. An irritant in Anglo-American relations might thus be removed. And the device would not increase the difficulties of American sugar-beet growers or leave on the American doorstep the complicated social problems emphasized in Lord Moyne's report in 1939.

Canada has had preferential trade agreements with the Caribbean colonies since 1912. She maintains a subsidized steamship service between their ports and Canada. Canadian banks have twenth-five or more branches there. Trade commissioners from Ottawa are stationed in Trinidad and Jamaica. In 1938 Canada bought in the British West Indies, Bermuda, British Guiana and British Honduras products to the value of $20,343,569 and sold products worth $14,102,918. The war has improved the market there for Canadian goods, so that imports and exports in 1940 almost balanced at approximately $21,500,000. The amount still is less than two and a half percent of Canada's foreign trade.

These details hardly add up to enough to provide any substantial basis for urging the transfer of administration over the Caribbean colonies to Canada. It would not be difficult for Canada to supply the small number of troops now garrisoned there by Great Britain; and the naval problem is disposed of by the establishment of the United States bases. But Canada has no experience of colonial administration, and her people evince no

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ambition in that direction. Nor would the additional financial burdens involved in government and in carrying out social reforms be welcome.

There used to be talk of a union of all the Caribbean colonies, which could then join the Canadian federation as another province. This idea holds little attraction for Canadians, many of whom would shrink from taking on the native problem as a factor in their domestic life, and who would see disadvantages in throwing their industries open to labor from the islands. Moreover, it makes little headway in the colonies themselves. Progressive elements there are still working towards federation, possibly in the form of two unions centered respectively upon Jamaica and Trinidad. But the minimum they contemplate for these unions is distinct Dominion status.

One step of Canadian "expansion" does seem likely. Newfoundland's absence from the federation has always been something of an anachronism, and several very tentative approaches have been made from one side or the other towards union. On the only occasion, however, when Newfoundland displayed any real warmth towards the project her finances were in grave difficulties, and Ottawa was unwilling to take on an additional debt and new burdens. That was in 1895. In 1934 financial troubles brought about the suspension of the island's status as a Dominion and the substitution of an administrative commission appointed in England. Again the idea of federation with Canada came under discussion, this time quite unofficially, but no enthusiasm was exhibited on either side. Now Newfoundland has a United States naval base and a mixed Canadian-American garrison, and thus bulks large in the activities of the Permanent Joint Defense Board. These strategic considerations may in future outweigh bookkeeping caution at Ottawa. In Newfoundland, protracted economic stringency, coupled with the experience in commission government, must have awakened doubts as to the very possibility of separate autonomy. This is important, because the people of Newfoundland must desire inclusion in the Canadian federation if any such move is ever to materialize.

Clearly Canada's part in the community of the Americas will not be as a center of any new imperialism. She has room and to spare within her present boundaries, and problems and to spare. Nor is she pleased with the dreams some people have of hemispheric autarchy. Her heavy accumulation of wheat gives her a

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keen interest in the Havana plan for the financing and orderly marketing of Pan-American export surpluses. She will keep an eye on the activities of the Inter-American Financial and Economic Advisory Committee and its subsidiary, the Inter-American Development Commission. The effort of the United States to develop Latin American industries, to stimulate production of commodities hitherto purchased overseas, and to increase the inter-American exchange of surplus products, will engage her earnest attention. But she will continue to regard the reopening of European markets as a necessity for her economy.

Coupled with this economic interest in the world outside the Americas, the Canadian people have a warm sense of fellowship with the other British nations. It is fully as important as any abstract devotion to democracy in explaining why Canada will be less than satisfied with a limited association designed merely to serve the security and welfare of the Western Hemisphere. The urge to assist all communities struggling to defend or to reach a liberal way of life will continue to be a feature of the Canadian national character. And a liberal way of life is not, in the Canadian view, simply a question of formal political democracy. It implies progress towards equality of economic opportunity for all with the will to work.

Confronted now with tasks and with perils that exceed anything in its previous history, adventurous though it has been, the Canadian nation is buoyed up by an undercurrent of strong optimism. It is perhaps a surviving characteristic of the frontier that beyond the dangers of these present years the future is still looked upon as inevitably holding great things for the country. Even sceptical observers foresee that new forces will thrust upon our northern people a larger rôle in world politics. There already is evidence that in the war's train will come an influx of immigrants of the most desirable type. We shall emerge from this struggle with a vastly augmented industrial production. The strengthening of our partnership with the other nations of the Americas brings new courage to face the formidable problems of post-war adjustment. Given a world in which international trade is possible, Canada will grow in population and power. She may be counted on to display two fairly constant qualities — a sturdy good sense which will continue to make her a reliable neighbor; and a generosity of outlook which will incline her to share actively in any practical and vigorous plan of world order.

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THE DEFEAT OF THE FRENCH AIR FORCE

By Pierre Cot

IT is commonly thought that France's defeat was due exclusively to the weakness of her air force. This is an exaggeration. France was conquered more by Germany's armored divisions than by her aerial divisions. What is true is that the success of the motorized troops would have been impossible without the work of the German air force. The same thing happened in Poland. Thus the first lesson to be drawn from the war on the Continent is the importance of a close collaboration between the armies on land and the armies in the sky.

Nobody, until now, has seriously studied the reasons of the defeat of the French air force. They were many. But most of them flowed from the mistake of French military leaders in underrating the importance of aviation in modern warfare. Let us begin by examining the factors which made German aviation superior to French aviation.

I. THE PROBLEM OF QUALITY

Germany's superiority in the air derived less from quality than from quantity. All the evidence so far collected seems to establish the fact that every time French aviators met German aviators, one against one, or even one against two, the French were the victors.

This proves, first, that in morale and training the French crews were equal or superior to the German crews. Secondly, it establishes that French matériel was, on the whole, good. At the outbreak of the war we had two excellent types of pursuit and combat planes, the Morane 405 and the Potez 63. These machines became somewhat outclassed in the course of the winter by new German planes. But in the spring we began to receive the Dewoitine 520, the Bloch 17 and the V.G. 33, which, in turn, were somewhat superior to the German machines. Meanwhile, the American planes sold to France did a wonderful job. Our pilots appreciated them particularly because of their motors, which were superior to the French motors and gave a sense of great confidence.

Furthermore, Germany did not enjoy any advantage in the

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armament of the machines. The French planes were armed with cannon or machine guns. Experience seems to show that in aerial combat the cannon is more effective against bombers, while the machine gun is more effective against pursuit planes. Our cannon were somewhat superior, and our machine guns were somewhat inferior, to the cannon and machine guns of the Germans. As for the explosive capacity of bombs, our French bombs seemed to be more effective than the German bombs of equal weight.

II. QUANTITATIVE INFERIORITY

But in quantity of air forces France was far outstripped by Germany. The two following tables measure the extent of this difference. The first follows the figures given by the French Air Ministry to the Parliamentary Committees; the second is based on figures provided by the French Intelligence Service:

FRENCH COMBAT PLANES [1]

	Continental France	*North Africa*	*Naval*	*Total*
August 30, 1939.....	1,250	400	350	2,000
February 1940.....	1,550	500	350	2,400
May 1940.....	1,550	600	350	2,500

GERMAN COMBAT PLANES

	1st Line	*1st Reserve*	*Naval*	*Total*
August 30, 1939.....	6,000	3,000	500	9,500
May 1940.....	7,000	4,500	1,500	13,000

[1] 1st line and 1st reserve.

In other words, the French air force was outnumbered almost five to one (six to one if we leave aside formations in North Africa).

But France was not alone. She was able to count on the assistance of Great Britain. It would be more just, then, to compare the air force of the Allies with that of Germany. The French Air Ministry, taking British figures into account, arrived at a figure of approximately three for the Allies against five for the Germans. The ratio appears to have remained constant between September 1939 and June 1940. This was due to a balance between production and losses. During the first ten months of the war both the production and losses of Germany were higher than those of France and Britain. Furthermore, after the outbreak of the war the Polish air force joined the French and English. It was perhaps not very large and was rather mediocre in equipment, but nevertheless this equipment was manned by an extremely courageous and well-trained personnel.

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III. PRODUCTION

Among the many reasons why it is difficult to compare French and German figures are the following:

1. We lack accurate information as to the volume of German production. In order to impress her adversaries Germany frequently put out figures which were manifestly exaggerated.

2. When we speak of "airplane production," we must differentiate warplanes from all the other various types of airplanes necessary for an army (including training and transport ships), as well as from a country's production of civil aircraft.

3. Furthermore, people usually talk of a monthly production. But unless an average monthly production is based upon a very long period, the figure means nothing. The requirements of mass production on the one hand, and constant advances in aeronautical technique on the other, can result in a powerful aircraft industry producing relatively few planes over a period of several months, its activity being confined to the manufacture of special tools and dies and to the production of detached parts.

4. The same industrial effort will produce three times as many pursuit planes weighing two tons as it will bombing planes weighing ten tons. In order to compare the results of two industries, or of two periods of production, one must watch tonnage as much as units. Thus in 1937 France produced as many planes as she did in 1936. But the 1937 production amounted to 5,500 tons while that of 1936 amounted to 2,401 tons. As a result, the planes produced in 1936 were able to carry only 296 tons of bombs over Germany, but those constructed in 1937 could carry 880 tons.

If all these factors are taken into consideration, we may say that during the five years preceding the war Germany's production of warplanes was, on an average, approximately 7 times higher than that of France. The proportions seem to have been 7 to 1 in 1935, 1936 and 1937; 9 to 1 in 1938; 7 to 1 in 1939; and 5 to 1 in the spring of 1940. The high point of German production, compared to French production, occurred during the months just preceding and following Munich, because German industry was then in a state of mobilization. By the outbreak of the war France had achieved an average production of 120 warplanes per month, while Germany was producing 800 warplanes a month. In May 1940, the figures were 350 warplanes a month for France and 1,700 warplanes for Germany. To these figures must be added,

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for each year, equivalent quantities of transport planes, training planes, etc.

We have here a contradiction between the proportion of 7 to 1 for production and 5 to 1 for the front-line craft. In reality, however, there is no inconsistency. Germany had to create her air force after the advent of Hitler; as a result, she used more planes than France for the training of her personnel and in the evolution of her tactics of air warfare. Furthermore, in 1936 and 1937 Germany sent ten times as many planes to Spain as France did.

Having established and analyzed the facts we must now try to find the causes. How was it that France was five times weaker in the air than Germany?

IV. INDUSTRIAL CAPACITY

First, let it be said that France could not dream of producing as many planes as Germany when both countries were putting forth a maximum effort.

France is a country of 40,000,000 inhabitants whose economy is more agricultural than industrial. Germany is a country of 80,000,000 inhabitants whose economy is more industrial than agricultural. This simple fact is sufficient to explain why, even with an equal effort, France could not produce as many planes as Germany. With a good economic policy she would have been able to compensate for this inferiority in part. But the general trend of French policy was the opposite of the German. From 1934 to 1938 the index number of industrial production in Germany moved from 79.8 to 126.2, showing an increase of 80 percent. During the same period the index number in France moved only from 75.2 to 76.1, showing a practically static production. As a result, French industrial capacity, which at the outbreak of the First World War had been about 50 percent inferior to the German, and which still held that relationship in 1934, became at the outbreak of the new World War about four times inferior.

Let us consider, for instance, the output of steel and aluminum, both of them important raw materials for aircraft production. From 1935 to 1938 inclusive, Germany produced 78,808,000 tons of steel and 455,000 tons of aluminum. During the same period, France produced 26,817,000 tons of steel and 128,300 tons of aluminum. The 1939 statistics are not known, but the figures available for the first few months of that year reveal a situation

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even more favorable for Germany than in 1938, when the ratio of production was 1 to 3.8 for steel and 1 to 4.5 for aluminum. From 1937 to the outbreak of the war, Germany produced three and a half times more steel and four and a half times more aluminum than France.

It would lead us too far afield to look for all the causes of this disproportion. German propaganda, as well as propaganda coming from the Vichy Government, has circulated the rumor that it was the "Popular Front" that disorganized French production and led to the decline of French industrial capacity. Statistical figures disagree with this explanation. French industrial production was 12 percent higher in 1937, when the Popular Front was in power, than in 1935, when Conservative cabinets led by Pierre Etienne Flandin and Pierre Laval were in the saddle. The insufficiency of French industrial production was due to the wrong economic policy of France dating from as far back as 1920, and not to the policy of any one cabinet. When M. Flandin, in 1935, refused to devalue the franc, his decision had worse consequences than the bad application of the forty-hour week. As a matter of fact, each cabinet added its own mistakes to the mistakes of its predecessors.

We therefore have to look for deeper reasons than the political agitation of February 1934 or the sit-down strikes of May 1936. They are to be found in the differences in social structure and economic system between prewar France and Germany. First, long before Hitler, Germany was more industrialized than France. In 1931, 41 percent of the French gainfully occupied population were independent workers (farmers, artisans, employers, etc.), whereas in Germany the figure was only 17 percent. In 1938, Germany had three and a half times more skilled workers than France. French farmers produced "butter" and German skilled workers produced "guns." Second, France kept her liberal economy, while Germany adopted a centralized economy. Experience has proved that when it comes to mobilizing a country's economic resources, free competition and capitalist monopolies are less efficient than centralized economic control and government leadership. Lacking leadership, the French industrial capacity which could be turned to producing armaments dropped to one-fourth of the German. All France must take the blame for not having paid sufficient attention to the menace of Hitler.

In view of this difference of one to four, France ought to have

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been able to produce one-fourth the number of planes that Germany produced. Actually she produced one-seventh as many. How is this extra degree of inferiority to be explained?

V. DIFFERENCE IN MILITARY CONCEPTIONS

The explanation for the supplementary difference just mentioned is that in her war preparations Germany attached much more importance to aviation than France did. The two military doctrines may be summarized by the statement that Germany prepared for a war of movement, the Blitzkrieg, and France prepared for a war of position. The modern war of movement is based upon the use of solid masses of aviation and tanks. In contrast, the war of position is based upon the use of "lines," such as the Maginot Line, as well as upon defensive arms such as machine guns and cannon.

Having different military conceptions, France and Germany created two different war machines. Actual preparation for war forces important choices, because the resources of a country, in terms of credits and basic materials as well as manpower, are limited. The Maginot Line and the French Navy were approximately as expensive as the Siegfried Line and the German Navy. By choosing to develop her fortifications and her navy to equal Germany's, France was under a necessity of sacrificing her planes or her tanks. In fact, she sacrificed both. In May 1930, when her air force was one-fifth the size of Germany's, France had two motorized divisions to oppose to ten German "Panzerdivisionen."

Before the war it was possible to argue as to which was the better conception of modern war, the German or the French. Now the facts have spoken. The French General Staff failed to realize that a real revolution had occurred in military science as a result of new industrial techniques, especially through the progress of the internal combustion motor, the soul of the tank and the airplane.

VI. AIR APPROPRIATIONS

The difference in military conceptions was reflected in the appropriations placed at the disposal of the two air forces. Of all the great nations France applied the least part of her effort towards the development of military aviation. This is shown in the following table giving the amount of air force expenditures for France, Britain and Germany from 1935 to 1939, and the per-

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cent which those figures represent of the total military expenditures of each country for air, army and navy.

EXPENDITURES FOR THE AIR FORCES

(in millions of dollars)

	France		*Britain*		*Germany* [1]	
	Amount	*Percent of total military appropriations*	*Amount*	*Percent of total military appropriations*	*Amount*	*Percent of total military appropriations*
1935	160	22	140	23	900	30
1936	162	23	280	34	1,000	33
1937	170	22	420	34	1,200	34
1938	230	27	600	34	1,550	33
1939	380	27	700	34	2,550	33
Total	1,102	24	2,140	32	7,200	33

[1] Estimated

This table shows that: (1) from 1935 to 1939 the British spent almost twice as much money for their air force as the French, and that the Germans spent almost seven times as much as the French; which explains why both the British and the German air forces were stronger than the French. (2) In this period Britain and France together spent less money than Germany for their air forces; which explains why, according to the French Intelligence Service, their aviation held a ratio of *three* to *five* to the German aviation. (3) In this period England and Germany put approximately one-third of their total defense expenditures into their air forces, while France put only one-quarter, this difference being the result of their different military doctrines and policies.

VII. MILITARY PROGRAMS: SOME UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTS

Additional evidence may be found in the official plans proposed to the Ministry of National Defense by the Air Ministry.

At the end of 1933 the Air Ministry drafted a first program, called Plan I. In 1934 it was adopted by Parliament and put into execution. It envisaged the construction of an air force consisting of 1,000 first-line warplanes, with 200 first reserves. By June 1936 the numbers of planes under Plan I which had been delivered to the air force was 637, representing 50 percent fulfilment. In August 1936 the magnitude of the German effort led to the adoption of a new program. It was called Plan II, and it envisaged the construction of 1,500 first-line warplanes, plus 60 percent first reserves, or a total of 2,500 aircraft. Plan II was to be fulfilled by the end of 1939.

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On December 30, 1936, the Air Ministry realized that Plan II was insufficient. It addressed to the Permanent Committee of National Defense a report which was filed in the archives under the number "10–913 R/EMAA." This report contained a complete study of the air problem and underlined the danger for France of the German air effort. To this report were attached two new plans: Plan III, which dealt with the organization of anti-aircraft defense and asked in particular for an increase in anti-aircraft guns; and Plan IV, which asked for the doubling of our air force, by creating a fleet of 2,600 first-line planes in addition to 1,500 reserve planes.

These plans were studied by the French military authorities. On February 15, 1937, a report was made on them by the High Military Committee, which included the Minister of National Defense, Marshal Pétain, the Chief of the Army General Staff, General Gamelin, and the Chief of the Navy Staff, Admiral Darlan. The Committee unanimously rejected the proposals of the Air Ministry and decided that "there was no need to extend or modify the plans for the expansion of the air force." Throughout 1937 the Air Ministry did all it could to get this decision changed. It could not break the resistance of the Ministry of National Defense and of the General Staff. And not only did it fail to succeed, but M. Georges Bonnet, Minister of Finance, reduced the appropriations requested for the 1938 budget by more than one billion francs.

In view of these facts, the Air Ministry on December 6, 1937, addressed a report to the Prime Minister and to the Ministry of National Defense. The report, filed in the archives of the Air Ministry under the number 712-C.M/R, protested against the attitude of the Ministry of National Defense as well as against the budget reductions. It may be interesting to cite some extracts from this document:

"During the past eighteen months I have not ceased to warn that the rôle assigned to aviation in our national defense system is too small. . . . In relation to the effort that we are making for national defense, the French Air Force today is the least provided for; its budget represents 22 percent of the national defense budget (1937 budget and projected 1938 budget). The British air budget represents 34 percent (last fiscal year, March 1937 to March 1938). . . . If the Air Force continues to be treated in this manner, it will not be able to accomplish the effort which

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you deem desirable and the awakening may be terrible. . . . By refusing to develop our aviation in the same proportions as the other European armies, we risk repeating on a much larger scale the errors we committed before 1914 in neglecting machine guns and heavy artillery."

Not till the spring of 1938 did the General Staff realize its mistake. Then the Air Ministry had a new program adopted which was called Plan V. It was a new draft of Plan IV, and it envisaged the creation of an air force of 2,600 first-line warplanes.

The above-mentioned documents (principally Plan III, Report to the Permanent Committee of National Defense of December 30, 1936, and Plan IV, Report of December 1937) have remained unpublished until today. Before the war, and before June 1940, it was impossible, without weakening France, to disclose the conflicts which had existed all through 1937 between the Air Ministry and the Ministry of National Defense. But now they must be known. They exist in several copies in the archives of the Air Ministry, in the office of the Prime Minister, in the Superior Council of National Defense, and in the Ministries of War and the Navy. The Committee on Aviation in the Chamber of Deputies knows about them. The officers of the General Staff who drafted them are still alive. It is impossible to explain how one could have passed from Plan II of August 1936 to Plan V of 1938 without referring to Plan III and Plan IV. The text of the decision of the High Military Committee, and of the opinions given by the Chiefs of Staff of the Air Force, the Army and the Navy which preceded this decision, should be published. Military historians will not fail to do this later, when a free government will give them access to the archives. Only then can the responsibility of everyone be established.

In laying these facts before the American public today I am not motivated by any wish to blame the French military authorities who failed to realize the importance of aviation in modern warfare. I desire only to show that these problems are difficult and complicated.

VIII. THE FRENCH AVIATION INDUSTRY

The question now arises whether the aviation industry of France was capable of undertaking greater production programs. An answer is contained in the report delivered in September 1937

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in response to the request of the Committee of Inquiry charged with making a general study of French production. The report on the aviation industry was made by M. Roos, an engineer, and submitted to the Committee of Inquiry. Copies of the "Roos Report" are to be found in the files of the Air Ministry, the Ministry of National Economy and the Ministry of Finance.

The "Roos Report" shows two things. It shows first that the productive capacity of the French aviation industry had not declined in 1937 but had grown. It states: "The increase in productive capacity as represented by previous machine-tool purchases since the beginning of the year 1937 varies from 40 to over 100 percent according to the companies." Second, it shows that the aeronautical industry in 1937 was capable of producing more had it been asked to do so. It states: "The productive capacity of the French aeronautical industry can, without further plant expansion, satisfy a much greater demand than that which will exist in the near future." (This means, of course, a demand based upon the execution of the production program of national defense.)

It is not my intention to deduce from the "Roos Report" that the French aeronautical industry was perfect. It was far from being perfect. The fact remains that this serious study emphasizes the development of productive capacity in the course of the year 1937. If the Cabinet had asked for it, and had provided the necessary funds, the French aeronautical industry could have built the planes and engines that the French Army needed.

IX. BOTTLENECKS IN FRENCH PRODUCTION

In every country in the world, including the United States, the aviation industry is the most difficult of all industries to organize. Production programs are usually from 30 to 50 percent behind schedule. This is a general phenomenon, due to the youthfulness of the industry and the incessant progress and changes in technique. From 1935 to 1939 the delay in production in France amounted to about 40 percent. It is interesting to examine the main causes of this delay. What were the chief French "bottlenecks"?

The most important bottlenecks were caused by the frequent changes in the type of machines constructed. Forgetting the French proverb "le mieux est l'ennemi du bien" (the better is the enemy of the good), the French General Staff too often in-

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sisted upon the modification of prototypes. Sometimes modifications were even asked for when production was already under way, without consideration for the fact that very often a modification forces the manufacturer to vary his tools. Technological ignorance is a common phenomenon in the General Staffs of most countries. In France the well-known French characteristic of individualism aggravated this ignorance.

Another important source of bottlenecks was the insufficient way in which aircraft construction was organized. An airplane is composed of a body, motor, armaments and numerous accessories (navigation instruments, landing-gear, etc.). Each part was assigned to a different manufacturer. Thus any delay on the part of one manufacturer led to a delay in the entire production. For instance, from 1934 onwards the production of engines was slower than that of bodies. To overcome this the Air Ministry in 1937 acquired the patent rights on an excellent American motor. But as a result of opposition on the part of French motor manufacturers the Air Ministry in 1938 abandoned the construction of this motor. Similarly in 1937 the air force suffered from delays in the manufacture of its ammunition and machine guns. Even after the war had begun, the production of new planes suffered from delays in the manufacture of landing-gear.

The third cause of delay was the stagnant mentality of the French Government administration. Airplane production suffered especially from the lack of understanding among the bureaucrats in the Ministry of Finance. They applied to aviation the sort of administrative methods that belonged to horse-and-buggy days. For example, in June 1937 the Air Ministry needed the authorization of the Ministry of Finance to order planes to be delivered in 1938. The Air Ministry asked for this authorization urgently. They received it only in October — and then with a reduction of fifty percent. All Americans who had occasion to deal with the French *functionnaires* in charge of purchasing war materials found their methods aggravatingly slow. Even after war actually began they stuck to their old habits.

Such were the real bottlenecks that prevented the rapid manufacture of planes. Naturally, there were many other causes for delay, notably the bad organization of French industry as a whole.

Back of all this, and aggravating all the difficulties I have emphasized, was the bad political and social climate which had long existed in France, and especially from 1934 to 1939. France

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was a house divided against itself. Misunderstanding between employers and workers was aggravated by the opposition between what can roughly be called the Fascists and anti-Fascists, between the adversaries and defenders of democracy. This political fever reached a crisis stage with the famous Paris riot of February 6, 1934, and was intensified up to the time of the general strike in December 1938. It would be childish to imagine that German propaganda did not help create this agitation and did not use it to break down the moral strength of France.

It would lead us too far afield to try to examine here who was responsible for this social situation and for the consequent agitation. What we must try to do is to estimate its economic consequences. There can be no doubt that it hampered industrial production as a whole, including, of course, the manufacture of aircraft. Delays in deliveries of raw materials and tools increased the delays already being incurred in the delivery of engines and completed planes.

X. THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE AVIATION INDUSTRY

Nationalization of the aviation industry was not a cause for delay in production. I would like to emphasize that there was nothing revolutionary about the procedure. The State did not expel the owners and hand the factories over to the workers. Under a law which was passed almost unanimously by the French Parliament, the State bought a majority of the shares in certain industries. In the case of the aviation industry approximately 70 percent of the body manufacturers and 10 percent of the motor industry were so affected. The indemnities due the owners were paid by the Ministry of Finance and not by the Air Ministry. They had been fixed by independent arbitration commissions set up to safeguard private interests.

Nationalization brought some inconveniences. It also brought unmistakable advantages, among them these two:

It permitted the regrouping of the aviation industry. New factories were built, especially in the provinces and away from the large cities, thus assuring the dispersion of the industry. It also enabled the establishment of common purchasing programs (interchange of patents, allocation of key materials, etc.) and the organization of professional training for the workers in different parts of France.

It permitted the State to choose among the industrialists and

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place the best men at the head of the vital national industries. Experience showed that the choice was good. The proof was negative as well as positive. Beginning with 1938, massive orders again were given to those industries which had been left out of the nationalization, notably the firms of Renault, Breguet and Amiot. The experience of French aviation with these three firms was highly disappointing. All our good planes (Potez, Bloch, Dewoitine) came from the plants which had been nationalized.

The fact is that nationalization was partial industrial mobilization, which put the ablest industrialists in charge of the plants and which permitted the State to undertake a regrouping of the industry and to institute new machine tools. Anyone who knows how outdated French machine tools were in 1936 will approve the efforts made to reorganize French industry under the plans for nationalization.

XI. THE CONDUCT OF AIR WARFARE

In spite of its inferiority the French air force could have resisted the German air force. The British were able to hold their own alone against the Germans after June 22, 1940. What the British air force achieved alone could have been achieved even better in union with the French air force.

As France and Britain lacked numerical superiority, or even equality, they needed a highly perfected aerial strategy. Their most important problem was to distribute the force at their disposal correctly and to use it intelligently. To accomplish this they needed a joint air command and a technical organization permitting rapid concentration and direction of available forces. Because of its mobility an air force lends itself particularly well to such concentrations. But for a thousand airplanes to be assembled at a given point at an hour's notice all the services of command, of liaison and of control have to be prepared in peacetime. In September 1939 these prerequisites did not exist on our side. They had existed in 1936–37, but they had been destroyed in 1938.

In 1936–1937 the General Staff of the French air force contained, under the direction of General Fequant, a brilliant group of young and audacious officers. These young men, among whom 43-year-old General Jauneaud was outstanding, created a small but modern army of the air, organized by air divisions and well adapted to the necessities of French military policy. One year

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after the publication of the French Decrees which General Jauneaud had inspired, the Germans created the air divisions which later permitted them to act in great air formations in Norway, Holland, Belgium and France.

In 1938 General Fequant was replaced as Chief of the Air Staff by General Vuillemin, a popular officer with the Army because of his pluck in rising from the ranks without ever having gone through one of the great military schools. General Vuillemin was personally a very courageous man, but he disliked the ideas and personality of young, intelligent and ambitious General Jauneaud. He shunted Jauneaud aside into an administrative post, just as General de Gaulle was "disgraced" when he proposed and pressed for the creation of mechanized divisions. At the beginning of 1939 the *organisation Jauneaud* was suppressed. France gave up the French idea of the air divisions at the very moment Germany began to apply it.

Having committed these peacetime errors of organization, the General Staff needed only to fail in imagination in actual battle in order to ensure defeat.

XII. FAULTY DISTRIBUTION OF AIR UNITS

At the beginning of May 1940 the Germans had about 7,000 first-line planes. They concentrated for the air battle over France and the Low Countries practically all their forces and reserves, leaving in Norway and along their extended eastern frontiers only effectives of small importance. A total of approximately 6,000 planes were actually used in the attack on Holland, Belgium and France. Thanks to Germany's supply of reserve crews and machines, the number did not decrease throughout May and June.

France did the opposite. The French air forces remained dispersed and strung out. A thousand planes were left on the Mediterranean (approximately 600 in North Africa, at the disposal of the land forces, and 350 at the disposal of the Navy) and 400 planes were left in the Alps, facing Italy, not yet a belligerent. Germany attacked us with 80 percent of her total air force. We opposed it with only 40 percent of an already insufficient air force. This bad strategy produced a real catastrophe. The Vichy Government declares that on June 12 only 550 modern planes were left in France to oppose 5,000 German planes. This may be true, for thanks to the lack of prevision of the French General Staff our aviators had to fight one to five and

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sometimes one to seven against the Germans, when it ought to have been possible for them to fight one against two. To the six thousand airplanes which Germany threw into the Battle of France the French and English could easily have opposed 3,000 airplanes. The British experience at Dunkerque in June and in their own isles in September proved that a proportion of one to two is sufficient for a good General Staff to organize an efficient resistance. We all know that the defensive needs fewer forces than the offensive. But what the British General Staff achieved by careful concentration and skilful utilization of their units the French General Staff was incapable of doing. Comment is superfluous on their decision to leave in North Africa a third of their air forces at a moment when the Nazis were attacking our metropolitan area with all their might.

XIII. PARACHUTE TROOPS

This analysis of French aviation in the war would be incomplete if no mention were made of the parachutists. German parachutists played an important rôle in the conquest of Holland, Belgium and France. But parachute troops could have been even more useful to the French than to the Germans. The German motorized units which rushed far ahead into enemy territory had great difficulties in maintaining liaison with the infantry divisions following after. French parachute troops could have worked havoc with this attenuated liaison. They also would have found ready help among the masses of the French and Belgian civilian population, whereas the Germans had to operate in unknown territory and amidst a hostile people.

The military use of parachutes is a Soviet invention. In 1935 the Red Army tried them out on a large scale (an entire brigade) during manœuvres in the Ukraine. In 1936 France created two groups of parachute troops and used them in the summer manœuvres of 1937. These two groups were commanded by a first-rate officer, Major Geille. It was decided to form three more groups in 1938; and as these were to be transformed into battalions, France could have had five battalions of parachutists (1,500 men) by the end of 1939. But in the course of 1938 a violent campaign was let loose against the idea of parachutists in the pro-Fascist organs of the French press. The parachute organization was ridiculed and the suggestion was made that it was a result of my policy of Franco-Soviet rapprochement. One im-

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portant air force commander declared that "parachutists are good only for the circus." This became the official doctrine. The French General Staff turned their back on parachute troops just at the time that the German generals were taking the idea up.

During the early months of the war Major Geille and his men were distributed among infantry units. At the last minute, in the month of May, the Air Minister, M. Laurent Eynac, tried to correct the mistake of the French General Staff. It was too late. France, which had had parachute troops before Germany, was unable to reconstruct her units before the final defeat.

XIV. CONCLUSION

In short, the defeat of the French air force is to be considered the result of many mistakes — political, industrial and military. The most important seem to have been the following:

French industrial capacity and output were inadequate as a result of the wrong economic policy pursued by French governments from 1920 to 1939. France did not have an economic policy commensurate with her foreign policy.

French statesmen and the French General Staff underestimated the importance of aviation in modern warfare. They prepared for a war of position and refused to believe in the Blitzkrieg.

French strategy was unimaginative and hesitating while that of Germany was imaginative and audacious. Specifically in the air, the French Staff never used more than 60 percent of existing French aircraft.

Beyond this, however, let us remember that the collapse of France was not only a military collapse, it was also a political and moral collapse. What has happened in Britain proves that war is not only a matter of planes and of tanks, but that it also is a matter of will and of spirit. Too many people in France refused to fight against Hitler because they had lost their faith in democracy and no longer valued individual and national freedom.

In ending, I would like to pay homage to the courage of France's aviators. Always outnumbered, with too few machines, badly equipped and badly directed, they accomplished real wonders. Their gallantry deserved a better fate.

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HOW EUROPE IS FIGHTING FAMINE

By Karl Brandt

NEWSPAPER headlines have assured us that famine stalks in Europe, but often the articles underneath consist mainly of conjectures based on supposed analogies with conditions during World War I or on out-of-date or fragmentary evidence. It is highly important for us, politically, to know whether the conquering, the conquered, and the few remaining neutrals of Europe are actually suffering from empty stomachs, or are likely to suffer in the near future, and whether there is anything they can do about it, and if so what. Let us therefore examine the facts in so far as we can learn them.

After knowing disastrous sweeps of famine for centuries, Europe finally succeeded in conquering hunger just as earlier she had banished the Black Death and other scourges. In Russia, India and China waves of hunger were, and still are, common. But in Europe they had disappeared, except in times of war. Among the measures which had brought about this result the more significant were an extensive storage policy; quick adjustments, when necessary, in the supply of grain set aside for the feeding of livestock; the reduction or expansion of livestock herds in view of the food and fodder situation; a readier access to overseas supplies; the accumulation of private reserves by ever-vigilant speculators; and, most important of all, the increased cultivation of high-yielding crops such as potatoes, sugar beets and fodder.

But though famine had disappeared as a phenomenon in Europe it remained a traditional fear. Children still are brought up never to waste a bit of food, because scarcity, if not famine itself, may be just around the corner. And Europeans are also aware from actual experience that war brings a scarcity of almost everything they eat and wear. As a result, consumers in European cities make more of a habit of keeping their pantry shelves well-stocked than Americans do. The farmers, too, as producers, are used to acting to forestall any threatened scarcity, for when crops are failing their governments instruct them to make adjustments long before any shortage becomes generally evident.

We can be sure that the Europeans have not been sitting idly by, twiddling their thumbs, until famine overtakes them or until charity from the United States or new supplies from Argentina or

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some other exporting country come to their rescue. If aid should come they would welcome it. But they know that even then it could only supplement the adjustments they must make themselves. And even small adjustments, when applied to the food habits of 330 million people and the production habits of 120 million farmers, will obviously produce great results.

II

Rationing has two objects: to eke out supplies efficiently and to eke them out evenly. The mere fact that rationing exists in a country does not necessarily mean that there is famine there. On the contrary, it may indicate merely that the government is on the alert to avoid famine, to make certain that rising prices and fear of scarcity do not lead to speculation or to hoarding and gorging by the well-to-do at the expense of low-income groups. Rationing measures are quite as important for public morale as they are for the maintenance of the physical fitness of soldiers and laborers.

Today practically all the European countries, those that export food as well as those that import, have rationed at least some of the essential foodstuffs. Normally the whole Continent, excluding the British Isles, imports 6 percent of its carbohydrates (grain, potatoes, and sugar) and 20 to 25 percent of its edible fats and oils. With the outbreak of war, a major part of these imports, and especially the fats and oils, became inaccessible. Germany foresaw this, and long before she launched her attack on Poland she had scientifically prepared a streamlined rationing system to take care of the different requirements of various age groups and occupations. Sweden, Finland and Switzerland, the few remaining neutrals, besides Portugal and Spain, early introduced rationing schemes. And since then the other nations, belligerent or occupied, have followed suit. With typical thoroughness, Germany rationed every kind of food. Bread is not rationed in Switzerland, Portugal, Greece and Italy. Meat, bacon and fish are not rationed in Denmark and Norway. Potatoes are not rationed anywhere except in Germany, Belgium, and, recently Holland.

In April of this year the basic weekly bread ration for a "normal" consumer varied from 43 ounces or less in Spain, to 56 ounces in Belgium, 59 in occupied and unoccupied France, 80 in Denmark, and 85 in Germany. In addition to these basic bread rations for adults, special rations were granted professional groups

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to meet the requirements of the physical work they perform. The rations of butter and fats range all the way from 2 ounces in Poland, 3 in occupied France and 5 in Bohemia and Moravia, to 7 ounces in Italy, 9 in Holland, 9½ in Germany, 11 in Norway, and 12½ in Denmark. Similarly, sugar rations vary from 2¼ ounces to 13 ounces and more.

To ascertain what these rations mean in terms of adequate nutrition is exceedingly difficult. To compare them with the average per capita consumption of 71 ounces of wheat-rye-corn bakery products in the United States [1] would be quite misleading, for reasons too complicated to explain here. Knowledge of normal peacetime food habits in each country is required, and these habits differ radically. In Poland, potatoes and rye bread have always formed the basic food. In France, it is wheat bread. Again, in some countries the rations change rapidly, while in others, such as Germany, they remain relatively stable. In countries with a large rural population much food evades public control. Hence comparisons must be made carefully and judgments must be cautious. Short rations in bread do not necessarily lead to under-nutrition in countries where potatoes remain plentiful (e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia, Norway, Denmark, and Holland). The same is true of short meat rations if there are ample supplies of fish, cheese, or dry peas, beans or lentils. Short rations of butter, lard, and margarine are not important so long as bacon, pork and sausages are available.

III

By this spring all the governments of Europe were in control of stocks and were regulating to some extent the consumption and distribution of all essential foods which were, or threatened to become, scarce. The various food administrations naturally have displayed different degrees of skill. Next to Germany it seems probable that Switzerland, Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Finland have the most efficient food administrations. Their markets were organized on behalf of the farmers many years ago, and as a result the farmers are used to coöperation and discipline.

Some countries, anticipating coming emergencies, began accumulating "war reserves" in 1938 and 1939. In occupied areas like Norway, Holland, Belgium, and France, the German Army

[1] Figure calculated from data of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, January 1940.

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has requisitioned large parts of these stores.[2] Some were released later in payment for political, military or industrial coöperation. But in the neutral countries which have so far escaped "protective custody" the reserves on hand helped avoid real stringency.

All countries with efficient administrations have readopted the food-saving methods developed during the first World War, along with the refinements worked out since by the German grain monopoly beginning in 1928. A higher ratio of flour to be extracted from wheat and rye has been fixed, and this has made it possible to increase by 15 or 20 percent the bread output from a given unit of grain. This procedure reduces the amount of bran and millfeed for animals. In other words, foodstuffs that once went into the manger are rerouted to the human dinner table. In countries compelled to be especially thrifty with grain, the millers are forced to extract 80 to 90 pounds of flour from 100 pounds of wheat instead of only 70 pounds. Hence they have only 10 or 15 pounds of bran and millfeed to sell to hog feeders and cattlemen instead of 30 or 40 pounds. Another step in the same direction is the compulsory admixture to wheat and rye flour of the flours obtained from barley and corn, or of starch from potatoes. Germany, Italy, Belgium, Norway and Spain, and even wheat exporting countries like Hungary, Jugoslavia and Rumania, use these devices. In some areas in Spain the proportion of wheat in bread flour is reported to be only 50 percent, the rest being admixtures of corn meal, barley flour or bean meal.[3]

Similar techniques are applied to other foodstuffs. Whole milk is reserved primarily for children. Calves are cut off from whole milk except in their first weeks of life. All remaining milk is manufactured into butter, cheese or condensed milk; while skim milk, buttermilk, and even whey are saved for direct human consumption. Germany distributes a war food called "Migetti," consisting of whey-protein, potato starch, and several other mixtures. Soybeans grown in southeastern Europe, heretofore used exclusively for extraction of oil and animal feed, are now used for human food on a large scale, especially in the German army.

IV

One of the chief methods of food retrenchment is in connection with animal husbandry. Normally only 35 percent of the grain

[2] See General Goering's paper, the *National Zeitung*, Essen, January 7, 1941, p. 9.
[3] *New York Times*, March 18, 1941, p. 3.

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consumed in Europe is used for making bread. The remaining 65 percent is fed to animals. But it is better to eat less meat than to be short of bread. When farmers are called on to reduce their livestock they begin with chickens and pigs, because they are converters of grain and also because they can be replaced quickly when sufficient feed-grain supplies again become available. Denmark and Holland, whose vast exporting egg industries were formerly geared mainly to the British market, have reduced their chicken flocks materially. Denmark's flocks have shrunk from 15 to 7 million, and Holland's from 28 to 20 million. In Norway and Belgium the same thing has happened. Hogs are always raised for slaughter, and farmers are accustomed to adjusting the number they raise to the feed supplies available. The herds of pigs in countries dependent on large feed imports were heavily culled. Denmark sold live pigs to Germany until she had reduced her pig stock from 3.1 to 1.5 million. Holland and Sweden canned pork for reserves.

Cattle are more valuable and slow-growing, so action on them has been less drastic. Up to date nothing has occurred which would indicate any dangerous depletion in this great capital asset of Europe. Denmark culled 200,000 cows out of 1.6 million, and 200,000 heifers out of 650,000, so as to keep up dairy production in spite of the feed shortage.[4] Holland reduced her cattle by 18 percent. The daily press has treated sensible adjustments like these in two prominent export agricultural countries as highly sensational. Actually, there are as yet no indications that the total productive livestock herd of Europe has been critically reduced. The period of active military operations on land was so short that, so far as is known, there was only insignificant destruction of farm animals. In France the war loss is said to have been the worst. Yet Pierre Caziot, Minister for Agriculture, stated late in May that from all causes France now has a "deficit" of 1.2 million head of cattle. As she had 15.6 million head of cattle in 1938, her stock is temporarily 8 percent below normal.[5] The slaughter referred to above cannot be considered a net loss, because practically all the meat either was added to reserves or was currently consumed. How serious a shortage of animal products will ensue depends on many developments, none of which can be foretold with any certainty either by optimists or pessimists.

[4] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, November 15, 1940; *Die Tat*, January 29, 1941, no. 24.
[5] *New York Times*, May 25, 1941, p. 32.

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However, a reduction in the number of farm animals is only one of the measures used to help solve the farmer's war problems. Next comes a change in the animals' bill of fare. They have to get along with less concentrated feed, such as protein-bearing oilcake and grain, and eke it out with more fishmeal and seafood scrap, more beet-sugar molasses, and more potatoes. In real emergencies, leaves from trees are harvested, dried, and compressed. Off the shores of Scandinavia quantities of certain sorts of seaweed are fished out and fed to the cattle.

Modern chemistry also comes to the rescue by producing cellulose-feed. In Norway, Finland and Sweden, all great wood-exporting countries, new cellulose-feed factories are in operation and are expanding. Cordwood is processed into a feed pulp with a digestible nutrient content equivalent to 85 percent of that of good feed grain. Norway let contracts for 100,000 tons of this pulp in 1940, and for 150,000 tons for the first six months of 1941, for domestic consumption.[6] Germany is constructing two large factories for processing feed cellulose out of pulp imported from Norway. The price of this processed feed is kept at the level of natural feeds of equal nutritive value. By-products are alcohol and feed yeast, rich in protein.

V

Since winter is the period of real worry, the European governments are acting to save all the perishable summer food possible. Southern France, Holland, Belgium, Switzerland and Germany have set up numerous factories for drying vegetables. Since tin is scarce, and the supply of lacquered sheet-iron cans is short, quick freezing, cold storage, and salting are widely used.

Plans are being made, too, to draw on such potential but unused food resources as exist in Europe, especially in the east and south. Actually, however, the chance for large developments within the next year or so is not impressive. More can be expected from the intelligence and equipment of the farmers of densely populated countries like Belgium, Holland, Germany, Denmark, Switzerland and France than by the development of the unused natural resources of more backward countries. Later on, however, if the need persists, these will come into new production.

On the whole, the hostilities in Western Europe, caused remarkably little destruction of farms, livestock and implements.

[6] *National Zeitung*, February 7, 1941.

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Belgium was even able, last year, to grow and harvest an excellent sugar beet crop. Of 5,000 farm houses destroyed in Norway, 3,000 were rebuilt by the fall of 1940 or replaced with prefabricated structures shipped from Sweden. In many countries the fall seeding of 1940 considerably expanded the acreage of short crops. The spring seeding of 1941 has been intensified by emergency planning, the pressure of great publicity, and, in some countries, compulsory labor. In Holland, Denmark and Switzerland, which have had great experience in agricultural coöperation and planning, such methods present no new problems in principle. Holland has prohibited the cultivation of flower bulbs and seeds and has encouraged the use of flower gardens for raising small fruit and vegetables. Belgium's aim is to grow 60 percent more wheat and 20 percent more potatoes. In France, the Vichy Government has contracted with farmers to grow 500,000 acres of potatoes, and has put both premiums and penalties into the contracts.[7] Contracts have also been let on a large scale for sugar beet production, for vegetables to go to the drying plants, and for oilseed. Special awards are offered for well-kept olive trees.

The famine-fighting crops *par excellence* are potatoes and sugar beets, for they produce several times as much energy per acre as do grain or grass. So all the European countries with any experience in them at all are going in for a maximum production. These hoe crops require labor, draft power and fertilizer in quantity; but none of these is scarce, except for phosphate fertilizer. The latter is being shipped in to some extent from Morocco and Russia, and even if a shortage persists it is doubtful whether it will curtail production in the years just ahead. Had agriculture been motorized to the same degree in Europe as in Soviet Russia, the shortage of motor fuels might have produced famine conditions by now. As it is, the farmers are complaining, but on the whole it seems that Europe's relatively small number of tractors is being supplied somehow or other, either with gasoline or with substitute fuels. Horses are again available in the conquered countries since the armies disbanded, and oxen fill some gaps.

Germany continues to intensify the cultivation of her own farms and of those in the annexed areas, mainly by plowing up pastures and turning them to sugar beets and potatoes. Favored by good weather, the 1940 potato crop totaled 53 million tons, compared to the average of 44 million tons in 1929–1933. This

[7] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, February 21, 1941.

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additional 9 million tons is the equivalent of 2,250,000 tons of grain. The acreage of sugar beets has doubled since 1932. It not only provides more sugar, but each acre yields from five to eight times as much cattle feed as it would if it were sown to grain.

Europe's real shortage, that in fats, will become less acute as the various re-arrangements become effective. Larger potato crops and more molasses and dried sugar beets will contribute feed for fattening more hogs. But the direct attack on the fat shortage is through increased cultivation of oilseeds. This represents a reversal of historical trends. In 1870 Europe grew most of its own oilseeds. But in the succeeding 70 years it turned more and more to less expensive tropical and marine sources of supply and utilized the freed acreage for better paying crops. Now in view of the scarcity of fats, European farmers once more have begun to cultivate the poppy, rape, mustard, sunflower, flax and hemp of their grandfathers. In 1940 Germany grew 918,840 acres of rapeseed, flax and hemp, compared with almost none seven years ago. Little Denmark is planting 889,200 acres of oilseeds, or 12 percent of her total cultivated area, in order to become independent in margarine raw materials by fall. Holland, Belgium and France are following suit. In all the Danubian countries, great subsidies are offered for growing more oilseeds, including sunflowers. Cotton and soybeans, that miraculous all-round foodstuff, are being grown in southeastern Europe also. Some of the changes are still in the blue-print stage, but most of them are on the way to becoming reality. The oilseeds help not only for their primary purpose but also to fill the protein feed gap, because the cake or residue left over after extraction of the oil has a high protein content.

In countries where cultivated land is scarce, especially Holland, Switzerland and Norway, energetic efforts are being made to find more acres that can be brought under cultivation. In Holland, the new Polders of the drained Zuider Zee are being plowed up ahead of schedule. Switzerland has broken in 100,000 acres of new land, and Norway is working along similar lines. Finland is clearing 740,000 acres of worthless woodlands with American bulldozers and resettling on them 40,000 farm families from the lost Karelian province. Of the new area, 75,000 acres will be put into barley, 50,000 acres into oats, and 120,000 acres into potatoes. These countries are also increasing their sheep flocks so as to utilize the scanty grazing facilities of the mountain

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ranges to the limit. In all countries, urban populations are expanding their kitchen gardens.

The seas — "salt water deserts" to inlanders — have always been regarded by the seafaring nations as rich storehouses of both food and fodder; and in this emergency they naturally turned to them at once.

Until December last the Dutch and Belgian fishing fleets were kept at anchor by the British bombardment or by order of the Germans who feared sabotage or aid to Britain. Now to some extent they have begun steaming and sailing again. The Norwegians and Danes have continued doing so right along. Most of the adverse conditions confronting the Norwegian fishermen were soon mastered. Charcoal gas generators met the shortage of diesel oil, and extension of the coastal fishing zone to 30 miles offshore gave greater opportunities for a good catch. Offshore whaling, which had been forbidden, is now practiced and yields a considerable amount of oil. The Danes are expanding both their fishing ports and their fishing fleet.

As a result, since last summer both Norway and Denmark have been shipping fish in bulk to Germany, Holland, Belgium and elsewhere. In 1940 the Norwegians caught 1,070,000 tons of fish, as compared with 1,030,000 tons the preceding year.[8] Their herring catch was the highest since the record catch of 1911. This was due partly to exceptionally strong runs of herring, partly to intensive fishing. Some fish are eaten locally, of course. But the bulk are shipped southward or else provide oil and a residue used as fishmeal or fertilizer.

Modern chemistry renders this crop from the sea even more valuable. Condensed fish preserves form a product similar to corned beef, and hydrogenated fish oil serves as raw material for margarine, shortening or salad oil. The sea also supplies valuable sea weed that can be used for cattle feed, for filling material in the manufacture of soap, and as a fishmeal concentrate for hogs and chickens.

Especial attention is paid by the various national food administrations to maintaining the supply of so-called "protective" foodstuffs, i.e. those rich in vitamins. Last winter Germany started distributing vitamin C doses free of charge to nursing mothers, children and coal miners. The army diet also is carefully stepped up with vitamins. Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, Den-

[8] *Frankfurter Zeitung*, February 5, 1941.

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mark and Norway also supply low-income groups with margarine fortified with vitamins A and D.

The foregoing illustrations are intended to show that the food situation in Europe is not be be viewed solely in the framework of a given set of facts, but as something that can be modified by human intelligence and energy. All the possible means of adjustment taken together do not solve the food problem or bring back the prewar status. However, in combination with rationing, they do make the situation bearable. Famine may strike particular localities that are overcrowded with refugees; but so far we have no reliable reports that this is the case. In some countries the situation is certainly stringent. It is worse where there is general disorganization and a lack of administrative efficiency, and particularly where, as in Spain, the effects of civil war have prevented the effective use of the various means of adjustment described above. In other areas, like the General Government of Poland, the adjustments fail to bring general relief because the whole population is kept under what might be called a permanent state of arrest.

VI

There is still another branch of the campaign against famine. This is under the command of foreign trade strategists, in close coöperation with the national banks and various departments of government. The changes in European trade since September 1939 are breath-taking, largely because the disappearance of customs barriers and the centralization of trade direction in German hands has resulted in more specialization in chosen "belts." Germany is hard at the job of rearranging all trade routes away from the oceans. The Reichsbank, through its Deutsche Verrechnungs Kasse, is the clearing center for the cobweb of German-controlled barter trade. Food, feed, fertilizer and industrial raw materials are given special attention. Where high prices are not sufficient to move commodities in the desired direction at the desired speed, political and military pressure are called into play. Trade becomes amazingly manœuvrable under the pressure of dire need and the coercion of an impatient tyrant.

Shipments inside the Continent, both north and south and east and west, are the most important; but a certain degree of relief also comes to Germany and German-dominated lands from

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Soviet Russia. The British sea blockade cannot touch the 2,000-mile Russian border, and Moscow is accelerating her deliveries across it, partly at any rate because of her own need for industrial goods. German imports from Russia have soared from a low of 47 million marks, in 1938, to a peak of 436 million marks. Foodstuffs and feed used to hold a minor place in Russian exports to Germany, but this has been changed somewhat since the annexation of several food exporting regions — the three Baltic states, Bessarabia and part of Bukovina. Russia ships some grain to Finland, Sweden, Norway, Belgium, Holland, Switzerland and Germany, and also some oilseeds and butter.

Bulgaria receives fertilizer duty-free from Germany and in return ships corn, wheat, rapeseed, sunflower seeds and soybeans. Hungary and Rumania both trade mainly with Germany. Denmark and Italy have a barter agreement by which Italy ships rice, fruits, wine and tobacco, while Denmark ships eggs, bacon, dairy machinery and other machines. A Danish-Finnish trade agreement provides for shipments of sugar, salt pork, meat preserves and eggs by Denmark and of lumber and paper by Finland. In February 1941 Switzerland and Russia signed their first trade agreement since 1917. Under it Russia ships grain, timber, oil and cotton in return for Swiss boilers, turbines, hydraulic presses and precision instruments. But perhaps the best rod for measuring European intra-continental trade is the volume of German foreign trade. Following the outbreak of the war it was curtailed in almost all categories; by the end of 1940 it had attained the prewar level, and it is constantly rising.

Finally, some of the "real" though hard-pressed neutrals, such as Finland, Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal, as well as "mug-wump" neutrals like unoccupied France and Spain, receive a certain amount of food from overseas under British navicerts. Switzerland has even chartered a small merchant marine which shuttles back and forth between Lisbon and Genoa. On one extreme rim of the continent, Finland receives food from Russia, Argentina and the United States; on the other side, Spain receives grain and other foodstuffs from Argentina. France has obtained grain shipments in considerable quantity from Morocco, Algeria and Tunis, and also from Argentina via Algeria.

All of this trade struggles with innumerable obstacles and hazards. Railroads, rivers, and canals are overburdened. Coastal shipping suffers from the effects of British bombardments, the

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blockade, and a shortage of vessels and port facilities. Swiss newspapers record the Odysseys of the imports that come from Lisbon via the Mediterranean and Genoa, or overland from Lisbon.[9] But the obstacles are not, under present circumstances, insurmountable. There is no general breakdown of transportation.

VII

By the time these words appear in print the critical season, from the food point of view, will have passed for this year. The new crop of vegetables and early fruit, and the dairy produce from cows returned to pasture, will relieve the greatest strain of the last months of the grain year. Towards the end of June and in July the first yield of the new grain will also become available. The shortage which will still persist can then be transferred to the spring of 1942. How much that shortage will be depends mainly on the size of the new crop. Thus far the crop reports have indicated generally favorable weather conditions.

The chances are, then, that Europe will be able in this Second World War to keep the wolf from the door, at least for another nine or ten months, and this despite the great initial strain of the food situation in Belgium, Central Poland and Spain. It was possible to bring the situation under control so rapidly because activite hostilities were so brief. If the war drags along for another two or three years, and especially if the United States actively participates, the picture will change again. The transportation system will deteriorate under intensified aerial bombardment, and the spread of economic, social and political disorder will break down the careful systems of the food administrations. But so long as Europe is in the grip of a tyrant who can maintain physical order, and so long as the process of wresting his booty from him has not actually begun, there seems no reason to believe that the food situation will grow worse, and much to believe that it will improve. Only when the combined American and British output of war materials begins to overtake that of the Reich will the European food situation require a careful reappraisal. Unless crops fail badly, we can provisionally shelve discussion of it until next spring.

[9] *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, March 23, 1941.

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SCANDINAVIA IN THE "NEW ORDER"

By Joachim Joesten

AFTER a year of tension, blitzkrieg and terror, Scandinavia seems to have reverted to its former rôle as the "quiet corner" of Europe. Mars, with his retinue of reporters, broadcasters and cameramen, has moved back to more familiar battlefields in the Balkans, the Near East and the Mediterranean. In the West, the crucial Battle of the Atlantic rages. Far from the headlines again, the conquered nations of the North are settling down to their new status as Germany's silent satellites in the great German living-space. It no longer is the dignified quiet of peace-loving, well-ordered nations. It is the stillness of the graveyard and the prison.

Hitler's sway over northern Europe is now firmly established. From Flensburg Firth to the North Cape, and beyond even to Spitzbergen, there is nothing to check his ambitions except perhaps Soviet Russia's influence in the eastern half of what Nazi geopoliticians call the Fenno-Scandian "Grossraum." British influence in this wide area has virtually ceased to exist. It would be foolish to delude ourselves on this basic, if unpleasant, fact. Too much importance has been given to the scattered raids which Allied naval units have lately carried out against Nazi-held territory in Norway. These were brave and heartening actions, but they do not in any way affect the present military balance.

The pattern of Nazi domination in Europe today is variegated, ranging from more or less voluntary alliances, enforced "neutrality," and "protection" in approved gangster style, down through various degrees of vassalage to the most abject serfdom. The Scandinavian nations before the war began were a happy community unified by geography, racial origins, history, language and very similar democratic institutions. Today, according to Alfred Rosenberg,[1] ideological monitor of the Great German Reich, they are united with Germany by a "community of fate." "Fate," he declared, "so willed it that the German Reich has taken under its protection the entire territory from which once the German peoples migrated." In exchange for their traditional mutual ties the Scandinavian nations have received a new common denominator — German "protection."

[1] Speaking in Berlin on July 9, 1940.

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I. NORWAY

Unhappy Norway, because it dared resist German armed aggression, is being run on semi-colonial lines. No African governor-general ever held greater power or used it more ruthlessly against the natives than does Reichskommissar Josef Terboven, Hitler's local satrap.

On September 25, 1940, a *coup d'état* ended five months of fruitless negotiations between the occupying authorities and those elected representatives of the Norwegian people who had not accompanied King Haakon and the Government on their flight to London. Since then there is no law in Norway except Terboven's and that of his stooge, Vidkun Quisling. All constitutional guarantees have been suspended; the triple division of powers into legislative, executive and judicial, which is the hallmark of democratic administration, has been abolished; all legally appointed judges have been dismissed; and the authority of the Supreme Court is now subordinated to that of the Reichskommissar. Like workers in Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, the Norwegian workers are forbidden to move from one place to another and are assigned dictatorially to jobs, at wages dictatorially fixed by the authorities. They have become practically serfs.

By the same stroke of the pen which put an end to half a century of progressive social legislation, Reichskommissar Terboven erased the traditional pattern of Norway's political life. All parties except Quisling's *Nasjonal Samling* were dissolved; King Haakon was declared to have forfeited his throne; and the Storting or parliament was abolished. The Administrative Council which had taken over the functions of government between April 9 and September 25, 1940, was sent home, and in its stead the Reichskommissar appointed thirteen "constituted cabinet ministers," all members of the *N.S.* or Nazi sympathizers, each with dictatorial powers in his domain.

Nasjonal Samling means National Union. The irony of this designation for Major Quisling's party of traitors, which could not succeed in electing even one representative to the Storting at the last election, was intensified after September 25. For with Hitler's aid Quisling really succeeded in bringing about a practically complete national union — against himself. Before the war, Norway was subject to intense party strife, though it seldom degenerated into violence. Today all the four great traditional

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parties, the Conservatives (*Höire*), the Liberals (*Venstre*), the Agrarian Party (*Bondeforbundet*) and Labor (*Arbeiderpartiet*) are united in a fierce underground battle against Quisling and his usurpers, which at the most number five percent of the population.

At the moment of writing, Vidkun Quisling has not yet achieved his ambition of becoming Norway's head of state, but he has assumed the title "Föreren," an imitation of Führer and Duce, and of course he virtually directs the cabinet which is composed of his henchmen. This is by no means because Quisling shuns the responsibility of government, or that he has any consciousness of his own unimportance or inadequacies, but merely because during their year as Norway's unbidden guests, Reichskommissar Terboven and General von Falkenhorst have had opportunities to take the measure of Quisling and to test Norwegian feelings regarding him. They have not wished to complicate their thankless task further by openly investing him with the trappings of government.

This has led to a long-drawn-out and as yet unsettled tug-of-war between Berlin, where Quisling, through his personal ties with Hitler and Goering, is still highly regarded, and Oslo, where the leaders in the German civil and military administration know that he is the most hated and despised man in Norway. Probably the issue will be decided, one way or another, during the coming summer or fall.

Meanwhile, however, the *N.S.* and its storm troops, the *hird*, have had a free hand to deal with all opponents of the present Nazi régime. The dissolution of the Administrative Council marked the end of all moderation and compromise. There followed a ruthless terror, not less ferocious than anything which has happened on the Continent. A whole book could be filled with the bare outlines of the tragic fate that has overtaken thousands of Norwegian patriots — jailed, tortured, shot or sent to concentration camps. Oslo alone has now three jails for political prisoners, guarded jointly by German soldiers and *hirdmannen*. The worst of them is "Mollergaten 19," where all sorts of atrocities have been committed.

In spite of all, Norway fights on. Neither the bitterness of defeat nor present sufferings have been able to crush the spirit of this gallant nation. And today, a year after the cessation of hostilities on Norwegian soil, the Norse stand out as one of Britain's

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strongest and most determined allies. In England, the legal Norwegian Government, headed by King Haakon and Prime Minister Nygaardsvold, has far from negligible forces at its disposal. Its biggest asset, of course, is the great Norwegian merchant fleet, which on March 1, 1941, still totalled some 900 vessels, with a gross tonnage of 3,600,000 tons, manned by 25,000 sailors. Contrary to current assumption, this fleet has not been turned over to, nor seized by, the British. It sails under the Norwegian flag and for Norwegian account, naturally in full coöperation with the British ally. The revenue from it, together with the proceeds of the gold reserve of the Bank of Norway which was rescued from the invasion, serves to finance the Norwegian war budget and to cover interest and sinking funds on foreign loans. Meanwhile, across the sea, at Toronto, Canada — "Little Norway" — a bigger air force than Norway has ever had in peacetime is being trained and equipped under the able command of Major Ole Reistad. It is eager to come to grips again with the enemy, and will in the near future.

II. DENMARK

Two years ago Denmark and Norway were, geography aside, very similar. Their kings were brothers, their political systems and social institutions were cast in much the same mold, and their languages were almost as like as are the English and American idioms. Today their lot is very different. Norway, which refused to follow Nazi instructions, has been duly chastised; Denmark, which entered docilely into Hitler's kindergarten, leads a happy life under German protection. Such, at least, is the Nazi picture currently presented to foreign correspondents, whether at press conferences in Berlin or on conducted tours through Copenhagen. On one such occasion, early last April, Dr. Joseph Goebbels said (according to the Stockholm daily, *Svenska Dagbladet*): "Denmark is not an occupied country. We have not been at war with Denmark, but we have concluded with that country an agreement for the cession of military bases. Denmark's sovereignty and her political independence are intact."

It is an equivocation to say that Denmark is not occupied, yet Dr. Goebbels was right in drawing a line between Denmark and countries which were occupied only after being conquered. Denmark refrained from resisting the invader, and in return has been spared many of the hardships imposed on other invaded nations.

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Outward and evident changes in Denmark have been, indeed, surprisingly few. There is as yet no Reichskommissar in Copenhagen, and no Nazi puppet führer has been put in charge by the German military commander. Denmark still has a legitimate King, a constitutional parliament, a Socialist Prime Minister, a powerful Trade Unions Council and a Communist daily paper. The King and the Premier have held their posts for, respectively, twenty-nine and twelve years, not a bad showing in these times.

And yet, Denmark has nothing to be happy about. The Danes know that if the Nazis have so far seemed to spare their country, it is because they needed a Potemkin village to use in impressing other victims faced with the choice of surrender or resistance. But the list of small countries open to German invasion is about used up, and no more pretence of treating Denmark nicely is required. On scrutiny, too, we find that the half of Denmark's supposed privileges which are not destined to be short-lived are already a sham. The future outlook for Denmark is quite as black under Germany as it is for Norway, France, and Poland.

Many samples could be given of the real extent of Danish "independence" and of German "non-interference" in Danish internal political affairs. One or two will suffice. One day last November, the Minister of Commerce, long-time leader of the Danish Conservative Party, Christmas Möller, expressed some doubts about the chance that the country will ever collect a penny of the huge debt (then approaching the billion-kroner mark) owed to Denmark by Germany for requisitioned food and other supplies.[2] The German Minister in Copenhagen, Herr von Renthe-Fink — who is virtually a Reichskommissar for occupied Denmark — at once forced Minister Möller to resign, and according to latest reports he is practically a prisoner in the hands of the Gestapo. The recent sudden recall of Henrik de Kauffmann, Danish Minister to the United States, is another example. Free Danes everywhere in the world gave unstinted applause to his act in signing the Greenland Pact with the American Government, and we may suppose that in King Christian's heart it met with the deepest approval. But the Copenhagen Government hastened to depose the Minister and indicted him on a charge of high treason and for violating the Nazi-inspired "spy law" that came into force last January. Shortly afterwards, the three Danish consuls-

[2] Under the latest Danish-German trade agreement, the Reich is not supposed to pay this debt until after the final victory.

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general in New York, Chicago and San Francisco, who had agreed with the Minister and who refused to return to Denmark, were similarly dismissed.

But it is in the economic field that the true nature of Denmark's "better fate" becomes most apparent. There is no exaggeration in stating that the Germans have systematically looted the country of all its resources and reserves. The new economic order is a "*Raubwirtschaft*," catering to the immediate needs of the occupying country without any regard for the future needs of the victim.

For nearly three-quarters of a century the economy of Denmark was based on livestock. It was large and scientifically handled, and it provided the chief staple products of the country — butter, bacon, eggs, cheese. These commodities were principally sold on the British market. All other countries together, including Germany, in normal years took less than one-fourth of Denmark's farming produce. Since the invasion, however, Germany is absorbing not only all of the produce that used to go to Great Britain, but much more, to such a point that since last November even butter and milk have been rationed in Denmark. This sounds about as though coal were rationed in Newcastle or oil in Texas. But, we are told, this means real boom times for the Danish farmers, for the German buyers nominally pay more for Danish produce than the British used to do.

The whole transaction is a mirage. In the first place, it is not the Germans who really pay for the goods, but the Danes themselves. Everything bought by the occupation authorities is paid for not in marks but in kroner. The Danish National Bank is forced to advance these kroner on behalf of the Reichsbank, which is supposed to settle the account after the war. An analysis of the Bank's latest statement to reach the United States shows that on February 28, 1941, Germany's open debt, on the clearing account, amounted to 488,000,000 kroner. Another item in the same statement lists "various debtors" as owing the Bank 536,000,000 kroner. Informed Danish sources assert that the latter figure represents another hidden German account, 400,000,000 kroner of it representing a forced loan which the Danish National Bank was compelled to make to the German High Command just after the invasion, to cover the costs of occupation. At the past rate of increase of about 70,000,000 kroner a month, it is reasonable to add another 280,000,000 kroner to the total of the Bank's debt since the above statement was issued. It thus becomes ap-

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parent that Germany at present owes nearly one and a half billion kroner to the Danish National Bank. Some observers put the figure very much higher.

Secondly, with the money the Danish farmer gets he can no longer purchase essential raw materials. Artificial fertilizers are indispensable for his fields and fodder concentrates for his cows and pigs and hens. Both were principally imported from overseas; but Denmark now is hermetically shut off by the blockade. As a result, the Danish farmers would have had to reduce their livestock even if it had not been systematically bought up and carried away by the Germans.[3] According to latest reports, Denmark's stock of pigs has already been reduced by 50 percent, her cattle by 12 percent and her chickens by 60 percent.

Whatever the final outcome of the war, then, Denmark is a certain loser. In exchange for her livestock, the foundation and the pride of Danish economy, she is getting German I.O.U.s. If Germany wins the war, her past record in such matters makes the chances that the debt will ever be paid look slight. If Germany loses, Denmark is hardly likely to collect a mark from a country against which the whole world will have prior claims.

III. SWEDEN

Sweden's status in the New Order is not easy to define and hence it continues to be the subject of lively controversy. Official Swedish spokesmen both at home and abroad naturally repudiate suggestions that during the past year their country, too, has been integrated into Germany's *Lebensraum*. They claim emphatically that Sweden, while naturally forced to adapt her policies to the new conditions in northern Europe, has not waived her neutrality nor lost any of her independence.

It will be noted that this claim does not coincide with the official German view as expressed in the statement by Reichsleiter Alfred Rosenberg, already quoted above. He said that the German Reich had taken under its protection the *entire* territory from which the German peoples once migrated. This obviously includes Sweden. His statement was made only four days after the Swedish Government, in an official communiqué dated July 5, 1940, made public the famous "transit agreement" under which Germany was authorized to move both troops and "all kinds of goods,"

[3] A few months ago, some 25,000 head of Danish cattle were transferred to the new Nazi settlers in occupied Lorraine.

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including war material, across Swedish territory on the way to and from Norway.

There also have been several indications that Washington is no longer able to regard Sweden as a country enjoying full freedom of action and maintaining a strict neutrality in the present conflict. Thus in October of last year an executive order barred delivery to Sweden of some 110 modern aircraft built in this country on orders placed more than a year ago. Shortly afterwards, President Roosevelt in a fireside chat let drop the remark that it would be no more "un-neutral" for the United States to aid Britain than it was for Russia and Sweden to place their economic resources at Germany's disposal. More recently word came from Washington that Secretary Morgenthau and the Securities Exchange Commission were suggesting that Swedish (and Swiss) balances in the United States be frozen in order to "prevent their manipulation by the Axis Powers."

Actually, a number of restrictions which the United States currently applies to trade with the Axis and Axis-controlled countries are already in operation against Sweden as well. At a lunch of the Swedish Chamber of Commerce in New York, on March 25, 1941, the Swedish Minister, Mr. Wollmar F. Boström, said: "The American export control system has, I regret to say, recently caused us a great deal of worry. Swedish industries which have for years relied on the United States for their supply of raw materials and semi-manufactured goods have been denied licenses, even when it is hard to see that the export would interfere with the American defense program." [4]

There can be little question that Sweden, economically speaking, now forms an integral part of the German living space. Practically the entire Swedish output of iron-ore, timber and wood-pulp, and a great part of the foodstuffs produced in Sweden, are now going to Germany or to German-occupied countries. This is a logical consequence, of course, of last year's military events in northern Europe, and no one will blame the Swedes for adjusting their economy to existing conditions. Conversely, Sweden does not seem to have any right to object if other countries act in the same spirit and adapt their trade policy to the realities of Sweden's present economic status.

More open to debate than Sweden's economic orientation is the question where she now stands politically and militarily. Many

[4] "American Swedish Monthly," April 1941.

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people in other countries cling to the hope that she may be counted on at least as a potential ally against Germany; others consider this an illusion.

Sweden today is a tragically split personality. Her soul is torn between an inmost desire to preserve her age-old democratic institutions and ideals on one side, and the postulates of "political realism" on the other. There can be absolutely no question that at least 80 percent of the Swedish population pray for a German defeat. They know that only this would permit the survival of the traditional Swedish way of life and bring liberation to Danes and Norwegians, for whom the Swedes naturally have deep sympathy. But it is equally certain that Premier Hansson and Foreign Minister Günther are determined to pursue their present course, which means preserving the status quo and safeguarding Swedish interests through coöperation, within certain limits, with the dominant Power on the Continent, Nazi Germany.

The question arises whether Germany is likely to occupy Sweden in the near future, and, if so, what Sweden's chances are of resisting. An answer on both scores was given by Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels in the same press interview already quoted above. He said: "We have had no reason, nor are we interested, in occupying these countries [Sweden and Switzerland], or in seeking bases there. Nor do we harbor any plans for such action. But one need not know much about Germany's strength and her resources to realize that it would be a trifling matter [*eine Bagatelle*] for our army to occupy both Sweden and Switzerland."

German protestations of peaceful intentions towards this or that country often herald aggression against it, but in this instance Dr. Goebbels probably spoke the truth. The same four reasons which last summer prevented Germany from rounding off her other Scandinavian conquests by occupying Sweden still stand today. They are: (a) unlike Denmark and Norway, Sweden does not lie in the Anglo-German combat zone, hence invasion is not necessary for purely military reasons; (b) Soviet Russia has consistently opposed any change in the status of Sweden; (c) the concessions which the Swedish Government has made to Germany as regards foreign trade, the transit of German troops, and restrictions imposed upon the Swedish press have been considered sufficient in Berlin; (d) if the Swedes chose to offer armed resistance, occupation of their country might well prove costly, as the Swedish Army is well trained and excellently equipped.

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The last point — the size and equipment of the Swedish Army — gives the Swedes a bargaining asset, but hardly more. The wish to maintain some sort of leverage may be the reason why Sweden has sacrified so much, in recent years, on a huge rearmament program. Four years ago her military budget was 148,000,000 kronor. For the current fiscal year it is 2,500,000,000 kronor. While a large part of the money has been raised through multiplication of taxes and duties, no less than 1,500,000,000 kronor have been voluntarily subscribed by the Swedish nation, on two defense loans, in the course of just over one year.

Nevertheless it would be a serious mistake to assume, as many casual observers do, that Sweden's tremendous defense effort is primarily aimed at fighting off a possible German invasion. The principal reason why Sweden is arming to the teeth is because she knows that sooner or later the day will come when the present Nazi-Soviet friendship will break. The ensuing Armageddon will undoubtedly engulf all northern Europe. In that situation the Swedish Government will face a peremptory demand from Germany either to join up and throw the whole weight of Sweden's armed forces into the battle or to bear the brunt of a German onslaught from three sides. All the indications are that Sweden is already preparing for such a contingency. As to the choice which the Swedish Government is likely to make, a good clue seems to be provided by the location and character of the recent army manœuvers, the biggest ever held in Sweden. They were held not along the Norwegian border but in the far north, around the powerful fortress of Boden, built by Sweden during the last war with an eye on Russia.

This is not unnatural. The Swedes, as a nation, nourish a traditional fear of their historical enemies, the Russians. For the last two decades this fear has been reinforced, in the large majority of cases, by an equally strong aversion for Bolshevism. The two emotions combine to make the Swedes feel much more strongly about the Soviet Union than they do about Nazi Germany. For though it is true that Swedes have developed an ideological opposition towards Nazism, this is largely offset by their traditional friendship for the German people. The result of this process of addition and subtraction is to leave Nazi Germany, in the eyes of most Swedes, as the lesser of two evils.

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GOLD: MASTER OR SERVANT?

By William Adams Brown, Jr.

"Man-hours are the only real wealth and the only real capital. Gold is worth nothing anyhow, — as the financial writer of one of our greatest newspapers, greatly daring, pointed out, some weeks ago. We spend millions of man-hours digging it out of the ground, refining it, transporting it, and then in burying it underground again in vaults which cost man-hours to dig and make proof against assault. And if an earthquake swallowed the lot nobody would be any the worse if the controlling financiers kept the knowledge to themselves." — *The Airplane*, London, October 4, 1940.

CHANCELLOR HITLER and his Finance Minister have loudly proclaimed that the German reichsmark, being based on productive labor, is a far sounder form of money than the American dollar backed by all the American gold. In the "New Order" gold will have no place, and the gold hoard of the United States will lose its value. Such statements have been branded by the American Economists' National Committee on Monetary Policy as a typical totalitarian attempt to destroy the confidence of people in democratic countries in their major social institutions. This Committee asserts that Germany cannot impair, much less destroy, the value of the gold stock of the United States, and declares that even if a victorious Germany should refuse to accept our gold, "our currency would still be more valuable because it is secured by gold as an asset than it would be in the absence of such security." This view is in harmony with a common American belief that the dollar is in some way strengthened because it is "backed" by great quantities of gold. We read, for example, in the last Annual Report of the Chairman of the Chase National Bank to its stockholders that, "Our financial strength is *supported* by three-quarters of the world's gold." Yet it is apparent that the present value of an ounce of gold is wholly determined by the fact that it can always be exchanged at the United States Treasury for thirty-five American dollars.

Clearly the debate over "the gold problem" has come to grips with ultimate issues. It now centers around the most fundamental question that can be asked about gold: "Has it become an obsolete form of money?" This question cannot be dismissed with a resounding "No" based on tradition and emotion, nor by a resounding "Yes" backed up by pointing to the record of the past six years. It must be recognized as an open question to be debated

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in the light of the historical record and of the alternative policies with respect to gold which will be open to the Powers after this war.

Professors Graham and Whittlesey, who have described the inflow of gold into the United States during the past six years with great ability in FOREIGN AFFAIRS [1] and elsewhere, have performed the ecclesiastical office of baptism for this phenomenon, and have given it a name, "the golden avalanche." An avalanche is rarely recognized as serving any useful purpose and never seems to stop before it reaches bottom and destroys everything that stands in its way. "The golden avalanche," however, differs from its natural prototype in several important respects. It has performed a number of useful functions, and it may not prove to be irreversible, uncontrollable and destructive. In trying to estimate its future behavior let us look at the past. In the last quarter-century the United States has been a party to seven different methods of international gold distribution. A summary description of all seven — rather than merely of the last three which fall within the period 1934–1941 — will help to sift out possible and probable uses of gold in the future from those which are impossible or improbable.

SEVEN WAYS OF DISTRIBUTING GOLD INTERNATIONALLY

1. Before the first World War gold was a limiting factor regulating in a general way the expansion and contraction of credit in most countries. Gold movements were in general responsive to the ebb and flow of trade and to the needs of the world's banking and currency systems. In the short run they were useful in maintaining exchange stability; and in the long run they enabled rapidly developing countries to satisfy their expanding currency requirements without frequent and violent checks due to inadequacy of gold reserves.

This system of international gold distribution was dominated by London. It was profoundly influenced by the way in which British capital exports were controlled, and countries which shared in its advantages found that they frequently had to make economic adjustments under British pressure. Under this system the United States was a member of what was in effect a world-wide sterling exchange standard. We bought and sold gold at a fixed price in order to share with other countries the advantages

[1] "Has Gold a Future?" April 1939.

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of a confident international movement of long-term capital; in order to enjoy the benefits of an efficient and cheap machinery for financing international trade provided by Great Britain; and in order to avoid the dislocations incident to violent departures in the course of our prices from trends established elsewhere.

2. During the first World War the foundations of this system were destroyed. Its refined techniques were abandoned. Gold moved and credit was extended in total disregard of long-run consequences. Until our entry into the War in April 1917 our purchases of gold were in part connected with our effort to supply war materials to belligerents without breaking down the previously existing system of exchange rates. The sharp distinction previously existing between the movement of gold and goods in international exchange was blurred. This was a misuse of gold, for gold ceased to be a purely financial instrument facilitating trade, and became part of trade itself. The aberration was regarded, however, as temporary, to be succeeded after the war by a restoration of the old order.

3. After the war the world faced economic adjustments made necessary by the distortion of world trade, a major change in the foreign investments of the Great Powers, the creation of large intergovernmental political debts, and an entirely new dispersion of price levels. The gold content of the various standard monetary units as defined by prewar law ceased to have current significance. But so strong was the hold of tradition on men's minds that statesmen and bankers did not think in terms of replacing an obsolete international convention by a new one more suited to existing conditions. Instead of seeking to establish by international agreement some new system of exchange rates they embarked on a struggle to return to "Par with Gold."

In the early stages of this struggle the United States became the sole effective buyer of gold for monetary purposes. For four years we exchanged goods for gold on an unprecedentedly large scale. Yet these transactions did have primarily a financial and monetary significance, for they were part of a nearly world-wide effort to find a new basis for exchange stability conforming approximately to the prewar model. All countries except the United States hoped that the attainment of this objective would be made easier by gold inflation in the United States. But then, as now, our power to absorb gold was exceptionally great, and the inflation was delayed.

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4. After 1924 this country ceased to be the residual buyer of gold in the London market. The general "return to gold" brought other buyers at fixed prices and for unlimited amounts into the market, with bids competitive with ours. Our selling price once more took on international significance, and when the dollar was strong in the exchanges we were able once more to take gold from other central banks. But the United States did not occupy, after 1924, the same position in the international distribution of gold that it did prior to 1914. *For the first time*, the world had to solve the problem of managing a true *international gold* standard. The former nearly world-wide sterling exchange standard had shrunk to a segment of the whole. A "sterling area" now existed within the framework of the international gold standard; an important "dollar area" had come into existence; and in addition, France, after 1926, attained a temporary position of great power in the whole system. The relative importance of London in influencing the world distribution of gold was much reduced, the exchanges were supported by a new type of international lending, and the "rules" governing the old gold-standard system were disregarded.

The international movement of long-term capital was at this time dictated by the needs of one creditor country preoccupied with the necessity of defending a basically weak exchange — Great Britain; one creditor country utterly disillusioned by defaults on almost all of its prewar long-term foreign loans — France; and one creditor country seeking outlets under the compulsion of a delayed gold inflation and the necessities of an export trade overexpanded in relation to its willingness to accept imports — the United States. Consequently, in the 1924 to 1929 period, the world's international financial machinery, rudely torn from the matrix of a gradually developing world economy and deprived of its former powerful and centralized control, was used to postpone rather than to facilitate radical and even revolutionary adjustments which were bound to come sooner or later. This was most clearly shown by the gold redistribution policy of 1927 and its consequences. The defense of the gold standard in England was largely dependent on the American capital market and the pound sterling was exposed to "danger" whenever America was "under-lending." When the support given to the whole system of exchange rates of the gold standard world by American foreign lending began to be withdrawn in 1928, some solution

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of the basic economic problems other than postponement to a distant date had to be found.

From 1929 to 1931 a rearguard action was fought in defense of the newly reëstablished system. But with Britain's abandonment of the gold standard this was replaced by a fierce battle to shift economic burdens both within and between countries. The weapons used in this battle were: exchange depreciation, total and fractional; exchange control in its Protean aspects; deflation, as exemplified by the Bruening policy in Germany; repudiation of debt, domestic and international, private and political; destruction of world markets for commodities; tariff warfare; bilateral and barter trade; and devaluation in gold by some countries, while others continued to make sacrifices to Par.

5. The use of this last weapon of economic warfare established the characteristic relationship of the United States to the international distribution of gold from the autumn of 1933 to September 1936. The general aim of the devaluation of the American dollar in 1934 and of the gold purchase policy which preceded it was to break the vicious circle of declining prices, to raise farm prices relative to other prices, and to cancel the advantages of British relative to American exports assumed to have followed the British abandonment of the gold standard and the decline of sterling in terms of dollars. This aim was to some extent accomplished because the American action forced a radical change in the world's system of exchange rates.

The belief of the so-called gold-bloc countries at this time that the number of grains of gold in their monetary units was in itself something important was the lever by which America was able to replace a system of exchange rates which we did not like by one which we did like. These countries were subject to an unlimited drain of gold until their exchange rates on New York conformed to the new gold parities established by our devaluation. More important by far was the fact that sterling also was forced to appreciate in dollars. Sterling had to adjust itself to the new position of the gold-bloc currencies, and the power of the British authorities to check the rise in sterling was limited by American policy. The United States, though buying gold freely at its new price, would sell only to the central banks of gold standard countries, and consequently sterling could not be held down by British purchases of gold in America.

The use of gold in this way as an instrument of economic war-

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fare, however justifiable as tactics in the battle for immediate advantage, had grave defects as strategy in the campaign for lasting economic stability and peace. It started the golden avalanche, first by making gold imports the technical means for forcing the new system of exchange rates into existence, second by adding to the internal difficulties of France the element of grave uncertainty concerning the future of the currency, and third by providing the greatest stimulus to increased gold production in history. A crisis in French finance was not long in coming, and it provided the occasion for the sixth stage in the evolution of America's relationship to the international distribution of gold.

6. In the summer and autumn of 1936 the United States took advantage of a series of capital flights from France to obtain British consent to a French devaluation without retaliatory action on the part of England and the United States. In exchange Britain acquired a new and flexible exchange stabilization agreement under which she was given access to American gold. A tripartite agreement was negotiated, avoiding permanent commitments to any given system of rates. One of the main contracting parties, Great Britain, was not in any formal sense a gold standard country. The American authorities who negotiated the Agreement, from the President down, were hostile to the gold standard and did not regard the new arrangements as a return to gold. Yet there was a sense in which the stabilization was dependent on gold, for without the buying and selling of gold it would not have been technically workable.

The essence of a multilateral exchange stabilization agreement between countries which do not use rigid exchange control methods is that all countries adhering to such an agreement undertake to support their own currencies when they are weak in terms of the other currencies in the group, and to support any of these other currencies when their own currency is strong. There are three ways by which such a policy can be carried out. The financial authorities of the country with a weak exchange may have a long position, built up at some previous time, in the currencies of the countries with strong exchanges, and may sell these currencies in the market to strengthen the demand for their own currency; they may persuade the financial authorities in the countries with strong exchanges to take a long position in the weak currencies; or they may sell them some generally acceptable asset, provided that they can agree upon a price. Under the

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Tripartite Agreement it was taken for granted that gold was such an asset. Accordingly long positions in the foreign exchanges taken in execution of the coöperative arrangements were, as a matter of routine, liquidated by conversion into gold within twenty-four hours. Given the rates within which the fluctuations of the sterling dollar exchange were to be held, and the rate at which the French franc was to be stabilized in terms of dollars, and also given a fixed price of gold in the United States, the prices at which the French should buy and sell gold in francs and the prices at which the British should buy and sell gold in sterling were indicated. This principle could be extended, and later was, to include Belgium, Holland and Switzerland.

Such arrangements provided for an international distribution of gold responsive to the requirements of short-term exchange stability as between its members, leaving them, however, to work out special clearing arrangements with countries practising rigid exchange control. They also provided a very large area of free exchanges by the use of which multilateral trade between the countries members of the group, and even between the members of the group and other countries using the milder forms of exchange control, could be carried out with a minimum of difficulty. Since the alternative to this Agreement was for France to join the ranks of the exchange control countries and for the relations between the pound and the dollar to remain indeterminate and subject to a renewal of currency warfare, the Agreement was important. Because of its flexibility and the now extremely loose connection between gold movements and internal banking policy, it differed profoundly from the familiar gold standard arrangements of the past. If a readjustment of exchange rates were later agreed upon, in response to a new set of conditions, the system could be kept in full operation by appropriate changes in the buying and selling prices of gold of the various members. This was most easily accomplished by a change in the British sterling price for gold, because that was subject to the discretion of the managers of the Exchange Equalization Account. It was least easily accomplished by changes in the French, Belgian, Dutch and Swiss gold prices, for such changes involved a formal act of devaluation. The position of the United States was intermediate. The Secretary of the Treasury had power to buy and sell gold at any price he determined upon, and the President had power to alter the number of grains of gold in the dollar within certain

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limits. These, however, were really reserve powers not intended to be used, but useful in making sure that any adjustment in the system of exchange rates by changes in the gold price of other countries should really be made with our consent.

Under this system the United States continued to receive gold for three years at the rate of about one billion and a half dollars a year. Yet America had not returned to the position of residual buyer of the world's gold which she occupied from 1919 to 1924. For under the 1936 system there were many bids and offers in the gold market; but so long as at the chosen stabilization levels there was persistent pressure for the dollar to appreciate, these bids did not become effective. The situation of 1919 to 1924 seemed to be reëstablished.

The causes of the gold inflow which brought to this country seven and a half billions in gold at the new valuation of $35 an ounce from 1934 to the outbreak of the crises immediately preceding the present war have often been enumerated. Under our legal arrangements this gold was not needed by our banking system. Its amount bore no relation to changes in the amount of money work to be done in this country. It may to some extent have stimulated productive effort in the making of export goods which might otherwise not have been called forth. And it fitted in well with the philosophy of our government in providing cheap and abundant supplies of money. On the other hand, it unquestionably gave rise to difficult banking problems and was a potential inflationary threat. We gave up our foreign investments and our goods and went into debt to foreigners to whom we gave bank balances and to whom we sold our own securities. For all this we received gold. On the face of it this was not an advantageous exchange, but in reality we bought gold in preference to sacrificing other values. We had become the central cog in a machine that maintained, in a period of unexampled crisis, a very considerable degree of stability in exchange rates and preserved free exchanges in a large part of the world. We made it possible for very large movements of capital to take place without disrupting this system of rates to a point where, for example, our trade agreements program would have had to be abandoned. Finally, we helped to undo some of the damage caused by our original dollar devaluation by permitting successive adjustment in the exchanges to be made in an orderly manner. Had this time of chronic crisis been followed by peace rather than by war, gold

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might have resumed its useful service as a balancing item in international exchanges under the mechanism then in force. But it was not, and we entered the seventh stage of our relationship to the international distribution of gold.

7. We recently have been buying gold chiefly because it is something which Great Britain could offer us in exchange for war materials. After the gold supplies of Japan had been exhausted, we could conveniently continue this policy without legal discrimination and also without the embarrassment of helping the totalitarian Powers. The securities which we sold to the British and the balances which we gave them in earlier years are now being used to buy war materials. Though a considerable part of our exceptionally large gold imports in 1939 and 1940 was sent to us for safekeeping and is held under earmark, the golden avalanche is, in the main, resolving itself into a gigantic exchange of goods for gold. Gold has once more, for the time being, lost its character of a financial instrument in international trade. It has become just a type of merchandise which we are willing to accept at a certain price on grounds of high national policy, as part of the tactics of an undeclared war. Yet we still treat this gold in our banking system according to existing rules and allow it to create bank reserves and bank deposits.

When the economic stagnation which permitted us to absorb great additions to our money supply without inflationary consequences began to give way to the activity of a war boom, our monetary authorities recognized the danger and proposed strong counter-measures. These took the form of the abortive Eccles proposals concerning gold sterilization, increased reserve ratios and sale of government bonds to others than banks. Such proposals, however, do not go to the root of the matter. If we continue to take all the gold that other countries can send us, we shall run out of palliatives and shall have to admit that gold is an anachronism in our monetary system.

AN EIGHTH WAY OF DISTRIBUTING GOLD

No one imagines that the conditions of the nineteenth century can be reëstablished, but the historical record from 1914 to 1940 shows the dangers of failing to integrate the international distribution of gold with credit and commercial policy. The question now to be resolved is: "In the world as it is likely to be organized after this war, will gold be able to perform a genuine service as

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money that no other means can render as well or better?" Since no one knows how the war will end, this question cannot be given a categorical answer. Yet we can establish in general terms the conditions under which the answer would be in the affirmative, and if we do so it will be found that much more will be required of the United States than a mere willingness to continue buying all the gold offered to us at a fixed price.

With the end of this war will end also the era of postponing radical solutions to economic problems. Voluntarily or involuntarily, the United States will have to accept the fact that in international affairs the policy of exchanging goods for gold can no longer serve a useful purpose, and indeed is merely the economic equivalent of giving goods away. Gold will no longer be a *deus ex machina* to solve the problems of our trade relations with the rest of the world by postponing to some distant date the establishment of a real international economic equilibrium. The world will be impoverished and there will be, as after the last war, an insistent demand for all sorts of things which America can supply. In addition there will be in full operation a nearly world-wide system of exchange controls covering both goods and capital transactions. The essence of these controls is that exporters are obliged to surrender the proceeds of their exports to government authorities, who distribute them to importers in the order of the urgency of their imports. The dollar will probably still be what is known as a free exchange, but it will be free only in a limited sense. It will be in great demand, and Americans who possess dollars will be able to purchase goods and services in almost every country, but the dollars that American importers give up will not reappear on a free exchange market. The character and amount of American exports will be determined, not by the quality and price of the services which we can render, but by the decisions of governmental authorities elsewhere. The pressure for the expansion of American exports will be extremely great, but the question of payment will be very difficult. The exporters of this and certain other countries will proceed to sell foodstuffs and other urgently required goods abroad. They thus will come into possession of claims on foreign countries which they can liquidate only by finding purchasers who in turn wish to buy goods either in those countries or in the economic areas which they control or with which they have multilateral clearing agreements.

The economic difficulties arising from this situation will prob-

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ably be met in part by the formation of larger economic units than those defined by prewar national boundaries. If Germany wins the war, the continental multilateral clearing system now in process of formation, with the reichsmark as the settling unit, will be further developed, probably to include the entire area of German political and economic domination. If Britain wins, there will probably also be larger economic units. They might be composed of groups of countries, including possibly colonial areas with complementary economies, having in effect a single currency and without tariff barriers. The negotiations between the governments-in-exile of Poland and Czechoslovakia are harbingers of such a development. In either case there will be less basis for small and restrictive clearing and compensation agreements within the larger units and for blocked accounts awaiting settlement between the smaller political entities.

If Great Britain does not win but nevertheless survives then there is likely to exist, side by side with a multilateral continental clearing system focussed on Berlin, a large multilateral sterling clearing system like that at present existing within the orbit of British exchange control. The United States and its economic dependencies may be another such system; Russia and its dependencies another; and there may be a yen bloc as well. Some important countries like the Argentine will not fall naturally within any such group, and will depend for their economic welfare on their ability to offset credits in one group against debits in another. This will be true in less degree of every country having, or capable of having, a general international trade. Unless each country or area within these larger groups is forced to regulate its dealings with countries in other groups on a strictly bilateral clearing basis, there will be trade between the large currency areas in all directions. This trade is not likely to be free, in the sense that it will be governed solely by price and quality considerations. It will be controlled and the rule will be applied that those who will not buy cannot sell. Nevertheless, exchange controls, especially if chiefly confined to the non-merchandise items in the balance of payments, *can* still be used to promote mutually advantageous trade; and there is some ground for hoping that if they are so used they can gradually be relaxed.

From a long-run point of view it will be to the interest of all countries to substitute for the detailed control of individual items entering into international trade a more flexible and more general

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type of exchange control. This will have the effect of releasing the individual importer as much as possible from a rigid system of priorities, and the individual exporter from uncertainty as to his ability to convert the proceeds of his shipments into his own currency. Gold clearing between the large economic units is an appropriate instrument for accomplishing such a purpose. The techniques worked out from 1934 to 1938 can probably be adapted to provide it if the nations decide that exchange stability between the larger currencies at agreed rates is preferable to official control over the proceeds of exports or to violently fluctuating exchanges. There will then be a technical place for gold in the financing of international trade; for a general stabilization of exchange would be extremely difficult unless the control authorities were able to convert foreign credit balances into some generally acceptable asset.

Such a system, however, would entail some sacrifices of national sovereignty as regards domestic credit policy. More important from our point of view, it would mean establishing a proper relationship between exports and imports. Some such limitations of national sovereignty are implicit in any system which is both peaceful and international. Americans would be apt, however, to resist them. There will be pressure for large credits to finance the transition to a peacetime economy by expanding export markets. But if we are interested in establishing permanent and advantageous trading relationships, the first consideration governing foreign loans should not be how much immediate relief they will give to the borrowers but how they are to be repaid.

This does not mean that we should adopt a hard and brutal attitude towards European reconstruction after the war. But it does imply that we do something which we and other countries have not done in the period since the World War — have a careful and well-thought-out coördination between monetary, credit and commercial policy. In this scheme, we should aim to increase our total trade, but to allow our imports to grow faster than our exports. We should not lend to countries which do not have a reasonable prospect for making repayment in the form of goods, directly to us or indirectly through other countries. Unless we accept this radical readjustment in our point of view the proceeds of our exports and the funds which accumulate abroad for the repayment of our loans and advances will merely be impounded

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in blocked mark, blocked sterling and blocked yen accounts. The experience of all countries trading with Germany in recent years has demonstrated what advantages accrue to debtors under a system of blocked exchanges. We can, of course, accept gold in exchange for accumulated credits, up to the limit of the world's annual new gold production. But if we do so we shall not be contributing to a constructive system of international gold distribution, but simply exchanging goods for gold as a permanent policy. In that case, whether we admit the fact or not, gold will have become in truth an obsolete form of money.

If after winning the war of arms Germany should then elect to continue the economic war by offering very favorable barter terms of trade to all countries in which our exports compete, and should attempt to force a destructive competition in our own markets by the use of export subsidies raised by levies on the whole subject economy of Europe, it would not be peace. For us, under such circumstances, to give goods in exchange for the gold obtained by Germany from conquered countries, and to follow that up by entering into the trap of accumulating credit balances in blocked marks in order to serve the short-run interests of our export trade, would be to show ourselves lacking in the most elementary economic as well as political intelligence.

THE VALUE OF OUR GOLD STOCK

Nothing has been said so far as to the value of our great accumulated stock of gold. As long as we continue to purchase gold at $35 an ounce there can be no change in the nominal dollar value of this stock; and as long as we continue to buy gold at this rate and as long as American dollars are universally in demand gold will always be acceptable elsewhere. This does not mean that if we were to cease to pay this price gold would become quite valueless, for in great areas of the world there is a feeling about gold as a desirable commodity which would be sufficient to give it value. This makes it conceivable that even if all present and prospective monetary controls were to break down some new world monetary system might be reconstructed on the basis of gold.

But these are distant speculations. What does concern us now is the value, in terms of foreign currencies, of that portion of our gold stock which we shall wish to use in the settlement of balances arising in the future from our international transactions. This will depend on the rates of exchange which are established, the

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presence of other buyers in the gold markets, and the prices that these other buyers will pay for gold. We are also urgently concerned with the dangers of inflation which face us because we choose to treat each ounce of gold held in the form of gold certificates by our central banks as $35 in reserve funds. We have inherited a dangerous banking position from the misuse of gold in the past and the failure of all countries, including ourselves, to find a commercial policy which would restore a balanced international trade and a proper utilization of the world's productive resources. We do not, however, need to be greatly preoccupied with the nominal dollar value of our existing stock.

The only reason why the total value of the stock of anything is important to the holders is that they wish to be able to exchange it for other things. The United States does not wish or intend ever to purchase twenty-two billion dollars' worth of other things with its stock of gold. Some part of this may be redistributed when peace comes, either in order to repatriate foreign capital or to form a basis for setting up a new system of gold distribution. The great bulk of our gold, however, has come to stay. It has done its work, whether for good or ill. Should its dollar value decline as a result of some future international agreement, we could, if we wished to, substitute government bonds for gold certificates among the assets of the Federal Reserve banks, just as the Issue Department of the Bank of England has substituted government bonds for its entire gold reserve, without important consequences for the national welfare. Even complete demonetization of gold would not confront us with anything much more than an accounting problem; the loss (shared with others) of a useful mechanism for international settlements; and unemployed gold mines.

If we consider the gold problem as only one of the many facets of our economic foreign policy, and if we deal intelligently with the domestic problems arising out of whatever decisions we make concerning it, gold may once more become our servant and the servant of the world economy. If, however, we insist under all circumstances on paying $35 an ounce for gold, regardless of whether it is being used constructively to promote international trade or not, and regardless of the internal banking problems it creates for us, then gold will be our master.

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THE VICIOUS CIRCLE IN INDIA

By B. Shiva Rao

WHAT is India's future? The problem is rapidly assuming a significance which no one could have foreseen at the commencement of the war. The foundations of India's political structure have been so shaken by the events of the last twenty months that it seems unlikely they can ever regain their old stability. A prompt and generous fulfilment of the promises made by Britain during the last war would have seen India — as an equal partner with the other Dominions in the Commonwealth — willing and prepared in 1939 to shoulder her responsibilities in the fight against Nazism. But the period from Versailles to Munich was marked in India by two main characteristics: a phenomenal mass awakening under Gandhi's leadership; and a sense of acute frustration on the part of the political intelligentsia as a result of the cynical disregard for past commitments by successive Conservative Cabinets in Britain.

Two major political parties in the country, the Congress and the Moslem League, are committed to the goal of complete independence. There have been discussions among political leaders whether independence necessarily means a severance of the British connection, or is compatible with the status of a self-governing Dominion, especially since the adoption of the Statute of Westminster. It is significant that Mahatma Gandhi and the older politicians in the Congress have preferred the Indian term *purna swaraj*, the precise meaning of which is full self-government, or freedom. Mr. Gandhi has never concealed his personal view that if Britain and India could remain together as equal partners, without any coercion being implied in such association, these two would form the nucleus of a real League of Nations of the future. There is no political party in India which would accept anything less than full Dominion Status.

Stripped of superficialities, the Indian problem has two aspects: an external one in relation to the British Commonwealth and the rest of the world; and an internal one concerning the details of a new administrative and political structure.

Until the spring of 1940, before the dramatic collapse of Denmark, Holland, Belgium and France, the almost universally accepted view in India was that despite the inevitable vicissitudes

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of war, the ultimate result would undoubtedly be a British victory. This assumption was rudely shaken by France's surrender and again after the Nazi victories in the Balkans and North Africa. The British position is now viewed with considerable anxiety in India, while Germany's moves in the Near East and those of Japan in the Far East are regarded as threats to India's own security. This uncertainty has had a curious but noticeable effect on the outlook and tactics of the different political parties in India.

It is significant that the bitterest criticisms against Britain (particularly since the war began) concentrate on her short-sighted policy of refusing Indians adequate opportunities for taking their legitimate part in the defense of the country. There is deep resentment against the normal peacetime policy of excluding Indians from the officer ranks of the defense forces (except in grossly inadequate numbers) and against the unpreparedness of the country for any major attack. This feeling is shared by all classes, including even a large section of the Congress which was willing to coöperate actively in strengthening the defenses of India through a National Government. The significance of such an offer was missed by the British Cabinet. The offer represented a great sacrifice for the Congress, for it meant a breaking away from Gandhi's leadership by pledging active assistance in a united stand against the totalitarian Powers.

Though the Congress still adheres to the demand for independence, and the application to India of the principle of self-determination at the end of the war, its emphasis, since the summer of 1940, has been on the immediate present. Many of its leaders do not rule out the possibility that the British Empire will so change its basic structure in the process of fighting the war that it will be beyond recognition afterwards.

Pandit Nehru committed the Congress to the creed of complete independence in 1927. Today he cherishes the conviction that unless the present conflict has a revolutionary aim of ending the present order and substituting one based on freedom and coöperation, it will merely lead to more wars and violence and destruction. He has lately been giving much thought to the new world order that will follow the war. His ideal is world-wide international coöperation, political and economic. But "a world federation," he has said, "seems a far-off ideal in this world of war today." An intermediate stage may well be the rise of several

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groups of nations, regional or otherwise. The British Empire, in Nehru's view, is bound to disappear at the end of the war. He thinks that Britain herself, and some of the units of the Commonwealth (Canada and Australia in particular), may be absorbed into the United States, or seek a loose type of federation with it. Continental Europe, without Soviet Russia, may form yet another group.

Regarding India and the East, Nehru is emphatic that they could not "be just hangers-on or dependent entities of these major groups." In common with other Congress leaders, he has been bitterly disappointed with the persistent refusal of British Cabinet Ministers to look beyond Europe in their definition of Britain's war aims. "Do the advocates of a European Federation," he recently asked, "imagine that Asia and Africa will continue as they are, more or less under the leadership of Europe? So far as we are concerned, we will oppose all these attempts to federate the Western world to the exclusion of the Eastern. A federated Europe, or Europe and America taken together, will exploit Eastern nations and delay their freedom." Therefore, he argues, "we must look forward for the present, and till such time as a real world union takes place, to an Asiatic Federation of Nations." Regarding the constitution of this Federation, India and China will, in his view, take the initiative in inviting Burma, Ceylon, Afghanistan, Nepal, Malaya and the Dutch East Indies to enter the Federation. But he sees no reason why Iran, 'Iraq and Thailand also should not consider the desirability of joining it. This Eastern Federation would have the friendliest relations with the Anglo-American federation and the Soviet Union.

There are, as yet, few indications as to the views held by other Asiatic countries on this interesting theme. Nehru was at Chungking in August 1939, and his visit helped bring India and China closer together. In the last two years there have been good-will missions to India from China, Thailand and Ceylon. The suggestion of an Asiatic federation (without Japan) is a new conception in the modern world. Much propaganda will be necessary, especially in the Moslem bloc of countries to the west of India, to win sympathy and support for it. India so far has had singularly little contact with even her next-door neighbors — if an exception be made of Amanullah, who had an enthusiastic reception at several places in India while he was still King of Afghanistan. Even India's relations with Ceylon, Burma and the Malay States

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are not encouraging for those seeking an Asiatic Federation.

No other Indian party has applied its mind so seriously to the question of the country's external relationships as the Congress. Like the Congress, the Moslem League has accepted the creed of independence, but more as a sentimental concession to its younger and more radical elements than out of any conviction that Indian interests demand a severance of the connection with Britain. Other organizations have been content with the offer of Dominion status, their only criticism being on the score of its vagueness and because Britain has taken no measures that would impress India with her sincerity.

The Moslems and the Princes have shown considerable anxiety in regard to their respective positions in a free and possibly independent India. Step by step, the Moslems in several parts of India have committed themselves to the "Pakistan Movement." Though at first it was not taken seriously by other elements, skillful and energetic propaganda under Mr. Jinnah's leadership has now made it prominent and provided it with a slogan which is proving attractive to Moslems and to the rural masses.

Briefly, Pakistan implies the creation of a Moslem-controlled state comprising the provinces of Sind, the Punjab and the North-Western Frontier, the Indian State of Kashmir and (though it has never been definitely mentioned) Afghanistan. Such a state would possess the seaport of Karachi and control the entire Indus basin (including such vital strategic points on the Indo-Afghan border as the Khyber Pass). The creation of such a state would not mark an innovation in India's chequered history. More than once the regions in question have been controlled by a single authority — under the Buddhist Empire, which spread the new gospel of the Lord Gautama Buddha far to the west and northwest of India, and later in the early days of Moghul rule.

Mr. Jinnah's main concern in borrowing this plan has been to refute the charge that he has no positive solution to offer for the Hindu-Moslem problem. His psychological approach is simple. Moslems in India number approximately 90 million out of a total population of about 400 million. A minority even of this size cannot logically hold up all progress, but must be content with safeguards for its protection in an all-India structure. The only escape from the dilemma lies, therefore, in a division of the country into two regions; one in which the Hindus would be the predominant party, and the other under Moslem control.

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But Mr. Jinnah, seeking a formula which would enable him to avoid the logical consequences of a minority position for the Moslems, has roused fierce antagonisms among the Hindus and the Sikhs, the latter a martial race with a strong pro-Hindu affinity. The Hindus have condemned the proposal for "the vivisection of India" on sentimental and political grounds. To the Nationalist movement the suggestion of breaking up the country into two regions has naturally come as a profound shock.

But sentiment is not the only factor. There is a growing fear that the creation of Pakistan might endanger the security of the rest of India. All through the ages, before the advent of the European Powers, foreign conquerors poured into India through the passes on the northwest. The transfer of those regions to a state not controlled from Delhi would increase many-fold the vulnerability of the Ganges plains. Commending his scheme to a Moslem audience nearly three years ago, Mr. Jinnah referred to the action of the Sudeten Germans in seeking the aid of the Reich against Czech excesses. But the analogy has a lurid significance for India. The loss of the Khyber Pass, the Northwest Frontier Province and the Punjab would place the rest of India at the mercy of an aggressor even more decisively than the loss of the Sudetenland put Czech territory at the mercy of the Nazis.

The Sikhs' point of view is very different. They are a minority in the Punjab, constituting less than a fifth of the population. Yet before the British conquest of the Punjab less than a hundred years ago, the Sikhs ruled the greater part of the area now included in Pakistan. They knew the art of enforcing their authority on the frontier and among the trans-frontier tribes with a firmness that has not been emulated by their successors. The "Khalistan Movement" — the Khalsa being the symbol of Sikh power — is based on the idea that the Punjab, should it pass out of British hands, must revert to the control of the Sikhs. It has rapidly achieved formidable proportions. The fear of a major clash between the Moslems and the Sikhs and the Hindus has had a sobering effect on the more practical Moslem leaders of the province like Sir Sikandar Hyat Khan, the present Premier. He has learned that the division of India on the basis of Pakistan must involve the Punjab in a civil war which would threaten the security of the entire country. Nor is he alone in opposing Mr. Jinnah's movement. The Shias, who form an influential minority among the Moslems, to the number of between 25 to 30 million,

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do not subscribe to the two-nations theory and would prefer a friendly settlement with the Hindus.

What are the Princes thinking about? Here it is more difficult to be precise. The last ten years have seen some startling changes. At first, the Princes seemed keen about an all-India federation and at the Round Table Conferences ten years ago they demanded only Dominion status as the condition of their entry into it. But subsequent discussions, which showed that a number of their privileges and treaty rights would be abridged, cooled their enthusiasm. Later still, the Congress movement in favor of democratic forms of government — in itself a direct result of the federal idea — created a revulsion against federation, particularly in the more backward of the so-called "Native" States. The British Government, after having laid down the dictum in 1928 that its "paramountcy must remain paramount" (in other words, that the States could not claim treaty "rights" but only concessions), suddenly became ardent supporters of the Princely Order. And by a process of reasoning natural enough under the circumstances, the Princes convinced themselves that the Viceroy could be better trusted to safeguard their interests than the members of his executive drawn from British India. Every constitutional precaution was adopted in advance, therefore, to prevent the democratic upsurge in British India from swamping the States. The British frankly intended that the nominees of the States would act as checks on the radical tendencies of the Congress, the best organized party in British India. They therefore fashioned the federal scheme in a manner that would have prevented the formation of any radical or even progressive Cabinet.

The general elections in India early in 1937 proved, however, that the hold of the Congress on the 35 million newly enfranchised voters far surpassed the estimates of its opponents, or even those of its own leaders. The Princes were alarmed that the numerous safeguards provided in the Constitution might prove insufficient to protect their treaty rights. The conduct of the provincial Governors between 1937 and 1939, and their failure (from the Princes' standpoint) to interfere with the policies of the Congress Ministries, confirmed the Princes' apprehensions as to what methods the Viceroy might follow on the inauguration of federation. They feared that appeasement of the Congress might be the Indian counterpart of the Chamberlain Government's foreign policy.

The commencement of the war saw the sudden suspension of

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federation, to the immediate relief of everyone — the Congress, the Moslem League, the Princes, and (one cannot help suspecting) the British as well. But more recent developments have modified in some degree these first reactions on the part of at least two parties. Among a number of Congress leaders there is a growing realization that, with all its obvious limitations, federation would, at any rate, have guaranteed the basic conception of all-India unity and brought all the divergent elements under a single administration. The more farsighted Princes now know that the terms for entering federation, which they rejected before the war in the hope of securing further concessions, will never be renewed. The Moslems alone have shown little proof of regret.

In the early stages of the internal crisis that took place during the closing months of 1939, a settlement with the Congress seemed possible along somewhat the following lines: (1) a declaration by the British Government that at the end of the war India's elected representatives would be free to draft their own Constitution on the basis of complete self-government, subject to certain transitional conditions covering defense, British commercial and financial interests and the Indian States; (2) these conditions to be embodied in a prior agreement (or a treaty) between the representatives of the two countries; (3) safeguards for minority interests, acceptable to the minorities themselves. Gandhi was willing to accept this program and in April 1940 even suggested a joint Committee of Indians and Britons to evolve a suitable formula and to outline the procedure.

Such a declaration would have enabled the Congress to resume office in the seven provinces where it had withdrawn its Ministries a few weeks after the declaration of war, and it would have permitted the country to offer its full coöperation in the prosecution of the war. Gandhi's personal support would have been only moral. But, as he explained to me in an interview, he would have wished Britain success — "a Britain which has played the game by India." Other Congress leaders would go still further than Gandhi. For instance, Pandit Nehru has denied with vehemence the suggestion that the Congress Party's attitude towards the war is helpful to Hitler. He claims that few persons in India have so consistently raised their voices against Fascism and Nazism as he has done; and indeed his severest critics cannot deny that ever since the invasion of Manchuria, and during subsequent events in Ethiopia, Central Europe, Spain and China,

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he has been a determined opponent of the policy of appeasement.

The tragic irony of the present conflict in India is that the radical elements in the Congress, now in prison, are sincerely and uncompromisingly anti-totalitarian. In fact, their complaint is that the British, while fighting Hitlerism in Europe, are seeking alliances in India with the autocratic Princes and those Moslem leaders who not only denounce democracy as unsuitable to India but have no faith in democracy anywhere.

The situation has deteriorated with Mr. Gandhi's decision to embark on civil disobedience on a limited scale. But even after six months of the struggle, he refuses to be hustled by his followers into converting it into a mass movement, or to relax the conditions for enrolling volunteers. There is, in consequence, a certain amount of discontent in the Congress Party, because while Gandhi receives no credit from the British for his restraining influence, the movement cannot profit from the spectacle of prisons filled to overflowing. The question is how long the British will allow the deadlock to continue. Significantly, all parties with any influence in the country, including the Congress and the Moslem League, have charged Britain with "unwillingness to part with power." Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, one of the most constructive statesmen in India, recently declared that he has never known in his forty years of political life a Government of India so isolated from the main currents of public opinion.

As for the Princes, they are busily occupied with the war effort. Since the suspension of federation, questions like the safeguarding of their treaty rights have been relegated to the background. But it would be a mistake to assume that they do not concern themselves with the future. A significant movement has lately sprung up in favor of returning large slices of British India to the premier Moslem State of Hyderabad. In other words, the Princes are wondering whether they should not claim back the territories that until 100 or 150 years ago belonged to them but which now form parts of British India.

In effect, the last two years have witnessed a process of general dismantling of India's political superstructure. Provincial autonomy has been withdrawn from over the greater part of India because of the refusal of the Congress majorities in the legislatures to accept the responsibility of administration. All-India Federation is in suspense, for the duration of the war, and may never again be revived. The country is being governed under a system

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which, in the majority of the provinces, was in vogue about forty years ago; and at the center by an autocratic Viceroy with an out-of-date executive council dominated by the permanent officials.

What, then, remains of the Constitution enacted in 1935 after eight years of elaborate discussions in India and in London? Statements recently made by Mr. Amery, the Secretary of State for India, suggest that the Churchill Cabinet does not regard even the underlying principles of that Constitution as beyond challenge after the war. He has given tacit but powerful support to the idea, always popular and now gaining ground among the Moslems and the Princes, that even in an all-India federation (should a revival of the scheme seem practicable after the war) the list of federal subjects may be cut to a minimum in order to give provinces and States the fullest freedom from central control. Such a scheme already has the active support of the Moslem Premier of the Punjab and some of the leading Princes.

Other suggestions of Mr. Amery's have had an unsettling effect on India — those for an irremovable executive and for the substitution of functional for territorial representation. Both proposals, seemingly constructive in their nature, are regarded by a large section of the Indian people as inspired by a desire to prevent democracy and parliamentary institutions, as understood in Britain, from functioning in India. The Nationalists, whether in the Congress Party or outside, have been educated to look upon British forms of government as those most suitable for India; and any departure from them is resented as derogatory to their claim to full self-government.

Indian tension is now attaining formidable proportions and can be relieved only by a far-reaching settlement in which each principal political element makes a positive contribution. The British must decide in favor of an immediate transfer of control to the Indian people on the basis of complete Dominion status. And in doing so, they must resist the temptation of using the Princes, the Moslems and the other minorities as arguments for loading the new Constitution with reservations and anomalies which would compromise the democratic principle.

Once the British have irrevocably made this decision, the various parties in India will settle down to discuss the constitution in an atmosphere free from prejudice and suspicion. The approach will be positive instead of, as hitherto, negative. All but the extreme left-wingers in the Congress will accept a firm

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offer of full Dominion status, while the number of Moslems who insist with Mr. Jinnah on a division of India into two regions will be found to be in a minority. The Princes, too, will cease to raise impossible conundrums about treaty rights which have no relation to the realities of the modern world.

What is the alternative? So long as the British refuse to come to terms, the manœuvring for position will continue. The Congress will demand independence, Mr. Jinnah will clamor for Pakistan, the Sikhs for Khalistan, and the other elements for their partisan rights and privileges. The sooner these tendencies are discouraged, the better for India's security. The National movement is virile and idealistic. But its main strength is derived from opposition to British domination rather than from any positive realization of an identity of interests among the various elements in the country.

The entire complex of Indo-British relationships is moving in a terribly vicious circle. It must be broken if disaster is to be averted. Nationalist India will not coöperate in the war effort until Britain includes India's freedom in her war aims; Britain refuses to move forward until India's assistance is wholehearted and full. Mr. Churchill, the most determined opponent of the Baldwin Government's India policy until 1935, is silent in regard to India. Generous recognition of India's equality with Britain and the self-governing Dominions would transform the situation. Many thoughtful observers have asked why the British Prime Minister should feel unable to offer India an Anglo-Indian union of the same sort he offered France on the eve of her capitulation.

Furthermore, the immediate recognition of India as a Dominion would guarantee her representation at the Peace Conference through a delegation of her own choice. At Versailles there were two delegates from India, Lord Sinha and the Maharaja of Bikaner; but they were there only as members of the British Empire team. At the next peace conference India expects independent representation, so that her leaders may make their own contribution to the building of a new world order and thus prevent the formation of regional federations based on distinctions of race and color.

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BRITAIN'S DEBT TO KING FAROUK

By Pierre Crabitès

AN imperative need to secure sources of high grade oil, the possibility of arousing the Moslem world against England, and the moral and strategic value of controlling the Suez Canal have brought Hitler to the Near East.

The Rumanian oil fields did not satisfy the requirements of the Nazi mechanized forces for an abundant supply of high grade lubricants. Without them Hitler cannot invade England, and he therefore had to make 'Iraq a major objective.

Hitler seems to act with nerve-destroying suddenness. Actually the groundwork for his movements is prepared long in advance with German thoroughness. Thus he has had his agents at work for months stirring up Islamic resentment against England. He hopes to be able to capitalize among the Moslems his position as the world's greatest Jew-baiter, and to turn to his advantage the enmity between Zionism and the Arabs which revolves around British policy in Palestine. He hopes in this way to facilitate his conquest of the 'Iraq oil fields.

The Suez Canal is so often referred to as a British life line that Hitler would like to seize it, not so much for what it is actually worth to England but in order to deal British prestige a staggering blow. As British shipping to India, Australia and the Far East is now routed via the Cape, he would be merely closing an inlet and outlet that have not been used in an important way for many weeks. But the prestige value of its capture would be high, especially for propaganda purposes among the Arabs.

As the Suez Canal traverses Egyptian territory, the part it has played in the relations between Britain and Egypt is well worth considering at this juncture. The sovereign of Egypt is today the world's most influential Moslem ruler. Now that Hitler is manifestly endeavoring to arouse all Moslems against Britain the attitude of King Farouk towards that country is a question of major importance. Probably the best way to get a proper insight into it is to inquire into the King's feeling about the control of the Suez Canal. This requires that the pages of history be turned back to February 1922.

This date is chosen because it was then that Britain renounced her Protectorate over Egypt. The British Occupation, which be-

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gan in 1882, had been converted into a Protectorate in December 1914. Through both these régimes Great Britain maintained complete control over the strategy of the Suez Canal. When she issued her unilateral declaration of February 28, 1922, she incorporated in it a proviso to the effect that "until such time as it may be possible by free discussion and friendly accommodation on both sides to conclude agreements in regard thereto . . . the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt" would remain in English hands.

It took the British and the Egyptians from February 1922 to August 1936 to come to an understanding concerning "the independence with reservations" granted to Egypt. Personalities are often a deciding factor in determining policy in the Near East. In 1930, when a settlement appeared to be imminent, they were the rock upon which it broke. The dynamic driving power of the late Lord Lloyd, then British High Commissioner, and the memory of the rugged individualism of Saad Zaghlul Pasha, whose dominance over Egyptian politics was actually strengthened by his death, defeated all chance of an agreement.

But in 1936 things were different. Lord Lloyd had been replaced by Sir Miles Lampson, after the contrast between them had already been lessened by Sir Percy Loraine's short stay at the Residency. The new High Commissioner, in Professor Arnold J. Toynbee's words, "played the part of the good genius in the Anglo-Egyptian drama of 1935–1936." He is a big man, a *charmeur*, a conversationalist, whereas his predecessor was a small man, a doer of things and an orator. Lord Lloyd impressed everybody with the fact that time is precious and that bargaining is a waste of time. Sir Miles Lampson loves to linger and therefore is able to do business in the East.

If Sir Miles Lampson was a good genius, Signor Mussolini could be described in the terms in which Mephistopheles introduces himself to Faust, as —

> "Part of that Power which would
> The Evil ever do and always does the Good."

What is meant by this is that when Fascism revealed, in the latter part of 1935, that it contemplated the spoliation of Ethiopia, both British and Egyptian statesmanship realized that the time had come when considerations of *amour propre* had to give way before the realities of life. Mussolini's designs upon Ethiopia presented an issue which directly affected both countries. They

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involved a challenge to Britain's position in the Sudan and impinged upon her hegemony in the Red Sea. They gave Egyptians, whether Moslems or Copts, grave concern regarding the safety of the headwaters of the Blue Nile; and they were an affront to the spiritual sway exercised by Egypt in Ethiopia through the Patriarch of the Coptic Church, who was an Egyptian.

With Mussolini hotfoot on his African warpath, the Egyptian people became aware that the irksome connection with Great Britain had at least the negative merit of ruling out a still more disagreeable alternative. It kept Mussolini from invading Egypt. It assured the safety of an adequate supply of life-giving sediment from the Blue Nile. The Nile Valley became anti-Fascist from one end to the other. The Egyptian authorities realized that the hour had sounded for them to take out insurance against Italian aggression by meeting Britain in the spirit of that "friendly accommodation on both sides" referred to in the unilateral declaration of February 28, 1922.

Though this general antagonism to Italy inspired the Egyptians to do their utmost to come to terms with Britain, the Anglo-Egyptian conversations of 1936 opened in a spirit of pessimism on both sides. This was not unnatural. The negotiations of 1930 had broken down over the Sudan after the military questions had been settled. The Italian menace to British Imperial communications through the Suez Canal, which arose after 1930, had caused English technical experts to make larger demands in 1936 than their predecessors had advanced in 1930. The issue revolved around the ability of Sir Miles Lampson, British High Commissioner, to persuade the Egyptians that his country was not wantonly raising the price of complete independence but was merely forced to ask for more because the defense of the Suez Canal had meanwhile become immeasurably more difficult.

The alterations in the technical military situation which had brought about the startling increase in the demands of the British experts were two — Italy's conquest of Ethiopia, and the rapid extension of the range of warfare, particularly in the air. Limited *places d'armes* like Gibraltar, Malta and Aden were dwarfed in the new geographical scale which wartime operations had begun to assume. "In 1936," Professor Toynbee asserts, "it would hardly have been an exaggeration to say that the strategist's first and last requirement was elbowroom."

British experts saw that Malta was overshadowed by Italy's

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manœuvring ground in Sicily and Libya, and that Aden was being overshadowed by Italy's new empire in East Africa. They insisted that their means of defending the Suez Canal, which they then thought was Britain's life line, should suit the new technical conditions. As a result, the diplomacy of Sir Miles Lampson was directed toward demonstrating to the Egyptians:

(1) That "the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt," that is to say, the safety of the Suez Canal, really was a matter of vital importance to Britain.

(2) That the problem with which the British and Egyptian Governments were confronted was to provide the British armed forces in Egypt with the elbowroom they would need in the event of war or the threat of war.

(3) That if Egypt desired complete independence and Britain's backing against Italian spoliation she would have to pay the price of giving Britain a free hand in protecting the Suez Canal.

Together, Mussolini's Mephistophelean touch and Sir Miles Lampson's diplomacy succeeded, and an Anglo-Egyptian agreement was signed on August 26, 1936. By it, the British air force in Egypt was given leave, even in peacetime, to range freely not only over the Canal Zone but through all the air over Egypt. In the second place, the British Navy in Mediterranean waters was to have the use of the harbor of Alexandria for a period of years. In the third place, the British Army in Egypt was assured of being able to command the technical means of deploying, at a moment's notice, from its narrow peacetime quarters in the Canal Zone over the remainder of the territory of Egypt, right up to Marsah Matruh, a point on the north coast of Egypt about halfway between Alexandria and the Egypto-Italian frontier.

Though Britain considered that the safety of the Suez Canal was vital to her interests, she in no way called upon Egypt to help her fight to maintain its inviolability. What she asked was to be given elbowroom in Egyptian territory for the defense of Imperial communications. Article VII of the Treaty is specific on this score. It reads in part:

> The aid of His Majesty the King of Egypt in the event of war, imminent menace of war or apprehended international emergency will consist in furnishing to His Majesty the King and Emperor on Egyptian territory, in accordance with the Egyptian system of administration and legislation, all the facilities and assistance in his power, including the use of his ports, aerodromes and means of communication.

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The rôle thus dictated to Egypt by Britain as the price of Egyptian independence was deliberately that of a passive ally.

During the reign of Khedive Ismail, 1863–1879, Egypt had had a fighting force that carried the Star and Crescent to the heart of Central Africa. It was led by such intrepid Americans as General Charles P. Stone of Massachusetts, Colonel Charles Chaillé-Long of Maryland and Colonel Alexander McComb Mason of Virginia — not to speak of the 48 other American officers who, from 1868 to 1878, gave Egypt as powerful an army as almost any secondary Power in the world. Europe frowned upon this American-led Egyptian army, and one of the causes that contributed to Ismail's enforced abdication was European resentment that he had turned to America for military experts. When he was forced into exile, in June 1879, British and French policy in the Valley of the Nile tended to bring about the complete effacement of the Egyptian Army. This policy led to the defeat and death of General Gordon. It necessitated the complete withdrawal of Egypt from the Sudan, until Kitchener began the campaign that culminated in the victory at Omdurman on September 2, 1898.

Thus it came about that Egypt had virtually no army, and certainly no effectively armed army, when the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty was signed August 26, 1936. And the corollary to these conditions, created by Britain, was that she deliberately decided it would not be profitable to make Egypt an active ally, given the fact that an Egyptian army could not be improvised overnight. She preferred complete freedom of action.

No discussion ever arose regarding the loyalty with which Egypt carried out the Treaty under Mohammed Mahmud Pasha, who was Premier just before the war began. When imminent death caused him to resign, his successor, Aly Maher Pasha, cooperated with Great Britain in a way no friend of the democracies has ever criticized. When he in turn retired from office in June 1940, the Italian propaganda machine intensified a campaign of mendacity against King Farouk and his new Prime Minister, Hassan Sabry Pasha. The strategy employed was simple. Fifth columnists started whispering that he was pro-Italian. They invented tales of intrigues and cabals to give a background to their calumnies. And they were able to get many innocent people, both English and American, to repeat these stories and to embellish them, with the aim of angering the young monarch and sowing mutual suspicion between him and the British authorities.

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If the procedure succeeded in causing King Farouk to break with Great Britain, Fascism and Nazism would have gained a powerful ally who might eventually have swung all North Africa, Syria, 'Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Moslem India to their banners. If, on the other hand, it precipitated him into turning his alliance with Britain from passive support to active aid, his subjects would resent being called on to fight on behalf of the nation which they considered was committed to turning over their Islamic Holy Places to the Jews. This might readily have caused a revolution and endangered the safety of the Suez Canal. Not merely have some friends of Britain failed to understand how wise the Egyptian sovereign was not to fall into the trap laid for him, but unfortunately certain Egyptians have joined in the sinister campaign against him. Many of them were hostile to the young King's father, the late King Fuad. They enjoyed a brief spell of glory during the Regency. They have not been able to forgive King Farouk for having attained his majority.

There was an effective means of converting some Englishmen and supporters of England into hostile critics of King Farouk. They simply pointed out that the Axis Powers had invaded Egypt, and that Egyptian troops were not in the battle line, and from this implied that the King was pro-Italian. This increased the difficulties of King Farouk in adhering to the letter and spirit of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. The fact that he nevertheless has done so is evidence of his honesty.

There were other reasons, connected with general British policy in the Near East, why King Farouk found difficulty in adhering to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty. They included:

(1) Mohammedan resentment at England's attempt to convert the Holy Land into a National Home for the Jews.

(2) The circumstance that the right-about-face executed by Britain in Palestine on May 17, 1939, when she brushed aside the Balfour Declaration, did not satisfy the Mohammedan world, but instead was looked upon by Islam as a manœuvre taken on the eve of open hostilities and intended to be effective solely "for the duration."

(3) The tirades launched against Haj Amin El Husseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, after May 17, 1939, by Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, the British Colonial Secretary.

Statistics demonstrate that Egypt is an overwhelmingly Mohammedan country, but they do not give an adequate insight

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into the intensity of the religious fervor of Moslems. And it is because Palestine is as much the Holy Land of the Mohammedan as it is of the Jew or the Christian that he so deeply resents Britain's attempt to convert it into a National Home for the Jews. He is prepared to die rather than surrender to Zionism this sacred Islamic soil.

The fact that the British Government said in its White Paper of May 17, 1939, that the framers of the Balfour Declaration "could not have intended that Palestine should be converted into a Jewish State against the will of the Arab population of the country" failed to allay this resentment. Too much Mohammedan blood had been shed in Britain's effort to impose a contrary interpretation. The new tack seemed to synchronize suspiciously with the imminence of war. Confirmation that it was merely a war measure appeared to be given by statements like that made by Selieg Brodetsky, head of the Jewish Agency's political department, that "Palestine is bound to become the chief channel for the resettlement of Jews who will have to leave Europe because of postwar conditions." And though the Balfour Declaration is repudiated in London, this repudiation has never received Washington's sanction. The Moslem world fears that American Zionism will try to force Britain to reapply the Balfour Declaration as soon as the war is won. And it knows how influential America will be after helping to bring about a common victory.

It is conditions of this character that are confronting King Farouk. His people are anti-Fascist. He is anti-Fascist. He knows, and his people know, what the Italians did in Ethiopia. He knows, and his people know, that the Blue Nile cannot be handed over to Italian control. Their interests are anti-Italian. But they are torn emotionally when they hear an American Senator say that Palestine must be converted into a Jewish National Home as "a vital part of the just world order when the present conflict is over."

Here the personal equation also comes in. Before 1914 Palestine did not present any racial or religious problem. When the First World War broke out all the lands where Arabs formed the majority were under the government of the Turkish Empire. The Allies, knowing the restiveness of the Arabs and being desperately in need of their help, encouraged a revolt, promising that freedom for them would follow an Allied victory. But similar commitments in favor of the Jews were also given the Zionist

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organization. The ensuing trouble, which led to bloodshed in Jerusalem on Easter Sunday, 1920, was at first looked upon by the Mohammedan world as a local Palestinian issue. It was Haj Amin El Hasseini, the Mufti of Jerusalem, who made Islam conscious of the fact that it was not. It was he who persuaded the more than 150,000,000 Mohammedans under British and French rule to serve notice on the home governments that they would not have the support of Islam in the war then in the offing if the Balfour Declaration was not recalled.

When Mr. Neville Chamberlain decided to appease Islam he did not take a consistent course. He had his Colonial Secretary, Mr. Malcolm MacDonald, announce that the Balfour Declaration "did not mean a Jewish State in Palestine against the wishes of the Arab population." But he also announced that the anathema against the Mufti of Jerusalem remained in force. The reason advanced for this procedure was the assertion that Haj Amin El Husseini was an assassin and a brigand, whose offenses were so heinous that Great Britain could not condone them.

No attempt will here be made to pass upon the correctness of these charges. Suffice it to say that 250,000,000 Moslems look upon the man in question as the personification of their claim to their Holy Places in Palestine and that like other people they are prone to personify causes. The fact that even since the present war began the ban against the Mufti of Jerusalem has not been lifted emphasizes how tactful King Farouk has had to be to prevent his devout Mohammedan subjects from turning their sympathies to the Axis Powers. This does not mean that Egyptian Mohammedans are rallying around Haj Amin El Husseini as the leader of Islam, but that the treatment to which he has been subjected by Britain has made him a symbol of Mohammedanism's claim to the Holy Land.

It requires not only a sense of loyalty, but also tact, forebearance and mastery of the niceties of psychology, for King Farouk to be able to adhere to the Anglo-Egyptian accord of August 26, 1939, when there is bound to be an undercurrent around him attempting to force him into the arms of the Axis. We may assume that Moslem extremists continually tell him that he should capitalize the well-known antagonism of Fascism and Nazism to Jewry in order to join forces with them to assure the preservation for Islam of Islam's Holy Places. But he has not listened to such counsels. He has lived up to his Treaty obligations with

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Britain in a way which should win for him the esteem of Englishmen and their American friends. If they knew the facts they would cease asking, as one American writer did recently, "whether the time for patience has not about run out and whether the choice of sides in this war can be postponed by the Egyptian Government indefinitely." They would see, on the contrary, that:

(1) The British military experts who dictated the dominant clauses of the Anglo-Egyptian Accord of August 26, 1939, deliberately elected, contrary to Egyptian *amour propre*, to make Egypt a passive ally and not an active one.

(2) The attention of these British military experts was centered upon safeguarding "the security of the communications of the British Empire in Egypt" — that is to say, the inviolability of the Suez Canal — and that unimpaired freedom of action seemed to them more important in this connection than permitting Egypt to become Britain's active ally.

(3) Great Britain has been given, in accordance with the letter and spirit of the Pact, all the elbowroom in Egypt desired by the British military experts and complete control over the harbor of Alexandria.

(4) Moslem feeling in Egypt is so resentful of British policy in Palestine, and so fearful of the present attitude of the United States as regards a "just world order when the present conflict is over," that it might be hazardous to attempt to enlarge the terms of the Treaty, even if British experts should change their minds as to what is the best rôle for Egypt.

(5) In view of Egypt's position in the Mohammedan world there is no telling how wide might be the repercussions of any unrest starting in the Valley of the Nile.

(6) King Farouk's unchallenged position as a devout Mohammedan, and as a man whom the Moslem leaders throughout the world trust, makes his loyalty to his Treaty obligations a matter of outstanding importance not only for the defense of the Suez Canal but in preventing uprisings in favor of the anti-Jewish Axis Powers throughout the entire Near East, North Africa, Moslem India and other lands.

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ROUTES TO ALASKA

By Vilhjalmur Stefansson

AS the northern anchor of America's ramparts in the Pacific, Alaska is destined to play a stellar strategic rôle in the defense of this hemisphere.[1] Present plans call for the expenditure of some $50,000,000 to create or enlarge Army air fields, naval air bases, submarine bases and other military installations in various parts of the Territory. Of this sum, $34,325,000 has already been appropriated, $17,200,000 for the Army and $17,125,000 for the Navy. But these preparations will be of little value unless Alaska is connected with the States by dependable means of transport easily defensible and available all the year round. Practically everything consumed by the Territory's inhabitants, whether civilian or military, is now being imported; and this condition is bound to continue, at least as far as arms, munitions and general military supplies are concerned. The problem of improving and making secure our lines of communications with Alaska is therefore one of great importance and urgency.

At present, all traffic between the United States and Alaska must go by sea — except for such mail, freight and passengers as are carried from Seattle by Pan American Airways or from Edmonton and Vancouver by Yukon Southern.

II

The north coast of Alaska may be considered open for navigation during three months — July, August and September. In only some ten of the fifty-odd years since 1889 have vessels been able to round Point Barrow before July 1; while in two or three of those years the ice either entirely failed to move away from Barrow or moved so late that ships had ceased trying to get through. The coast southwest from Barrow to Point Hope usually opens a little earlier and closes a little later.

At Nome, on the west coast south of the Bering Strait, the first ordinary steamers arrive sometime during May and the last ones usually leave between October 25 and November 5. But Nome is only an open roadstead. The harbor of Port Clarence — spacious enough to accommodate the entire United States Fleet, but almost too spacious since the sea in it is occasionally rough — opens later than Nome and closes earlier. At the head of Port Clarence the excellent little harbor at Teller, usable only by small vessels, has a still shorter active season. St. Michael, farther south, is open for about the same period as Nome — unless use is made of special methods, about which more will be said shortly. St. Michael is the port nearest the mouth of the Yukon River. This stream enjoys a slightly longer season than its southern neighbor, the Kuskokwim, because of the heat which its water has accumulated in its vast basin where summer temperatures frequently run above 90° in the shade, and sometimes even reach 100°. The delta of the Yukon generally freezes over during the first week of October, two or three weeks before the main stream above the delta.

All these facts are important, for by showing that the north and west coasts of Alaska are readily accessible by steamer during only a few months of the

[1] See William M. Franklin: "Alaska, Outpost of American Defense," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, October 1940, p. 245–250.

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year they indicate the serious problems involved in supplying a considerable part of the Territory. One way to alleviate this difficulty is to use the "special methods" alluded to above.

The Soviets have developed a system by which numerous shore observatories along polar coasts work in conjunction with planes that scout the sea in order to report the condition and movement of ice. In Alaskan waters vessels could be similarly directed and redirected constantly so as to take advantage of thin or loose ice or of the widest available gaps in the pack. The season for northern Alaskan water-borne commerce might thus be extended at the same time that the safety of navigation was increased. The Soviets also use powerful icebreakers to accompany fleets of transport ships, and this helps still further to lengthen the navigation season and to assure safety. Such special ships would be useful principally in the waters to the south of Point Hope, and their usefulness would increase as one went south. They would thus be most important south of the Yukon, where places now closed for several months each winter might perhaps be made accessible for the entire year.

The chief harbors of southern Alaska are, with one exception, little troubled by ice. At Skagway, Juneau, Cordova, Seward and, of course, the ports in the Panhandle, there is no trouble at all. It is unfortunately the chief harbor of Alaska, Anchorage, that lies idle through several winter months because of ice. Anchorage is located at the head of Cook Inlet, where the tides are among the highest in the world. These currents keep the ice in such a state of agitation that the port at Anchorage is useless for nearly half the year. However, some observers believe that by using modern methods Anchorage could be kept open the year round.

In any event, Seward, 80 miles south of Anchorage on the Gulf of Alaska, has since the construction of the Alaska Railroad been the winter port for Anchorage. But Seward too has drawbacks. Along the railroad just north of it the heavy snows have been a serious problem in winter, the very time when that port must carry the burden of traffic. Furthermore, this stretch of track contains high wooden trestles which military experts regard as vulnerable to attack or sabotage. Both railway and Army experts have therefore been urging the construction of a cutoff. Recent reports indicate that preparations are now being made to convert Portage Bay, on the east side of Kenai Peninsula, into a harbor that will replace Seward.

For the time being, however, Anchorage is the most important city in Alaska. Just back of it is Fort Richardson, chief military establishment in the Territory. From Anchorage runs the government railroad northward across the high Alaska Range to the Tanana-Yukon basin at Fairbanks; and from it will soon run a branch road up through the Matanuska Valley to tie in with the Richardson Highway which extends from Valdez to Fairbanks.

III

This brings us to the question of what facilities exist for connecting the ports of Alaska with the interior. First of all there is, as already mentioned, the Seward-Fairbanks railroad. Its main line covers a distance of 470 miles and is open for freight and passenger service the year round. Besides carrying through traffic from the Yukon basin to the coast, its branch lines serve the Matanuska Valley farming area as well as several coal fields.

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The railroad from Cordova inland along the Copper River ceased operation in 1938, but might be reopened. More important is the railway from Skagway across White Pass to Whitehorse in the Yukon Territory. From Whitehorse goods and passengers proceed by boat down the Yukon River to Dawson and to the great interior basin of Alaska. Like the Alaska Railroad, the White Pass line is open throughout the year.

There is only one road worthy of the name leading from the coast into the interior of Alaska — the 371-mile Richardson Highway from Valdez to Fairbanks. This has a narrow, winding roadway and is not surfaced. Parts of the highway are closed each winter by snow, especially in the passes; but with the use of modern snow-removal machinery the road could doubtless be kept open in all except the worst weather. There is also a respectable road from Fairbanks to Circle — the Steese Highway. The snow is drier and smaller in quantity in the interior than it is south of the Alaska Range, and for this reason it is easier to keep roads open in the Yukon Basin than on the southern coast. Indeed, Alaska blizzards, except those along the Bering Sea and the Arctic Coast, do not cause as much trouble as those of Minnesota and the Dakotas. Many roads, or trails, wind through various parts of the forested interior, and these are open in the winter when the ground is frozen. In the summer, however, when the mud and swamps turn into jelly, they become impassable. Hence it is upon aviation that much of Alaska must rely for transportation facilities.

In Alaska planes are used, both for freight and passengers, in a higher per capita ratio than anywhere in the world except in the Canadian and Soviet Far North. In 1938 the approximately 30,000 permanent white residents of Alaska purchased about 30,000 separate airplane passages. In the same year, Alaskan airways carried as much freight as all the airlines in the United States. There are three ways of flying to Alaska: Pan American Airways from Seattle and the two routes of Yukon Southern (subsidiary of the Canadian Pacific Railway), one from Vancouver and one from Edmonton. From Seattle-Vancouver, Pan American and Yukon Southern coöperate to make up a seven-times-a-week schedule, four days from Seattle by Pan American and three from Vancouver by Yukon Southern. These Alaska services have so coördinated their schedules with the transcontinental airlines that it is possible to reach Fairbanks from New York City in 20 hours. In another three hours of flying one may reach the frontier between the United States and the U.S.S.R. in Bering Strait between Little and Big Diomede Islands.

In 1939 there were in Alaska about 175 airplanes doing scheduled runs, many of them available in their spare time for charter service. By now the number is undoubtedly higher. These planes operate not only out of "big cities" in Alaska, but sometimes out of villages. With them one can go to any part of the mainland territory and to some of the neighboring islands.

Of supreme importance to Alaska's forested interior basin, greater in area than all the seaboard states from Maine to Georgia, are the two large rivers, the Yukon and the Kuskokwim. The Yukon, third largest stream on the North American continent, has been navigated by flat-bottomed steamers with a draft up to six feet, from its mouth to Dawson, a distance of 1,100 miles, and by steamers of shallower draft another 300 miles to Whitehorse, terminal of the White Pass railway. The Kuskokwim is navigable for the 330 miles from McGrath to the sea. Both streams are open from May to October.

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

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It has been suggested that the value of these two waterways as arteries of commerce would be greatly enhanced by joining them at a point near the Bering Sea where the portage between them is about 20 miles wide and 20 feet high. To dig such a canal would be simple and cheap, and would contribute to Alaska's defensibility by improving its interior lines of transportation.

Another suggestion, made with the same objective in mind, is to broaden and improve the road which runs across where the head of Lake Iliamna is less than 20 miles from Cook Inlet. Such a road, used in conjunction with steamers on Iliamna and its outlet to the Bering Sea, would represent a valuable cutoff for traffic from Bristol Bay to points on the Gulf of Alaska.

The most vulnerable link in the Territory's chain of communications is that connecting it with the United States by sea. Vessels from Puget Sound bound for ports in the Panhandle, naturally take the Inside Passage, the tortuous and spectacular route that threads its way through a maze of rugged islands along the fjord-like coast of British Columbia and Alaska. This is the most important tourist route to Alaska. Ships headed for all other ports in Alaska generally take the open sea, and in time of war they would therefore be liable to attack from hostile naval units operating in the North Pacific. Even those ships which followed the Inside Passage would by no means be entirely safe from attack by surface or submarine raiders lying in ambush in the countless hideaways which this deeply indented coast affords.

Summarizing, one can say that the various transport services to and within Alaska are fairly adequate for the peacetime needs of the Territory's 70,000 whites and natives. But they are pathetically inadequate to provide for the probable requirements of war conditions. In the event of an American naval defeat in the Pacific, commerce between Alaska and the States would be severed and Alaskans would become prisoners within Alaska, except those who could fly out. Those left would starve, since the food-producing potentialities of the Territory have scarcely been developed at all. These facts explain the necessity for the construction — at the earliest possible moment — of a modern highway across Western Canada to the interior of Alaska.

IV

Various routes have been suggested for this proposed highway. Those most discussed are four in number, designated as Routes A, B, C and D.

The most publicized of the four is Route A, which runs north from Seattle and Vancouver through Prince George and Hazelton to Whitehorse and Fairbanks. About a third of this road, from Seattle to Hazelton, is already in place, but only a part of it is in a state fit to carry the heavy military traffic of modern war.

Route A is picturesque, with many attractions for the tourist; but its steep grades and numerous curves would entail relatively heavy construction costs. It lies in general far enough inland to escape the heavy snows deposited by the moist winds of the North Pacific; keeping it open in winter would thus be relatively easy. Yet it is near enough to the coast to allow a number of feeder highways to be run up to it from tidewater. This would permit the road to be built from several intermediate points simultaneously, rather than merely from the termini, thereby reducing both the time and cost of construction. After the road had been finished these feeders would make it easier to furnish

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traffic on it with fuel and other supplies, and they would also serve as outlets for coastal communities now accessible only by sea.

Mr. Donald MacDonald, chief proponent of Route A, says it can be built from 60 foci in 18 months at a cost of $25,000,000. Hon. Anthony J. Dimond, Delegate to Congress from Alaska, puts the cost at $30,000,000. Either set of figures puts both a time limit and a price limit equal to only a third of the requirements for building a battleship. And, say the highway advocates, battleships sometimes go on rocks and in any case grow obsolete in ten years, whereas a road constantly increases in value and importance, in peace as well as in war. But some critics maintain that its proximity to the coast is a fatal military weakness of Route A, for it would expose the road to aerial raids from the North Pacific, and might even be cut by a hostile force if the United States were to lose, even temporarily, control over those waters. To this MacDonald replies that military units could easily be stationed along the highway, in addition to the chain of air bases already being set up along its route.

Route B is the same as Route A as far north as Prince George. Beyond that point Route B follows a course considerably farther inland. Since it passes through less rugged country, it might be cheaper to build, though its construction would take longer for it lacks the coastal feeders which are a feature of Route A. Furthermore, this same lack of feeders would increase the difficulty of supplying fuel along Highway B after it had been completed.

Routes A and B have their southern termini on the Pacific, and to many observers this is a serious drawback, for most of the manufactured goods — especially defense apparatus — which would be carried over a highway to Yukon Territory and Alaska would originate in the industrial areas of southeastern Canada and in the States east of the Mississippi. If this highway were to be built along either Routes A or B, it would mean, for instance, that a truck being delivered to Fairbanks from Detroit would have to go around two sides of a triangle. This is one of the reasons why some commentators feel that the highway should run direct from Chicago, the Twin Cities and Winnipeg northwestward across the prairies, keeping east of the Rockies till near the Arctic, thus making a beeline between the eastern industrial centers and Alaska.

V

There are, in fact, two proposals for such a direct highway: Routes C and D. Both of these may be thought of as starting from Edmonton where they would connect with well-established highways radiating south and eastward. They both follow the same route north from Edmonton as far as the town of Peace River. Here they divide, Route C following a more westerly course by way of Fort St. John and Fort Nelson. As the reader will note from the accompanying map, beyond Fort Nelson two courses are suggested, one to connect with Route B at Frances Lake, the other to connect at Whitehorse with Route A.

Either of these two Routes C, being fairly direct and passing through more level country, would, as compared to either A or B, represent a substantial saving in construction costs as well as in mileage between eastern American cities and the interior of Alaska. The backers of this proposal dwell on the fact that Route C runs through oil country in Alberta, and perhaps in British

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Columbia, and that this would greatly simplify the fuel problem. Oil has been produced for many years in the fields south and east of Calgary, while the Abasand Oil Company's plant near McMurray, 250 miles north of Edmonton and scheduled to enter production shortly, will produce Diesel oil, automobile gas and road-surfacing material "in any quantity desired." The oil sands of this field are estimated to contain 100 billion barrels of oil.

But Route C has the same drawback as B in that it would lack feeders and would therefore have to be constructed in long segments — an expensive and time-consuming process. This brings us to Route D. Though a little longer than Route C — perhaps 1,400 miles as against 1,300, measured from the railhead at Peace River to Fairbanks — Route D offers better chances for rapid and cheap construction than any other highway yet suggested, for reasons which will be explained shortly.

From Peace River, D runs north across a low divide of rolling hills into the Hay River valley, and then to Providence on the Mackenzie River just below the outlet of Great Slave Lake. This segment would pass through one of the finest wheat and mixed-farming regions in Canada, as yet only in small part developed. A heavy-trucking road for use in winter (when both ground and waterways are frozen) was completed through this section two years ago from Notikewin (at the end of the all-year highway 40 miles north of Peace River) to the west end of Great Slave Lake.

Beyond Providence Route D parallels the Mackenzie, second largest river in North America, down as far as the mouth of Keele River, some 30 miles upstream from Norman. Here the Mackenzie is just over 300 crow-flight miles from the nearest point on the Alaska-Yukon road system at Mayo. By following the Keele and its branches, crossing a rather swampy tableland and then descending along a fork of the Stewart River to Mayo, Route D avoids any real mountaineering problems, for at no point would it have an altitude much over 3,000 feet. According to the report of the one known flight over the Keele-Stewart route, the canyons are not serious; but, according to the one available report of a journey made on foot, they are bad. However, all authorities agree that the Mackenzie-Yukon divide in this region is low and not particularly rough.

The section of Highway D from the Mackenzie to Mayo would be the most difficult to build, for it could be constructed only from its two termini. But southward from the point where it meets the Mackenzie River, Highway D could be built simultaneously from many points, since it would almost everywhere be parallel to railways, makeshift wagon roads or navigable rivers. Supplies for construction could thus be set down at enough places to permit the highway to be completed in less time than it would take to finish any of the other three proposed roads. Also, Highway D would cost less to build. Mr. W. A. Fallow, Minister of Public Works in the Province of Alberta, has put the cost at $12,000,000; other proponents estimate it at $15,000,000.

The question of fuel — for use both during and after construction — is also important. Road D, like Road C, would utilize the oil produced in Southern Alberta and at McMurray. In addition, the northern part of Road D could be supplied from the plant of the Imperial Oil Company of Canada on the Lower Mackenzie near Norman. Imperial Oil drilled its first producing well in the Norman fields in 1920; but local demand did not justify production until

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1936, at which time a steam still began providing ordinary gasoline and Diesel oil, consumed locally by river steamers and by the heavy machinery used in the gold, radium and other mining industries that have developed so spectacularly in the region of Great Bear Lake during the last decade. In 1939 a modern unit was installed, with a capacity of 840 barrels of crude oil a day and capable of producing gasoline, light and heavy Diesel oil, and bunker oil. In this plant it is now possible to make aviation gasolines of somewhat better than 80 octane by the use of tetra ethyl lead. In 1940, 87 octane was being made with an imported blending fluid. In 1938 Imperial produced 27,697 barrels around Norman. This field has never been classified as one of the world's greatest, like the McMurray sands; but it is known to be large in area, and the impression prevails that with two or three years of energetic and well-financed drilling there is at least an even chance of finding a supply there that would produce several million barrels per year, enough to satisfy the commercial and military needs of both the Yukon Territory and the interior of Alaska.

As far as Highway D is concerned, the products of the Norman field would serve not only to build the road quickly and cheaply, but once built would supply traffic along it with a constant source of ready and inexpensive fuel. Furthermore, by means of its northern leg from the Mackenzie River to Dawson, Road C could keep the Yukon Territory and Alaska supplied with oil products at prices greatly below those now prevailing there. The champions of Route D point out that Alaska's oil supply, coming as it does entirely by sea from the United States proper, might be cut off, or greatly curtailed, by an enterprising enemy in time of war. The construction of an all-weather road from Fairbanks to the Mackenzie near Norman would be, they claim, one of the most important steps toward making Alaska defensible. It has also been suggested that a pipeline might be laid from Norman to the head of navigation on the Yukon River system.

Route D is, of course, less exposed to attack from the Pacific than any of the other three. It would also be less subject to blocking in winter because the amount of trouble caused by snow decreases as one goes inland from the ocean. Route A would thus have the most difficulties in this respect, and Route D the least. As far as the latter is concerned, the thousand miles from Chicago to the Peace River would suffer more from snow than the stretch from the Peace River to Fairbanks, since the strong winds which produce drifts on the prairies do not occur in the northern forest.

VI

Air communication between the United States and Alaska is assured by Pan American Airways from Seattle to Juneau, Whitehorse, Fairbanks and Nome, with a branch to Bethel. At Whitehorse, Pan American connects with the Yukon Southern lines running to Vancouver and Edmonton. There is also a regular airline from Edmonton down the Mackenzie to its mouth at Aklavik, with a branch running to Coppermine. However, the facilities — fields, hangars, repair shops, etc. — employed by these commercial lines are of little value for defense purposes. The Army and Navy are therefore building bases of their own. The Navy, for instance, is developing patrol-plane bases at Sitka, Kodiak Island and Dutch Harbor; while the Army is constructing one of its major air bases at Anchorage, the southern gateway to the interior, and an

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advanced base, especially adapted for experimentation in cold-weather flying, at Fairbanks.

What the Army Air Corps needs, then, is what the Army itself needs — an overland route across Canada. For the Air Corps this would mean one or more chains of large, well-equipped and well-defended air fields, located preferably east of the Rockies. Both the Canadian and American Governments are now improving the ground facilities of some of the existing fields so that they can handle large-scale military traffic. For bombers the problem is simple since they can take off in the United States and fly non-stop to their destinations in Alaska. It is the fighter planes that are a problem because of their short flying range.

As a matter of fact, the Canadian Air Minister, Mr. C. G. Power, revealed in the middle of last February that the Dominion Government was going to spend $9,000,000 on the construction of seven air fields between Edmonton and Whitehorse, and that when completed in the summer of 1941 these fields were to be open to both the commercial and military planes of the United States. A month later, on March 15, the Canadian Air Ministry and the Transport Department issued a joint statement officially announcing that work had already commenced on the construction of a series of "airdromes" running northward from both Edmonton and Vancouver. This announcement would appear to mean that existing fields at Grand Prairie, Fort St. John, Fort Nelson and Watson Lake — all of them located along the more southerly route proposed for Highway C — are to be improved sufficiently to carry military traffic. Between Vancouver and Fort St. John, where the two lines join, "airdromes" are being developed at Kamloops, Williams Lake and Prince George, with a field also at Smithers en route to Prince Rupert. Presumably the work on these fields will be supplemented by the enlargement of the fields at Whitehorse, Dawson and elsewhere in order to complete the chain to Fairbanks, and perhaps eventually to Nome.

According to reports these fields now being developed will have landing strips 4,000 feet long and 500 feet wide, complete lighting equipment for night flying, and all the necessary radio apparatus for guiding aircraft in any kind of weather. To move fighter squadrons to Alaska in winter would be a simple undertaking, for in an emergency wheeled planes can descend upon the ice of lakes and of rivers, just as commercial aircraft have been doing for some time. When the fields just listed have been expanded and completed, it will be as easy to move Canadian and American fighter squadrons to Alaska in summer as in winter.

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RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Robert Gale Woolbert

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General: Political, Military and Legal

VERSAILLES TWENTY YEARS AFTER. By PAUL BIRDSALL. New York: Reynal, 1941, 350 p. $3.00.

An objective and very readable reconstruction of the 1919 peace negotiations, by a professor of history at Williams College. Dr. Birdsall feels that Woodrow Wilson was remarkably successful at Paris in imposing his own views in spite of the bitter fight waged against him and his ideals by most of the other delegates and by many of his own countrymen. The book closes with a call for the revival of Wilsonian principles.

PREPARE FOR PEACE! By HENRY M. WRISTON. New York: Harper, 1941, 275 p. $2.50.

The author, President of Brown University, has written this thought-provoking book on the theory that in time of war prepare for peace. Drawing on his wide range of historical knowledge, he shows how easy it is for victors in war to lose the ensuing peace through their failure to organize it on a sane and durable basis. He therefore urges that these lessons of the past be taken to heart by the men who will be responsible for making and keeping the new peace, however and whenever it comes.

THE REDEMPTION OF DEMOCRACY. By HERMANN RAUSCHNING. New York: Alliance, 1941, 243 p. $3.00.

Dr. Rauschning, having been high in Hitler's confidence, is an unexcelled authority on the aims and methods of Nazi Germany — though what he has to say on this subject in his present work will be found in large part in his previous books. But when he enters the field of prophecy and calls for a sort of "Pax Anglo-Americana" to rule "the coming Atlantic Empire" he is not so convincing. Never having believed in democracy, he is not well equipped to understand its fundamental qualities and predict its future.

THE WAVE OF THE FUTURE. By ANNE MORROW LINDBERGH. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 41 p. $1.00.

This is one of the most controversial books to appear in recent years, and one of the most difficult to appraise. In substance, Mrs. Lindbergh's thesis is that the great fact of history, the law of life, is eternal and inexorable change, that we are now in one of the great periods of rapid and profound change, and that it is therefore the better part of wisdom — for Americans as well as for all other peoples — to accept this process, whatever it may be, and not to fight against it. The "wave of the future," as it presents itself to Mrs. Lindbergh, is totalitarian, and in her eyes there is no use in our trying, Canute-like, to stem it. The net effect of Mrs. Lindbergh's book, perhaps unintentional, is even more destructive than the mechanistic approach to life expounded by her husband because it furnishes a sort of *vade mecum* for the defeatists. One of the most disturbing things about this sincere, and in some respects courageous, little volume is its evasion of some of the real issues, particularly the moral ones. It carries the subtitle "A Confession of Faith," but it is precisely faith that the author seems to lack.

LET NO WAVE ENGULF US. By Frank Altschul. New York: Duell, 1941, 60 p. $1.00.

Mr. Altschul, senior partner of Lazard Frères, feels with Mrs. Lindbergh that drastic

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social and economic reforms are called for, but unlike her he wants them effected by strengthening democratic processes and ideals, not by surrendering supinely to the new barbarism. Mr. Altschul believes that the salvation of sanity and decency lies with the moderates and he calls upon all who belong to that way of thinking to rally behind President Roosevelt.

WHY FREEDOM MATTERS. By Sir Norman Angell. New York: Penguin, 1940, 134 p. 25 cents.

A cogent tract for the times.

THE WAVE OF THE PAST. By R. H. Markham. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1941, 55 p. $1.00.

A simple expression of a religious faith in democracy, by a former European correspondent of the *Christian Science Monitor*.

FREEDOM: ITS MEANING. Edited by Ruth Nanda Anshen. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 686 p. $4.00.

Essays by forty-two scholars and scientists of many nationalities.

THE MORAL BASIS OF DEMOCRACY. By Eleanor Roosevelt. New York: Howell, Soskin, 1940, 82 p. $1.50.

The wife of the President emphasizes the Christian content of true democracy.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF A MORE STABLE WORLD ORDER. Edited by Walter H. C. Laves. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1941, 193 p. $2.00.

Six lectures delivered at the Harris Institute of the University of Chicago in 1940.

DAS ENDE DES EUROPÄISCHEN GLEICHGEWICHTS. By Gerhart Jentsch. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1940, 72 p. M 1.80.

The Balance of Power idea suited only Britain, and now it has been abolished by historical processes of which the Axis is the culmination.

TERROR IN OUR TIME. By Richard Wilmer Rowan. New York: Longmans, 1941, 438 p. $3.00.

The amazing history of espionage and fifth-columnism in Europe and Asia between the two World Wars.

POLITICAL PROPAGANDA. By F. C. Bartlett. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 158 p. $1.25.

A scientific and comprehensive survey by a psychologist at Cambridge University.

MAJORITY RULE IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. By Cromwell A. Riches. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1940, 322 p. $2.75.

A scholarly study of the trend from unanimity to majority decision, by an associate professor of political science in Goucher College.

LEAGUE REFORM. By S. Engel. Geneva: Geneva Research Centre, 1940, 282 p. 40 cents.

"An analysis of official proposals and discussions, 1936–1939."

GEOGRAPHY IN HUMAN DESTINY. By Roderick Peattie. New York: Stewart, 1940, 323 p. $3.00.

Illuminating and readable essays on the effect geographic forces have had on the development of mankind.

CONQUEST AND MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW. By Matthew M. McMahon. Washington: The Catholic University, 1940, 233 p. $2.00.

A scholarly and timely study of "The Legal Limitations on the Acquisition of Territory by Conquest."

DE LA GUERRE À LA PAIX. By Georges Kaeckenbeeck. Geneva: Naville, 1940, 103 p. Fr. 2.

Lectures on the legal problems involved in the transition from war to peace by a Dutch jurist.

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THE ARMY OF THE FUTURE. By General Charles de Gaulle. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941, 179 p. $2.00.

The first English translation of a now famous book, originally published in France in 1934, in which de Gaulle, then only a captain, laid down the pattern for mechanized warfare — a pattern ignored by his own countrymen but applied by the Germans.

MODERN ARCTIC EXPLORATION. By Gunnar Seidenfaden. Boston: Hale, 1940, 189 p. $2.50.

An illustrated review of methods, aims and achievements.

GREENLAND LIES NORTH. By William S. Carlson. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 306 p. $3.00.

An entertaining account of a winter spent in northern Greenland by two American scientists, instructive as to native life in that region.

THE WORLD OVER IN 1940. Edited by Leon Bryce Bloch and Lamar Middleton. New York: Living Age Press, 1941, 914 p. $4.00.

The third annual volume of this chronology and interpretation of world-wide events.

General: Economic and Social

BARRIERS TO WORLD TRADE. By Margaret S. Gordon. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 530 p. $4.00.

A systematic study of the manifold restrictions that grew up around world trade during the last decade. This book is published under the auspices of the Bureau of International Research of Harvard University and Radcliffe College.

THE CONDITIONS OF ECONOMIC PROGRESS. By Colin Clark. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 504 p. $5.00.

An important work synthesizing present technical and statistical data concerning the question of national income and allied problems in the world's principal countries.

THE DEFEAT OF CHAOS. By Sir George Paish. New York: Appleton-Century, 1941, 122 p. $1.00.

A British economist holds that a new era of international economic coöperation, reviving the golden age of free trade, will follow the defeat of Hitler. However, he seems unaware of the necessity of establishing new international political institutions, and he gives no indication of sympathy with those who, like the late Lord Lothian, proclaim the necessity of social reconstruction.

A PROGRAMME FOR PROGRESS. By John Strachey. New York: Random House, 1940, 303 p. $3.00.

Mr. Strachey, having forsaken Communism, now favors a sort of Popular Front Socialism. In this book he outlines a "new economic policy for the democracies."

STUDIES IN ECONOMIC WARFARE. By D. T. Jack. New York: Chemical Publishing Co., 1941, 178 p. $4.00.

An historical study covering the period since the latter part of the eighteenth century and devoted largely to maritime warfare.

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WAR. By A. C. Pigou. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 169 p. $1.50.

A revision of a general study first published in 1921. The author is professor of political economy at Cambridge.

THE INTERNATIONAL GOLD STANDARD REINTERPRETED, 1914–1934. By William Adams Brown, Jr. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940, 2 v. $12.00.

An exhaustive history of one of the most important phases of the economic history of the last 25 years. The author of this monumental work is professor of economics at Brown University. An article by him appears in the present issue of Foreign Affairs.

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IL SISTEMA AUREO. By Attilio Cabiati. Turin: Einaudi, 1940, 324 p. L. 25.

An historical and technical treatise on the gold standard and the Exchange Equalisation Account, by a recognized Italian authority.

VALYUTNYE OGRANICHENIYA I KLIRINGI. By L. I. Frey. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Mezhdunarodnaya Kniga, 1940, 291 p. $1.75.

A study of international currency restrictions and clearing agreements.

LE PÉTROLE DANS LE MONDE. By Victor Forbin. Paris: Payot, 1940, 240 p. Fr. 27.

Oil production considered as a technical and a politico-military problem.

COMPETITION AMONG GRAINS. By N. Jasny. Stanford University: Food Research Institute, 1940, 606 p. $4.00.

A thorough examination of the world-wide manifestations of the competition for both production and consumption between corn, wheat, rye, barley and oats.

TIDES IN THE AFFAIRS OF MEN. By Edgar Lawrence Smith. New York: Macmillan, 1939, 178 p. $2.00.

An attempt to correlate meteorology and economics.

WORLD-WIDE INFLUENCES OF THE CINEMA. By John Eugene Harley. Los Angeles: University of Southern California Press, 1940, 320 p. $2.00.

"A study of official censorship and the international cultural aspects of motion pictures."

SCHOLASTICISM AND POLITICS. By Jacques Maritain. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 248 p. $2.00.

This meaty little book by the eminent French Catholic philosopher is based on nine lectures he delivered at the University of Chicago.

FREEDOM UNDER GOD. By Fulton J. Sheen. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1940, 265 p. $2.25.

An exposition of Catholic doctrine in which a prominent churchman carries on his war against Communism.

The Second World War

THE ORIGINS OF WORLD WAR II. By Alfred von Wegerer. New York: Smith, 1941, 128 p. $1.50.

An expanded and revised version of an article presenting the German point of view which appeared in the July 1940 issue of Foreign Affairs.

L'HÉRÉSIE ÉCONOMIQUE ALLEMANDE CAUSE DE LA GUERRE. By Paul Maquenne. Paris: Union Latine d'Editions, 1940, 408 p. Fr. 70.

A former attaché of the French commercial mission in Germany discusses Nazi economics in understandable terms.

WAR BY REVOLUTION. By Francis Williams. New York: Viking, 1941, 158 p. $1.50.

Mr. Williams' argument, aimed primarily at an English audience, is that the defeat of Hitler cannot be attained by military measures alone and that therefore an indispensable means to victory must be the organization of democratic revolutionary movements in Nazi-controlled Europe. Some critics will feel that Mr. Williams has leaned over too far in underestimating the military factor.

HOW TO WIN THE WAR. By an Englishman. New York: Knopf, 1941, 145 p. $1.50.

The thesis of this little volume is somewhat parallel to that of Francis Williams' book — that Britain cannot win by arms alone but must be aided by revolts among the continental peoples now subject to the Nazis. The anonymous author analyzes the

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antediluvian methods and mentality that rule Britain's Foreign Office, Ministry of Information and Home Office, and shows that these must be made efficient and democratic-minded before Britain can pose as the savior of European peoples.

THE COMMON SENSE OF WAR AND PEACE. By H. G. Wells. New York: Penguin, 1940, 116 p. 25 cents.

Peace can be restored only by a world revolution for which the famous English novelist gives the specifications.

WAYS AND MEANS OF WAR. By Geoffrey Crowther. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 184 p. $1.25.

A brief but rather comprehensive survey of the various economic problems involved in fighting the war, by the editor of the *Economist* of London.

LA MARINA MERCANTILE E LA SECONDA GUERRA MONDIALE. By Bruno Minoletti. Turin: Einaudi, 1940, 225 p. L. 18.

The effect of the war upon the merchant marines of both belligerents and neutrals.

ENGLAND SPEAKS. By A. P. Herbert and Others. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 222 p. $1.75.

Essays on the implications of this war by eight British writers including A. A. Milne, C. E. M. Joad and Harold Laski.

LABOUR IN THE WAR. By John Price. New York: Penguin, 1940, 176 p. 25 cents.

A discussion of the attitude of British organized labor towards the war and of the contribution it is making to the national effort through its trade unions.

SQUADRONS UP! By Noel Monks. New York: Whittlesey, 1941, 260 p. $2.50.

An exciting account of the operations of the R. A. F. fighter squadrons of the Advanced Air Striking Force in France from September 1939 to June 1940.

THEIR FINEST HOUR. Edited by Allan A. Michie and Walter Graebner. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 226 p. $2.50.

Graphic "first-hand narratives" of how England is fighting this war, by some of the men and women, in and out of uniform, who are fighting it.

I SAW ENGLAND. By Ben Robertson. New York: Knopf, 1941, 213 p. $2.00.

An excellent piece of reporting by the London correspondent of *PM* of New York.

THE WOUNDED DON'T CRY. By Quentin Reynolds. New York: Dutton, 1941, 253 p. $2.50.

One of the more vivid books to come out of the Blitzkrieg, which the author witnessed as correspondent for *Collier's*. The scene covers both France and Britain, and the approach is personal rather than comprehensive.

ENGLAND'S HOUR. By Vera Brittain. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 230 p. $2.50.

How the British civilian is "standing up to Hitler."

BRITISH WOMEN IN WAR. By Peggy Scott. London: Hutchinson, 1940, 329 p. 7/6.

An illustrated book covering many fields of activity, military and civil.

CANADA FIGHTS. Edited by John W. Dafoe. New York: Farrar, 1941, 280 p. $2.00.

Chapters on Canada's part in the war, by six Canadian scholars and journalists.

FRANCE SPEAKING. By Robert de Saint Jean. New York: Dutton, 1941, 335 p. $2.50.

The author, formerly a foreign correspondent of the *Paris-Soir*, served as an official in the French Ministry of Information before the collapse of France. The title is a bit misleading. Actually the book consists of passages taken from the author's diary between October 9, 1939, and June 17, 1940. It throws a great deal of light both on the inside story behind events and on the reaction of the man-in-the-street to those events.

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J'ACCUSE! By André Simone. New York: Dial Press, 1940, 354 p. $2.50.

This book, by a French journalist writing under a pseudonym, was admittedly set down in the "white heat of anger," and therefore is not to be taken too literally as the gospel truth, in spite of Carleton Beals' glowing tribute to its exactness in his introduction. Many of the author's charges against the ruling men of the Third Republic are no doubt only too well justified. But many others are, to say the least, "not proven."

FRANCE MY COUNTRY. By Jacques Maritain. New York: Longmans, 1941, 117 p. $1.25.

A leading French Catholic philosopher examines the causes of his country's downfall. He is very critical of the political parties of both Right and Left, but less severe with the military men. At heart a democrat he wants French Catholics to rally against Hitler.

LA FRANCE EN GUERRE. By C. J. Gignoux and Others. Paris: Plon, 1940, 315 p. Fr. 24.

The impact of the war on the French people, their economy and their culture described in a book written before the débâcle.

FINANCES DE GUERRE. By Paul Reynaud. Paris: Flammarion, 1940, 228 p. Fr. 18.

This book covers the period from July 29, 1939, to February 29, 1940.

LE ROI DES BELGES, A-T-IL TRAHI? By Robert Goffin. New York: Éditions de la Maison Française, 1940, 291 p. $1.50.

A Belgian lawyer, after reconstructing the events of the Blitzkrieg, decides that if there was treason, it was not by the King but by his Minister, Henry de Man.

L'ECONOMIE ALLEMANDE À L'EPREUVE DE LA GUERRE. By Henry Laufenburger. Paris: Médicis, 1940, 270 p. Fr. 50.

A treatise by a professor of economics at the University of Strasbourg.

FLIGHT FROM POLAND. By Cedric Salter. London: Faber, 1940, 226 p. 7/6.

A journalist's adventures in Poland and the Balkans.

UNDER THE IRON HEEL. By Lars Moën. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941, 350 p. $2.75.

An American scientist, caught in Antwerp by the Blitzkrieg, reports on what he saw and heard in Nazi-occupied Belgium from May to October 1940. His story is important, not only because it is one of the very few to come out of the conquered countries, but because of its unemotional and factual nature. Mr. Moën reports, for instance, that none of the Belgians he talked to really believed Belgium "could be fed without a great deal, and perhaps the lion's share, going to their new masters."

INVASION IN THE SNOW. By John Langdon-Davies. Boston: Houghton, 1941, 202 p. $2.50.

A first-hand account of the Soviet-Finnish War and a critique of its strategy.

The United States

WOODROW WILSON, THE FIFTEENTH POINT. By David Loth. Philadelphia: Lippincott, 1941, 365 p. $3.00.

A sound and readable biography of Wilson, sympathetic but not uncritical. Mr. Loth has read the pertinent literature and documents, including Wilson's private papers, and has woven their substance into a consistent and well-proportioned fabric. He gives particular attention to reconstructing the Paris peace negotiations and the impact upon them of Wilson's character — "the fifteenth point" — on which humanity rested its hopes for a better future.

UNION NOW WITH BRITAIN. By Clarence K. Streit. New York: Harper, 1941, 234 p. $1.75.

Mr. Streit has revised his original proposals for a union among the democracies to

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take account of the present world situation. His federal bloc would now include only the United States and the six states of the British Commonwealth. He assures us that only by such a union *now* can Hitler be stopped.

OUR WAR AND OUR PEACE. By James P. Warburg. New York: Farrar, 1941, 227 p. $1.75.

Forthright and "tough-minded" essays, addresses, etc., by an American financial expert who thinks nothing is to be gained by trying to live in the dream-world of isolationism.

ALL OUT! HOW DEMOCRACY WILL DEFEND AMERICA. By Samuel Grafton. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940, 104 p. $1.00.

The remedy for our ailing democracy is more democracy, says a young American columnist after reviewing the recent experience of France and Britain.

FIVEFOLD AID TO BRITAIN. By Fritz Sternberg. New York: Day, 1941, 76 p. $1.00.

In simple terms, and with the aid of statistics, Dr. Sternberg shows how the United States must drastically increase its aid to Britain if the latter is to win.

AMERICA CAN WIN. By Major Malcolm Wheeler-Nicholson. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 246 p. $1.75.

A hard-hitting, clear-thinking demonstration that if Hitler is to be defeated the United States must enter the war — at once and with all its forces.

UNITED WE STAND! By Hanson W. Baldwin. New York: Whittlesey, 1941, 364 p. $3.00.

A clear, readable and authoritative picture of the problems involved in Hemisphere Defense, of the present state of our military and naval establishments, and of the task still lying ahead. The author, who is the military and naval expert for the *New York Times*, is at his best when treating technical matters, less convincing when he discusses questions of diplomacy, politics and public opinion.

STRATEGY OF THE AMERICAS. By Fleming MacLiesh and Cushman Reynolds. New York: Duell, 1941, 247 p. $2.50.

A brief survey of the problems involved in Hemisphere Defense and an attempt, far from successful, to demonstrate that an invasion of the United States would be difficult if not impossible. Like so many other "experts," the authors either ignore or undervalue the psychological effect on the American will-to-resist of an Axis conquest of Europe, Africa and Asia.

APPROACH TO BATTLE. By Major Leonard H. Nason. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 113 p. $1.50.

A pessimistic picture of the state of American defense.

AMERICA AND TOTAL WAR. By Fletcher Pratt. New York: Smith and Durrell, 1941, 318 p. $3.00.

A journalistic survey of the technique of modern warfare and of the relative unpreparedness of the United States. The author is an American military writer and commentator.

ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY. By Burnham Finney. New York: Whittlesey, 1941, 284 p. $2.50.

A good source of information for the layman about the industrial side of the defense program, by the editor of *The American Machinist*.

INVASION. By Hendrik Willem Van Loon. New York: Harcourt, 1940, 203 p. $2.00.

An imaginative account of a Nazi attack on the United States.

I FIND TREASON. By Richard Rollins. New York: Morrow, 1941, 291 p. $3.00.

Amazing revelations, including documentary evidence, concerning the ramifications of the Nazi movement in this country.

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AMERICA IS WORTH SAVING. By Theodore Dreiser. New York: Modern Age Books, 1941, 292 p. $2.50.

The major part of this book, the first published in ten years by the well-known American novelist, is a garrulous and intemperate attack on England.

REPORT ON AMERICA. By Robert Waithman. London: Muller, 1940, 384 p. 12/6.

This book, by the American correspondent of the London *News Chronicle*, though better than the average British "report" on this country, shows how difficult it is for even a very observing and intelligent foreigner really to know the United States except after years of residence and wide travel.

RECENT AMERICA. By Henry Bamford Parkes. New York: Crowell, 1941, 664 p. $4.50.

A review of four decades of American history, useful to student and layman alike. The author, born in England and educated at Oxford, is now a professor of history at New York University.

MY NATIVE LAND. By Anna Louise Strong. New York: Viking, 1940, 299 p. $2.75.

A coast-to-coast report on the American social scene by a well-known Stalinist writer.

NEW DIRECTIONS IN OUR TRADE POLICY. By William Diebold, Jr. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1941, 174 p. $2.00.

After examining the successes and failures of the Hull program, the author demonstrates its basic incompatibility with wartime needs as proved by the impact of belligerent and neutral trade controls on the principal agreements made under it. The new measures of commercial policy introduced in this country are described, and the possibilities of shaping a unified trade policy consistent with our foreign policy as a whole are discussed in some detail.

AMERICAN BUSINESS IN A CHANGING WORLD. By A. W. Zelomek and Robert C. Shook. New York: Whittlesey, 1941, 264 p. $2.50.

A rather comprehensive survey, intended primarily for the layman, of America's economic position in a chaotic world, by the president and research director of the International Statistical Bureau.

THE OUTPUT OF MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: 1899–1937. By Solomon Fabricant. New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1940, 685 p. $4.50.

A statistical analysis covering a wide variety of American industries. Besides numerous tables there are 24 charts.

THE FEDERAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM. By Daniel T. Selko. Washington: Brookings Institution, 1940, 606 p. $3.50.

A description of such processes as budget-making, revenue administration, treasury management and accounting. This scholarly book is an important contribution to the morphology and physiology of American government.

MY COUNTRY 'TIS OF THEE. By Lucy Sprague Mitchell and Others. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 335 p. $3.50.

A thoughtful, readable survey of what America has done both to waste and to conserve its natural resources.

GOVERNMENT AND AGRICULTURE. By Donald C. Blaisdell. New York: Farrar, 1940, 217 p. $1.50.

The functions and organization of the United States Department of Agriculture comprehensibly described.

FOR GOD AND DEMOCRACY. By James A. Magner. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 158 p. $1.50.

This book by an American Catholic priest and teacher is a useful antidote to the anti-democratic publications disseminated by certain of the forces within the Roman Catholic Church in the United States.

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DIPLOMATICALLY SPEAKING. By Lloyd C. Griscom. Boston: Little, Brown, 1940, 476 p. $3.50.

The entertaining and often enlightening memoirs of an American who enjoyed quite a career as diplomat in various parts of the world before and during the last World War.

THE MINGLING OF THE CANADIAN AND AMERICAN PEOPLES. Volume I. By Marcus Lee Hansen. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, 274 p. $3.00.

An historical treatise on the movement of population between the two countries during the last two centuries.

Western Europe

GOVERNMENTS OF CONTINENTAL EUROPE. Edited by James T. Shotwell. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 1092 p. $4.50.

This text gives the historical background and the present status (as of 1940) of government in the following countries: "France and the Low Countries," by R. K. Gooch; "Germany and Central Europe," by Karl Loewenstein; "Italy and Switzerland," by Arnold J. Zurcher; "Soviet Russia," by Michael T. Florinsky; and "The Scandinavian Countries," by Nils Herlitz and John H. Wuorinen.

THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND. By David Thomson. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 136 p. $1.25.

Essays interpreting 250 years of history.

D'UNE GUERRE À L'AUTRE. Volume I. By Bertrand de Jouvenel. Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1940, 416 p. Fr. 40.

A decade of European history interpreted by a French writer identified with the Right.

EUROPE IN CHAINS. By Paul Einzig. New York: Penguin, 1940, 127 p. 25 cents.

A factual survey of the manner in which the Nazis are exploiting the conquered lands and degrading the standard of living of their inhabitants.

BRIAND. Volume IV. By Georges Suarez. Paris: Plon, 1940, 480 p. Fr. 52.

Another volume in a series already described. This one covers the years 1916–1918.

HISTOIRE DIPLOMATIQUE DE LA FRANCE PENDANT LA GRANDE GUERRE. Volume III. By Albert Pingaud. Paris: Alsatia, 1940, Fr. 65.

The author of this competent work was formerly director of the archives at the French Foreign Office.

HE MIGHT HAVE SAVED FRANCE. By Marguerite Joseph-Maginot. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 310 p. $3.00.

A biography of André Maginot by his sister. Only the last two chapters refer to his postwar political and administrative career, when he devoted himself to a vain effort to make France "secure."

NOUS AUTRES FRANÇAIS. By Georges Bernanos. Paris: Nouvelle Revue Française, 1939, 290 p. Fr. 20.

The author of this polemical volume will be remembered for his attack on Franco Spain — "Les Grands Cimetières sous la Lune." In the present book he pleads, from his new home in Brazil, for a Christian Monarchy in France.

"ALL GAUL IS DIVIDED. . . ." New York: Greystone, 1941, 94 p. $1.00.

Sixteen poignant letters from a family in occupied France. The foreword was written by Elizabeth Morrow.

A HISTORY OF FRENCH COMMERCIAL POLICIES. By Frank Arnold Haight. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 285 p. $2.50.

An historical summary devoted largely to the period since 1914.

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ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

AMBASSADOR DODD'S DIARY. Edited by William E. Dodd, Jr., and Martha Dodd. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 464 p. $3.50.

As a professional historian, Mr. Dodd was well-equipped to place the Nazi movement in its proper perspective and to understand its implications ahead of some of his flashier colleagues and more superficial contemporaries. Unlike Sir Nevile Henderson, to mention only one, Mr. Dodd went to Germany (in the summer of 1933) already disliking the Nazi régime. He may not have been a great success as an Ambassador according to the conventional standards of the career service; but there can be no complaint that he failed in his reports home to portray the true character of the government to which he was accredited and of the men who ran it.

GUILLAUME II. By Maurice Muret. Paris: Fayard, 1940, 400 p. Fr. 25.

A serious-minded biography of the former Kaiser by a member of the *Institut*.

GERMANY: JEKYLL AND HYDE. By Sebastian Haffner. New York: Dutton, 1941, 318 p. $2.50.

A socio-psychological analysis of the German people under Hitler. The author, a German lawyer, escaped from Germany after working there for six years under Nazi rule.

THE DARK INVADER. By Captain von Rintelen. New York: Penguin, 1940, 214 p. 25 cents.

The amazing reminiscences of a German Naval Intelligence Officer who engaged widely in espionage and sabotage during the last war.

THE CANKER OF GERMANY. By Ernst G. Preuss. London: Williams and Norgate, 1940, 302 p. 7/6.

An analysis of German politics and postwar history by an industrialist who is the son of Hugo Preuss, the lawyer largely responsible for drafting the Weimar Constitution.

RIDDLE OF THE REICH. By Wythe Williams and Albert Parry. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1941, 351 p. $2.75.

A picture of what is going on in Germany, deduced not only from published sources but from secret information smuggled out of the country by anti-Nazis.

I LOVED GERMANY. By Evelyn Wrench. London: Michael Joseph, 1940, 287 p. 12/6.

The progressive disillusionment of a humanitarian and optimist, who hopes that after the war Germany will again become her true self.

GÖRING. By Kurt Singer. London: Hutchinson, 1940, 283 p. 8/6.

An undress biography of "Germany's most dangerous man."

GESTAPO: L'ORGANISATION. By Pierre Dehillotte. Paris: Payot, 1940, 213 p. Fr. 20.

A sound and factual description of how it works at home and abroad. Between 1932 and 1938 the author served as correspondent of the *Journal des Débats* in Berlin, Vienna and Prague.

EXCHANGE CONTROL IN CENTRAL EUROPE. By Howard S. Ellis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941, 413 p. $4.00.

A technical study covering the last decade in Germany, Austria and Hungary.

AFTER HITLER. By Axel Heyst. London: Minerva, 1940, 228 p. 6/.

Rambling chapters showing an eclectic rather than an original mind.

LE "FRECCIE NERE" NELLA GUERRA DI SPAGNA (1937–1939). By Sandro Piazzoni. Rome: Edizioni "Nazione Militare," 1939, 254 p.

An Italian general records the feats of one of the "legionary" divisions that fought in Spain on behalf of Fascist "non-intervention."

MY SHADOW IN THE SUN. By Frances Davis. New York: Carrick and Evans (Lippincott), 1940, 318 p. $2.75.

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Against a background of the Spanish Civil War a young American newspaperwoman writes a moving chronicle that may take its place as one of the more important journalistic "Personal Histories" of our day.

FRANCO BEFREIT SPANIEN. By Dagobert von Mikusch. Leipzig: List, 1939, 301 p. M. 6.50.

Spain's recent history interpreted for Nazi consumption.

LO QUE VI EN ESPAÑA. By Blanca Lydia Trejo. Mexico City: Polis, 1940, 142 p.

Personal reminiscences of the Civil War.

Eastern Europe

WORKERS BEFORE AND AFTER LENIN. By Manya Gordon. New York: Dutton, 1941, 524 p. $4.00.

In a day when good books on Russia are becoming increasingly rare it is a pleasure to welcome this sound piece of diligent research and objective interpretation. Making full use of Soviet statistics, the author shows how in the field of wages, living standards, social services and education the actual standards at present are not only far below official Soviet claims but inferior to those that prevailed under the Tsars.

BIOGRAFIYA V. I. LENINA. By E. Yaroslavsky. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 214 p. 60 cents.

A biography of Lenin by an authoritative Party historian.

STALINE ET LA GUERRE. By Nicolas Bassèches. Paris: Payot, 1940, 248 p. Fr. 32.

An important book on the objectives of Soviet policy, by an Austrian journalist many years resident in Moscow as representative of the *Neue Freie Presse*, the *Manchester Guardian* and several Swiss and American papers. In 1937 he was expelled from Russia for publishing two articles predicting the Nazi-Soviet Pact.

BOLSHEVIKI V GODY IMPERIALISTICHESKOI VOINY 1914–FEVRAL 1917. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 220 p. 50 cents.

Documents illustrating the activity of local Bolshevist organizations in Russia from the outbreak of the war in 1914 to the revolution of March 1917.

FORTY YEARS WITH RUSSIANS. By Ethan T. Colton. New York: Association Press, 1940, 192 p. $2.00.

An account of Y. M. C. A. work in Russia since 1900.

THE UKRAINE. By W. E. D. Allen. New York: Cambridge University Press (Macmillan), 1940, 404 p. $4.50.

A scholarly treatise going from Slavic origins to the present day.

TADZHIKISTAN. By V. M. Bardier. Edited by G. N. Cherdantsev. Tashkent: Izdatelstvo Tadzhikistana, 1940, 102 p. 50 cents.

The development of Taikistan, especially under Soviet rule.

FINLAND FOREVER. By Hudson Strode. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 443 p. $3.50.

An admirer of the courage and culture of the Finnish people writes glowingly of them and their country.

LA FINLANDE EN GUERRE. By Jean-Louis Perret. Paris: Payot, 1940, 224 p. Fr. 24.

A review of the last quarter century of Finnish history by a Swiss professor at the University of Helsinki.

LA BALTIQUE. By Louis Tissot. Paris: Payot, 1940, 272 p. Fr. 36.

A former professor in Memel describes the economic and strategic situation of the Baltic countries.

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GERMANY'S "DEATH SPACE." By Francis Aldor. London: Aldor, 1940, 261 p. 5/.
Supposedly authoritative reports on Germany's behavior in conquered Poland.

PILSUDSKI. By Alexandra Pilsudska. New York: Dodd, 1941, 352 p. $3.00.
An intimate biography of the late Marshal by his wife.

WHITHER EUROPE? By Arnold Lunn. New York: Sheed, 1940, 270 p. $3.00.
Impressions gained on a trip through southern and southeastern Europe early last year.

KING CAROL OF ROMANIA. By Baroness Helena von der Hoven. London: Hutchinson, 1940, 288 p. 16/.
Described as an "official biography," this somewhat sentimental book is better on personal than on political matters.

THIS IS GREECE. New York: Hastings House, 1941, 127 p. $2.50.
Photographs of Greece and its people.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

BLOOD, SWEAT AND TEARS. By Winston S. Churchill. New York: Putnam, 1941, 462 p. $3.00.
Speeches delivered between May 1938 and February 1941.

LABOR'S AIMS IN WAR AND PEACE. By C. R. Attlee and Others. New York: Rand School Press, 1940, 153 p. $1.75.
Statements by eight of the Labor Party's leading political and intellectual lights.

WAR COMES TO BRITAIN. London: Gollancz, 1940, 256 p. 9/.
The speeches of Major Attlee, Leader of the Opposition from 1933 to 1939, edited by John Dugdale.

ALLENBY: A STUDY IN GREATNESS. By General Sir Archibald Wavell. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 312 p. $3.00.
The military career of Allenby in South Africa, France and the Near East, recited *con amore* by the present commander of the British forces in the Near East.

GREAT BRITAIN UNDER PROTECTION. By Frederic Benham. New York: Macmillan, 1941, 271 p. $2.50.
A history of how the British Government controlled the country's foreign trade from 1932 to 1939.

THE IRISH FREE STATE AND ITS SENATE. By Donal O'Sullivan. London: Faber, 1940, 697 p. 25/.
Recent Irish history and constitutional development interpreted, on the whole objectively, by the Secretary of the Senate.

CANADA IN WORLD AFFAIRS. By F. H. Soward and Others. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 343 p. $3.25.
This is the first of a new series in which it is planned to publish a volume every two years. The present work deals with the political, economic and diplomatic problems of Canada during the last years before the present war.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES. By F. R. Scott. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1941, 77 p. 50 cents.
A concise, comprehensive and readable bird's-eye view of American-Canadian relations in the present crisis by a professor of law at McGill University.

THE MILITARY PROBLEMS OF CANADA. By C. P. Stacey. Toronto: Ryerson, 1940, 184 p. $2.50.
A history of Canadian defense policy, with a concluding chapter on the Dominion's present war effort. The author is assistant professor of history at Princeton University.

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CANADA GETS THE NEWS. By Carleton McNaught. Toronto: Ryerson, 1940, 271 p. $3.50.

An examination of the way foreign news is handled by the Canadian press and radio, prepared under the auspices of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs.

THE WORKING CONSTITUTION IN INDIA. By S. M. Bose. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 689 p. $1.00.

An expert and detailed commentary on the Government of India Act of 1935, the text of which is given. The author is one of India's leading lawyers.

THE NEW BURMA. By W. J. Grant. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 159 p. $2.00.

An informative book on life in Burma, but with no reference to events taking place in the rest of the world.

The Near East

DER NAHE OSTEN RÜCKT NÄHER. By Werner-Otto von Hentig. Leipzig: List, 1940, 117 p. M. 1.80.

How the Near and Middle East are fast becoming Europeanized, as explained by one of Hitler's principal agents in that part of the world.

TURKEY. By Emil Lengyel. New York: Random House, 1941, 474 p. $3.75.

The country, the people and their history entertainingly described by the author of "The Danube."

ES WETTERLEUCHTET ZWISCHEN NIL UND TIGRIS. By Reinhard Hüber. Berlin: Drei-Säulen-Verlag, 1940, 378 p. M. 9.60.

A survey of the conflict between local nationalism and European imperialism in the Arab countries.

THE JEWISH WAR FRONT. By V. Jabotinsky. London: Allen and Unwin, 1940, 255 p. 7/6.

The late leader of Revisionist Zionism declares that only the creation of a Jewish State in Palestine and the mass emigration of the Jews to it from Central Europe can solve the Jewish problem. He also calls for the creation of a Jewish Army to serve on the Allied fronts.

THE HISTORY OF AFGHANISTAN. By Sir Percy Sykes. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 2 v. $10.00.

Sir Percy Sykes first visited Central Asia some fifty years ago. Since then he has devoted constant study to that remote but strategically important part of the world, where from time to time he has held official appointments. The result is the first adequate treatise we have of the whole sweep of the history of Afghanistan from prehistoric times down to the present. There are several appendices, a bibliography, a detailed index and a large map in colors of Iran and Afghanistan folded in on the cover of volume two.

Africa

NORTH OF SAHARA. By Mattie Johns Utting. Boston: Christopher, 1940, 133 p. $1.50.

Meanderings in the Madeiras and North Africa.

L'AFRIQUE BLANCHE. By E. F. Gautier. Paris: Fayard, 1939, 353 p. Fr. 35.

A readable survey of the geography and ethnography of North and Northeast Africa.

BEHIND GOD'S BACK. By Negley Farson. New York: Harcourt, 1941, 555 p. $3.50.

In this highly informative book the author of "The Way of a Transgressor" records his experiences and impressions gained on a trip through several parts of Africa which

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he made shortly before the present war. Starting in Southwest Africa, Mr. Farson visited the Union of South Africa, Tanganyika, Kenya, Uganda, the Belgian Congo, French Equatorial Africa, the Cameroons and the Gold Coast. His book does not pretend to be a systematic treatise on those places; but in spite of its episodic and personal character it manages to tell a great deal about the political and economic problems of sub-Saharan Africa.

FOCUS ON AFRICA. By Richard Upjohn Light. New York: American Geographical Society, 1941, 228 p. $5.00.

Though the author of this fascinating book belongs to the medical profession, he has demonstrated himself to be a geographer of no mean proportions. With his wife as co-pilot and photographer, he flew his own plane from Capetown to the Mediterranean via East Africa, making numerous detours and stopovers on the way. His text is more than a news chronicle, for it makes a serious attempt to interpret the everchanging landscape in relation not only to natural but to human factors. The book is enriched by over 300 photographs, mostly air views, and a number of maps. These will prove useful aids to those who read Negley Farson's book, mentioned above.

MY VANISHED AFRICA. By Peter Rainier. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1940, 307 p. $2.75.

The autobiographical record of an adventurous career in South Africa during and after the First World War.

DAS PORTUGIESISCHE KOLONIALREICH. By Ernst Gerhard Jacob. Leipzig: Goldmann, 1940, 142 p. M. 2.85.

A history emphasizing the recent revival of colonial activities under the Salazar government.

DAS RASSENRECHT IN SÜDWESTAFRIKA. By H. Krieger. Berlin: Junker und Dünnhaupt, 1940, 137 p. M. 6.80.

A comparison of native legislation under German rule and under the South African mandate. The author concludes that *when* the colony returns to Germany a policy of strict racial superiority for the whites must be pursued.

The Far East

THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN'S NEW ORDER. By William C. Johnstone. New York: Oxford University Press, 1941, 392 p. $3.00.

This painstaking survey investigates the effects of the Sino-Japanese War on American rights and interests in China and on our general Far Eastern policy. The book is published under the auspices of the Institute of Pacific Relations.

1940–41 WHO'S WHO IN JAPAN WITH MANCHOUKUO AND CHINA. Edited by Tsunesaburo Kamesaka. South Pasadena: Perkins, 1940, 867 p. $7.00.

Some 4,000 short biographies of Japanese and Chinese, as well as of numerous Europeans and Americans resident in the Japanese Empire.

JAPAN UNMASKED. By Hallett Abend. New York: Ives Washburn, 1941, 322 p. $3.00.

On his return from Shanghai, where for eleven years he had covered China and the Far East for the *New York Times*, Mr. Abend visited Hong Kong, Thailand, the Malay States, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines — on each of which he gives us his impressions. His concluding chapters deal with various aspects of the Sino-Japanese War.

THE BATTLE FOR ASIA. By Edgar Snow. New York: Random House, 1941, 431 p. $3.75.

A continuation of the author's "Red Star Over China" carrying the story of his

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reportorial wanderings in the Far East down to 1940. As in his previous book, Mr. Snow devotes much of his space and sympathies to the Chinese Communists.

CHUNG-KUO CHIN PO-NIEN SHIH CHIAO-CHENG. By Chien-fu Chang. Kweilin: Cultural Service, 1940, 349 p. $1.80.

A history of China during the last century.

CHINA SHALL RISE AGAIN. By Madame Chiang Kai-shek. New York: Harper, 1941, 356 p. $3.00.

The wife of the Generalissimo describes China's war effort in many of its diverse aspects. She does not hesitate to subject the "democratic Powers" and the Chinese themselves to searching criticism.

IN CHINA NOW. By Winifred Galbraith. New York: Morrow, 1941, 285 p. $2.50.

A collection of very human sketches of life in unoccupied China.

INTO CHINA. By Eileen Bigland. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 298 p. $3.00.

The vivid and highly personal narrative of a trip to Chungking via the Burma Road.

MONGOL JOURNEYS. By Owen Lattimore. New York: Doubleday, 1941, 324 p. $4.00.

An account of wide travels in the country of the Mongols by one of the outstanding authorities on China.

A FRENCH VIEW OF THE NETHERLANDS INDIES. By G. H. Bousquet. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 133 p. $1.50.

A study in comparative colonial policy.

ORPHANS OF THE PACIFIC. By Florence Horn. New York: Reynal, 1941, 316 p. $3.50.

A readable report on the present state of Philippine politics, economics, public opinion, social and other problems, by a member of the staff of *Fortune* magazine.

LABOR PROBLEMS IN THE PACIFIC MANDATES. By John Alvin Decker. New York: Oxford University Press, 1940, 246 p. $2.75.

Deals almost entirely with British and Dominion mandates.

Latin America

HANDS OFF. By Dexter Perkins. Boston: Little, Brown, 1941, 455 p. $3.50.

Professor Perkins is the recognized authority on the history of the Monroe Doctrine, and in this book he has distilled the essence of a lifetime of scholarship. Though obviously intended primarily to give the general reader a comprehensive and comprehensible picture of the origins and growth of the Doctrine, it is equipped with some of the apparatus of the historian's trade in the form of notes and a bibliography.

A NEW DOCTRINE FOR THE AMERICAS. By Charles Wertenbaker. New York: Viking, 1941, 211 p. $2.00.

A somewhat breezy survey of the Good Neighbor Policy in action and an appraisal of its chances to survive in the future, by the foreign news editor of *Time*.

AXIS AMERICA. By Robert Strausz-Hupé. New York: Putnam, 1941, 274 p. $2.50.

By quoting copiously from Nazi pronouncements and doctrinal treatises, the author reveals the pattern of the Nazi attack upon America and its ultimate objectives. This is required reading for those who think Hitler has no designs on this hemisphere.

NUESTRA AMERICA Y LA GUERRA. By Manuel Seoane. Santiago: Ercilla, 1940, 210 p. Pesos 15.

A discussion of the part which Latin America can and should play in the present world crisis. The author, an *Aprista* exiled from his native Peru, though anti-imperialist, is prepared on certain conditions to ally with the United States.

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WAR AND THE AMERICAS. Edited by J. V. Garland. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1941, 564 p. $2.00.

Many pertinent articles and speeches condensed and arranged for ready reference.

WESTERN HEMISPHERE DEFENSE. Compiled by Egbert Ray Nichols. New York: H. W. Wilson, 1941, 398 p. $1.25.

Another work along similar lines.

INTERAMERICAN STATISTICAL YEARBOOK 1940. Edited by Raul C. Migone. New York: Macmillan, 1940, 612 p. $6.00.

This valuable addition to the shelf of statistical annals is published under the auspices of the Argentine Commission of the International Studies Conference. The data in it cover population, production, industry, commerce, social questions, transport and communications, banking and currency, public finance, education, military and naval affairs, health, and international coöperation. The information is given in Spanish, English, Portuguese and French.

LA GRAN CRISIS. By J. L. Abalo. Havana: Cultural, 1940, 287 p.

A comprehensive analysis of the world's ideological, economic and political disorganization and a proposal for Pan American confederation.

CENTRAL AMERICA. By Charles Morrow Wilson. New York: Holt, 1941, 293 p. $3.00.

A man who has written widely on agricultural problems surveys the resources and economic potentialities of the Central American Republics, as well as of Colombia, Cuba and Jamaica. He is enthusiastic about these countries and their suitability as reservoirs of foodstuffs and raw materials for the United States and as prospective markets for our manufactured goods.

REPORTAGE ON MEXICO. By Virginia Prewett. New York: Dutton, 1941, 322 p. $3.00.

Mexico's recent history and current politics realistically summarized by an enterprising young American newspaperwoman.

EL DESTINO DE MÉXICO. By Isaac Guzmán Valdivia. Mexico City: Botas, 1939, 200 p.

Essays with a Leftist slant.

LA INDUSTRIA AZUCARERA DE CUBA. By Ramiro Guerra y Sánchez. Havana: Cultural, 1940, 301 p.

A factual description of the history, organization and present state of Cuba's principal industry.

LA COMISIÓN NACIONALISTA EN WASHINGTON (1920–1921). By Fabio Fiallo. Ciudad Trujillo: La Opinión, 1939, 118 p.

The tenor of this book can be surmised from the fact that it is taken from a larger, and as yet unpublished, work entitled "El Crimen de Wilson en Santo Domingo."

VENEZUELA'S PLACE IN THE SUN. By Nicholas Roosevelt. New York: Round Table, 1940, 87 p. $1.00.

A brief handbook emphasizing the country's economic progress.

QUIÉN ES QUIÉN EN LA ARGENTINA. Buenos Aires: Kraft, 1941, 685 p. Pesos 5.75.

Short biographical sketches of some two thousand prominent Argentines.

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SOURCE MATERIAL

By Ruth Savord

I. DOCUMENTS

Documents may be procured from the following: *United States:* Gov't Printing Office, Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D. C. *Great Britain:* British Library of Information, 620 Fifth Avenue, New York, *League of Nations, Perm. Court of Int. Justice, Int. Institute of Intellectual Coöperation:* Columbia University Press, Int. Documents Service, 2960 Broadway, New York. *Int. Labor Office:* 734 Jackson Pl., Washington, D. C. Washington imprints are Government Printing Office and London imprints are His Majesty's Stationery Office, unless otherwise noted.

Commerce

EUROPE'S trade; a study of the trade of European countries with each other and with the rest of the world. Economic Intelligence Service, League of Nations, Geneva, 1941. 116 p. (1941.II.A.1.)

Germany

VERWALTUNGSBERICHT der Deutschen Reichsbank für das Jahr 1940. Berlin, 1941. 47 p.

Hemisphere Defense

AGREEMENT between the Governments of the United Kingdom and the United States of America relating to the bases leased to the United States of America (and exchange of notes) together with protocol between the Governments of the United Kingdom, Canada and the United States of America concerning the defense of Newfoundland, London, March 27, 1941. London, 1941. 43 p. (Treaty Series No. 2 (1941). Cmd. 6259.) 9d.

JOINT resolution affirming and approving nonrecognition of the transfer of any geographic region in this hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power, and providing for consultation with other American republics in the event that such transfer should appear likely. Approved April 10, 1941. Washington, 1941. 1 p. (Public law 32, 77th Cong. — S. J. Res. 7.)

Labor

THE LABOUR situation in Great Britain; a survey: May–October 1940. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1941. 56 p. (Studies and reports; series B (Economic conditions), No. 34.)

A REPORT to the governments, employers and workers of member states of the International Labour Organisation, by John G. Winant. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1941. 16 p.

SECOND labour conference of the American states which are members of the International Labour Organisation. Havana (Cuba), 21 November–2 December, 1939. Record of proceedings. Montreal, International Labour Office, 1941. 248 p.

Latin America

COMERCIO exterior do Brasil; intercâmbio por países, 1937–1939. Rio de Janeiro, Ministério das Relações Exteriores, 1940. 168 p. First of an annual series.

BANCO central de Chile. Décimaquinta memoria anual . . . año 1940. Santiago de Chile, 1941. 109 p.

COMERCIO exterior; año natural de 1939. Havana, Dirección General de Estadística, 1940. 191 p.

ESTUDIO estadístico de algunos aspectos del comercio exterior de la República Dominicana, 1920–1939. Ciudad Trujillo, 1941. 125 p. (Dirección General de Estadística Nacional. Monografías estadísticas, Num. 1.)

ANNUAL book on statistics, fiscal year 1939–40. [San Juan], Department of Agriculture and Commerce, [1941]. 222 p.

Mexico

MEXICO'S oil; a compilation of official documents in the conflict of economic order in the petroleum industry, with an introduction summarizing its causes and consequences. Mexico City, Government of Mexico, 1940. 881 p.

Raw Materials

CRUDE rubber. Washington, U. S. Tariff Commission, 1940. 39 p. Mimeographed. Free.

Rumania

BRÊVIAIRE statistique de la Roumanie, 1940. Bucharest, Institut Central de Statistique, 1940. 256 p.

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Second World War

THE GERMAN fifth column in Poland. London, Pub. for the Polish Ministry of Information by Hutchinson & Co., 1941. 157 p.

Shipping

IMPACT of the present war on ocean shipping, with special reference to the effects of war shipping conditions on United States agriculture, by Hobart S. Perry. Washington, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1940. 123 p. Mimeographed. Free.

Soviet Union

VNEOCHEREDNAYA pyataya sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 31 Okt.–2 Noyab. 1939 g.: stenograficheskiy otchet. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1940, 101 p. 25 cents.

SHESTAYA sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 29 Marta–4 Aprelya 1940 g.: stenograficheskiy otchet. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR, 1940, 543 p. $1.25.

TRETYAYA sessiya Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR. 28 Maya–2 Iyunya 1940 g.: stenograficheskiy otchet. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR, 1940, 615 p. $1.50.

VSESOYUZNAYA Kommunisticheskaya Partiya (Bolshevikov) v rezoliutsiyakh i resheniyakh s'ezdov, konferentsii I plenumov TsK., 1898–1939. Moscow: Izdatelstvo Politicheskoy Literatury, 1940, 2v. $1.50 each.

Thailand

HOW Thailand lost her territories to France. Bangkok, Dept. of Publicity, 1940. 74 p.

EXCHANGES of notes between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Thailand regarding the boundary between Burma and Thailand, Bangkok, October 1, 1940, and December 10, 1940. London, 1941. 8 p. (Treaty Series No. 3 (1941), Cmd. 6262.)

United States

AN ACT to increase the debt limit of the United States, to provide for the Federal taxation of future issues of obligations of the United States and its instrumentalities, and for other purposes. Approved Feb. 19, 1941. Washington, 1941. 3 p. (Public law 7, 77th Cong. — H. R. 2959.)

FARMERS in a changing world. Washington, 1940. 1215 p. (U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Yearbook, 1940.)

FOREIGN accounts in federal reserve banks and insured banks. Approved April 7, 1941. Washington, 1941. 2 p. (Public law 31, 77th Cong. — S. 390.)

THE FLAG of the United States; its use in commerce, by James L. Brown. Washington, 1941. 51 p. (U. S. Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce. Trade Promotion Series No. 218.)

INVESTIGATION of concentration of economic power. Final report and recommendations of the Temporary national economic committee . . . March 31, 1941. Washington, 1941. 783 p. (Senate Doc. No. 35, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.)

REPORT of the President of the Commodity credit corporation, 1940. Washington, 1941, 22 p.

SAVING, investment, and national income, by Oscar L. Altman. Washington, 1941. 135 p. (T. N. E. C. monograph, No. 37.) 20¢.

United States — Defense

FOURTH supplemental national defense appropriation bill for 1941. Hearings before the subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 77th Cong., 1st Sess., on [H. R. 3617. February 12–18, 1941.] Washington, 1941. 383 p.

FOURTH supplemental national defense appropriation act, 1941. [Approved March 17, 1941.] Washington, 1941. 10 p. (Public law 13, 77th Cong. — H. R. 3617.)

FIFTH supplemental national defense appropriation act, 1941. [Approved April 5, 1941.] Washington, 1941. 9 p. (Public law 29, 77th Cong. — H. R. 4124.)

LABOR speeds defense; report on progress. Labor division, National defense advisory commission. Washington, 1941. 40 p.

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

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

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